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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review by this cross-appeal: 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding on remand that Plaintiffs were prejudiced by 
Doms* delay in seeking rescission? 
2. Did the trial court err by refusing to award attorney's fees and appropriate costs 
to Doms? 
3. Did the trial court err in its award of attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiffs? 
Standards of Appellate Review: The first issue presents a question of law which 
should be reviewed for legal correctness without deference to the trial court's rulings. City 
of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co., 796 P.2d 697 (Utah 1990). 
Issues 2 and 3, regarding awards of attorney's fees and costs, present initial questions 
of law as to which parties are entitled to attorney's fees and costs. The overall standard of 
review in regard to any awards of attorney's fees and costs is an abuse of discretion 
standard. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or rules determinative of or 
pertinent to the issues presented for review is contained in the body of this brief or in the 
addendum. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is the second time this case has been before the Utah Court of Appeals. On 
November 4, 1994, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision resolving many of the prior 
issues on appeal. Anderson v. Poms, No. 920653CA, (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1994) 
(Memorandum Decision) (a copy of this opinion is attached as Addendum 1). In this short 
and succinct opinion, the Court concluded that the trial court had correctly permitted Doms 
to proceed with his counterclaim for rescission, but had erred in its application of the 
doctrine of laches in determining that rescission was inappropriate. That is, the trial court 
had entered findings of fact regarding the first prong of laches—delay in bringing an action— 
but had failed to make any findings regarding the second prong-prejudice. 
Accordingly, this Court remanded this matter to the trial court on very narrow and 
specific grounds: to "enter[] findings of fact relevant to whether appellants were prejudiced 
by any delays in Doms pursuing his counterclaim." IcL at 2-3. This Court concluded, "If the 
trial court cannot find from the evidence presented that appellants were prejudiced by the 
delay, the equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the remedy of rescission." Id. at 3 
(emphasis added). 
On remand, the trial court expressed vehement disapproval of this Court's decision, 
and stated at several junctures that it had no intention of permitting rescission in this case. 
(A copy of the transcript of the October 27, 1995, hearing is attached as Addendum 4). 
Not surprisingly, the court then adopted very conclusoiy findings of fact and conclusions of 
law determining that there were other legal grounds precluding rescission and that prejudice 
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existed. (The trial court's two sets of Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law are attached as Addendum 2 and Addendum 3). 
The foregoing is the most pertinent procedural history regarding this case. In order 
to provide a context within which to understand both this Court's decision and the trial 
court's conduct on remand, a more detailed statement of the case follows. 
In March of 1982, Defendant/Appellee and Cross-Appellant Eugene E. Doms 
("Dams") and Michael R. McCoy ("McCoy") purchased the subject property of this appeal 
("Rossi Hills") from Plaintiffe for $276,750.00 (F. of F. 17; Ex. 69D).1 A copy of the 
warranty deed is attached as Addendum 7. Rossi Hills is located in the Park City Survey, 
Summit County, State of Utah (F. of F. 1; Ex. IP). 
Doms and McCoy purchased Rossi Hills as part of a residential development to be 
built in conjunction with two other adjacent parcels (F. of F. 26, 35). Doms and McCoy 
eventually became adversaries in 1983, and McCoy had nothing further to do with the 
development of Rossi Hills or this lawsuit (R. 7185-91, 7517-20; Ex. 78D). From a 
subsequent land survey and diligent legal investigation, Doms learned in December of 1984 
that a road (the "loop road") and other physical encroachments were located on the property 
and constituted prescriptive easements and encumbrances (R. 7498-7500, 7611, 7625). 
1
 Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this brief to Findings of Fact (F. of F.)> 
Conclusions of Law (C. of L.), and Judgment (Judg.) are to the trial court's final Second 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 6874-99; Add. 5) and Second 
Amended Judgment (R. 6900-07; Add. 6). All references to exhibits are to trial exhibits 
admitted into evidence at trial on April 17-19,1990, and August 21-24,1990. All references 
to attorney's fees exhibits are to exhibits admitted into evidence at the hearing held on 
attorney's fees on December 31, 1991. 
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In January of 1985, Doms informed Plaintiffe he was entitled to rescission of the 
transaction and the return of all money received by Plaintiffe (R. 7504-07). Doms even 
offered to deed Rossi Hills back to Plaintiffe in exchange for cancellation of the trust deed 
note, thus allowing Plaintiffe to keep aD money already received under the contract (F. of 
F. 44; R. 7507-08). 
Plaintiffe responded by filing their Complaint to foreclose on June 6, 1985 (F. of F. 
45; R. 1-9). Plaintiffe eventually obtained a default judgment against Doms and McCoy in 
January of 1988 (R. 34-40). The default judgment against Doms was subsequently set aside 
(R. 76-78,126-27), but not as against McCoy. Doms filed an Answer and Counterclaim, an 
Amended Counterclaim, and eventually a Second Amended Counterclaim (R. 41-44,102-05, 
237-42). 
Following three days of trial on April 17-19, 1990, the trial court issued a Memoran-
dum Decision denying rescission based upon the doctrine of laches (R. 4188-95). Following 
four days of trial on August 21-24, 1990, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision 
ruling that Doms suffered $83,000.00 in damages as a result of the encumbrances on the 
property (R. 4348-54). Subsequently, a hearing was held on December 31, 1991, in regard 
to awards of attorney's fees and costs (R. 6360-6540). 
Following extensive objections, motions and argument by the parties over the 
appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, the trial court entered its final 
Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 6874-99) and Second 
Amended Judgment (R. 6900-07) on June 23,1992. After this matter was remanded to the 
trial court for additional findings on November 4,1996, the trial court entered Supplemental 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 4,1996, and on September 8,1997. (Add. 
1 and Add. 2). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March of 1982, Doms and McCoy purchased Rossi Hills for $276,750.00 (F. of F. 
17; Ex. 69D). D.C. Anderson (who subsequently died in September of 1983) and his wife, 
Ellen Anderson; and Dan Scott and his wife, Jeanne Scott; all executed the warranty deed 
as grantors and transferred Rossi Hills to Doms and McCoy as tenants in common (F. of 
F. 1, 4; Ex. IP; Add. 7). This deed of conveyance was a warranty deed under Utah law and 
conveyed with it all of the statutory warranties and covenants pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12 
(F. of F. 1-6; C. of L. 1). 
Pursuant to an earnest money agreement dated November 12, 1981 (Ex. 63D; Add. 
8), D.C. Anderson and Dan Scott received $10,000.00 as earnest money and another 
$72,500.00 as the down payment, leaving a balance due of $194,250.00 after closing of the 
sale (F. of F. 18; Exs. 4P, 69D). Doms and McCoy executed a trust deed and trust deed 
note in the amount of $194,250.00, which called for monthly interest payments of $2,266.25 
up to and including January 10,1985 (F. of F. 19, 20; Exs. 2P, 3P; Add. 9,10). All of these 
monthly interest payments were received by Plaintiffs, in the total amount of $72,520.25 (F. 
of F. 22; Ex. 6P; Add. 11). The entire unpaid balance of $194,250.00, together with interest, 
was due on January 25, 1985 (F. of F. 19; Ex. 3P). 
Rossi Hills was purchased by Doms and McCoy as part of a residential development 
to be built in conjunction with two other adjacent parcels known as the "Slipper Parcel" and 
"Block 62" (F. of F. 26, 35). Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the Slipper Parcel 
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in October of 1982 to further the integrated residential development potential of the three 
parcels, and strengthen their position with the developers of Block 62 and the other interest-
holders of the Slipper Parcel (F. of F. 36, 37). Prior to Doms' purchase of Rossi Hills and 
the interest in the Slipper Parcel, Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the 
development of the three parcels prepared by an architect by the name of Richard Kohler 
(F. of F. 39; Ex. 68D). Doms relied upon this architectural plan for the residential 
development of the three parcels (R. 7430). Prior to purchasing Rossi Hills in March of 
1982, Doms met with D.C. Anderson and Anderson's real estate agent, Michael Sloan, in 
the fall of 1981 (F. of F. 33, 34). Both Sloan and Anderson represented to Doms that Rossi 
Hills was a "prime piece" of development property and its "highest and best use" would be 
as part of the integrated residential development with Block 62 and the Slipper Parcel (F. 
of F. 35). 
In October of 1982, Doms retained attorney Gerald H. Kinghorn for the purpose of 
closing a deal with regard to Doms' purchase of an interest in the Slipper Parcel, and 
continuing negotiations with the owners of Block 62 for purposes of creating the three-
parcel development based upon representations of Sloan and the architect, Kohler (F. of F. 
38). Kinghorn subsequently met several times with the owners of Block 62 between 
October of 1982 and the summer of 1983 in an effort to negotiate a joint venture agreement 
which would be acceptable to all of the parties (R. 7421, 7479-80; Exs. 81P, 82P). 
In anticipation of the three-parcel development, Doms and McCoy conveyed Rossi 
Hills by warranty deed to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. ("Domcoy") on August 20, 1983 (R. 
7182-84; Ex. 16P; Add. 12). Domcoy was a closely held Utah corporation formed in 
$ 
October of 1981 for the general purpose of acquiring, developing and selling real property 
(R. 7179-81; Ex. 3IP). The two corporate officers of Domcoy were McCoy as president and 
Doms as secretary/treasurer; and the directors were Doms and his wife, and McCoy and his 
wife (Exs. 31P, 32P). Doms and McCoy had problems over a number of issues and 
eventually became adversaries in 1983 (R. 7185-86). McCoy tendered his voting rights for 
all of his shares of stock in Domcoy to Doms in 1985. (Add. 13). 
Negotiations for the joint venture agreement broke down in the summer of 1983 as 
a result of the position taken by the owners of Block 62, who informed Kinghorn that the 
percentage of profit to be received by Doms would be much smaller than anticipated due 
to the fact that much of Rossi Hills was undevelopable due to apparent easements and 
encumbrances on the property (R. 7481-83). Kinghorn was told by the Block 62 group that 
they had been through all of this before with the previous owners of the property, and 
Kinghorn relayed this information to Doms (R. 7482, 7484, 7603-04). 
Pursuant to Doms' instructions to find out what the Block 62 group was talking about, 
in the spring of 1983 Kinghorn walked the loop road on Rossi Hills and observed the 
encroachments which the Block 62 owners believed constituted easements and encumbrances 
on the property (R. 7484-87). Although the loop road appeared to be located on Rossi 
Hills, Kinghorn was uncertain about the location of the loop road and other encroachments 
because he did not know the exact boundaries of the property (R. 7486). 
Kinghorn contacted Doms and informed him a road and other encroachments 
appeared to exist on the property and might constitute easements and encumbrances (R. 
7619). Doms instructed Kinghorn to immediately take whatever steps were necessary to 
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determine whether or not the loop road and other encroachments did in fact constitute legal 
easements and encumbrances (R. 7620). 
In August of 1983 Kinghorn retained surveyor Bing Christensen to locate and stake 
the boundaries of Rossi Hills (R. 7489). Although Christensen claimed to have placed 
stakes on the property to determine the boundaries sometime in the fall of 1983, it was 
November when he informed Kinghorn, and there was already two feet of snow on the 
ground and no way to locate the stakes (R. 7491). After the snow melted in the spring of 
1984, Kinghorn walked the property and was unable to locate any of the stakes (R. 7491-92). 
Shortly thereafter, in the spring of 1984, Doms and Kinghorn both contacted Alliance 
Engineering in Park City, Utah, and eventually retained Alliance in the late summer of 1984 
to do a complete land survey of Rossi Hills (R. 7493-94). At about the same time, in March 
of 1984, Kinghorn met with attorney Edward S. Sweeney, who represented the Estate of 
D.C. Anderson (and Ellen Anderson, who was the personal representative of the estate), 
and Dan Scott (R. 7500). At this meeting, Kinghorn expressed concerns to Sweeney that 
the loop road and other physical encroachments which appeared to be on Rossi Hills may 
constitute easements and encumbrances on the property (R. 7504-05). 
In October of 1984, Alliance Engineering completed their land survey of Rossi Hills 
(R. 7494; Ex. 77D). This land survey clearly revealed to Kinghorn and Doms for the very 
first time that the loop road and other physical encroachments were physically located on 
the property (R. 7170-72, 7496). Doms then instructed Kinghorn to do further investigation 
and form a legal opinion as to whether or not these encroachments constituted prescriptive 
easements or otherwise were encumbrances under Utah law (R. 7175, 7624-25). 
8 
Kinghorn personally talked to several long-time residents of Park City regarding the 
physical encroachments and the use of the loop road by abutting property owners (R. 7498-
99), Several of these people told Kinghorn that Elden and Ella Sorensen, and other people 
who resided on property abutting Rossi Hills, had always used the loop road for access to 
their property long enough to qualify as prescriptive easements (R. 7498-99). Kinghorn also 
was aware that the Park City Planning Department required all developments in Park City 
to recognize and respect lawful prescriptive easements and other property interests which 
exist upon property (R. 7499). Kinghorn then formed a legal conclusion for the first time 
that the loop road and other encroachments constituted prescriptive easements and 
encumbrances upon Rossi Hills, and shortly thereafter reported his conclusion to Doms in 
December of 1984 or early January of 1985 (R. 7500, 7611, 7625). 
Doms and Kinghorn both concluded that neither the three-parcel development nor 
Rossi Hills by itself would be economically feasible to develop because there was not enough 
useable land due to the encumbrances (R. 7398-7400, 7445-46, 7500). Doms accepted 
Kinghorn's legal opinion and instructed him to attempt to negotiate a resolution to the 
problem that would avoid litigation (R. 7176-77, 7500-01). Doms instructed Kinghorn to 
offer to deed the property back to the Andersons and Scotts in exchange for cancellation 
of the trust deed note and not to demand the return of money which had already been paid, 
in order to attempt to avoid expensive and protracted litigation (R. 7176-77, 7501-02, 7625). 
In a telephone conversation with Sweeney in January of 1985, Kinghorn informed 
Sweeney about the survey (Ex. 77D), and that the loop road and other encroachments 
constituted a serious problem which needed to be resolved; and that he wanted to meet with 
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Sweeney and present a proposal and discuss these issues (R. 7504-05). On January 17,1985, 
Kinghorn had a lengthy meeting with Sweeney in Kinghorn's law office (R. 7505). At this 
meeting, Kinghorn showed Sweeney the Alliance Engineering land survey of Rossi Hills, 
which clearly showed the loop road and other physical encroachments located upon the 
property (R. 7506). Kinghorn told Sweeney the names of the people he had talked to in 
Park City regarding use of the loop road by the Sorensens and others far in excess of 20 
years as access to their property, and that in his legal opinion the loop road, back yards, 
sheds and fences constituted prescriptive easements on the property under Utah law (R. 
7506-07). Kinghorn further told Sweeney these prescriptive easements constituted a 
violation of the covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed conveying 
Rossi Hills to Doms, pursuant to U.CA. § 57-1-12; and Doms was entitled to rescission of 
the transaction and the return of all money received by Plaintiffs (R. 7507). 
As a compromise, in lieu of seeking full rescission, Kinghorn presented Doms' offer 
to deed the property back in exchange for cancellation of the trust deed note, and allowing 
Plaintiffs to keep all money already received under the contract (F. of F. 44; R. 7507-08). 
Sweeney told Kinghorn he would have to talk to his clients, but not to worry about making 
the principal payment of $194,250.00 due January 25, 1985, until he got back to Kinghorn 
(R. 7508). 
On March 18, 1985, Kinghorn again met with Sweeney and another lawyer in his law 
firm by the name of Peter Mulhern at Kinghorn's law office to further discuss the matter 
(R. 7509). In a lengthy meeting, Kinghorn reiterated to Sweeney and Mulhern all of the 
information he had given to Sweeney at the January 17,1985, meeting (R. 7510). Kinghorn 
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again made the offer that Doms, in an attempt to avoid litigation, would deed the property 
back to the Andersons and Scotts in exchange for cancellation of the trust deed note, and 
they could keep all payments already received by them (R. 7511-12). Mulhem and Sweeney 
indicated they would get back to Kinghom and assured Kinghom that Doms would not be 
expected to make the $194,250.00 payment purportedly due under the trust deed note until 
they got back to Kinghom in regard to this matter, and the situation was straightened out 
(R. 7514). 
However, Plaintiffs did not subsequently respond to Doms' offer or contact Kinghom, 
but rather filed a Complaint to foreclose on the property on June 6, 1985 (F. of F. 45; R. 
7514-15). This Complaint is Civil No. 8339, the main case now on appeal (R. 1-9; Add. 14). 
After Plaintiffs filed their foreclosure Complaint in June of 1985, Kinghom engaged 
in numerous discussions with various counsel representing Plaintiffs at that time, and several 
extensions, stipulations and agreements were entered into to allow Doms to locate new 
counsel because Kinghom was going to have to be a witness in this case (R. 3182-85). 
Contrary to an agreement between Kinghom and counsel for Plaintiffs at that time, and 
unbeknownst to Kinghom, Plaintiffs filed a motion for entry of judgment by default and 
obtained a default judgment against Doms and McCoy on or about January 20,1988 (R. 34-
40, 3185-86). 
On January 29,1988, Kinghom filed an Answer and Counterclaim to rescind the Rossi 
Hills transaction, unaware that a default judgment had been entered against Doms (R. 41-
44; Add. 15). 
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The default judgment against Doms was subsequently set aside by the trial court 
effective June 1,1988, upon Doms' payment of $4,467.60 to Plaintiffs, which represented all 
attorney's fees and costs incurred by Plaintiffs in the action up to and including that date 
(R. 76-78, 126-27). The trial court issued an Order that whether or not it was appropriate 
to award that amount as attorney's fees was an issue reserved until final disposition of the 
case on the merits (R. 245-47; Add. 16). The default judgment against McCoy was never 
set aside. 
On June 15, 1988, Doms filed an Amended Counterclaim (R. 102-05; Add. 17). In 
this Amended Counterclaim, Jeanne Scott (the wife of Dan Scott) and Ellen Anderson, 
personally, were joined as involuntary Plaintiffs pursuant to an Order of the trial court (R. 
248-50). On July 6, 1988, Doms filed a Second Amended Counterclaim against all four 
Plaintiffs (R. 237-42; Add. 18). Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim alleged breach of 
the implied statutory covenants of warranty contained in the warranty deed pursuant to 
U.C.A. § 57-1-12, breach of contract, and fraud and misrepresentation; and sought rescission 
of the Rossi Hills transaction or, in the alternative, damages (R. 237-42). 
The major portion of Rossi Hills was sold in May of 1987 to Summit County for non-
payment of property taxes (R. 3115). Due to the adversarial relationship between Doms 
and McCoy, and a lack of communication with Kinghorn, Doms was unaware that this had 
occurred until sometime later (R. 3115). 
In July of 1988, after researching and investigating the status of the title to Rossi Hills, 
Doms' new counsel (and present counsel herein) informed Doms the tax sale had indeed 
taken place in May of 1987; and Summit County was in fact deemed to be the owner of the 
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major portion of Rossi Hills (R. 3116). Doms immediately instructed counsel to do 
whatever was necessary to redeem or purchase back Rossi Hills from Summit County (R. 
3116). In August of 1988, pursuant to instructions of counsel, Doms tendered a cashier's 
check paid to the order of the Summit County Treasurer in the amount of $4,175.51, to pay 
all delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs, plus the 1988 estimated taxes, due to 
Summit County; and for conveyance of the property back to Domcoy, the record owner of 
the property prior to the tax sale to Summit County (R. 3116, 3158). Upon receipt of this 
payment, Summit County, by quit-claim deed dated August 24,1988, conveyed Rossi Hills 
back to Domcoy, the prior record owner (R. 3117, 3160-61; Add. 19). On August 26,1988, 
Domcoy conveyed Rossi Hills by warranty deed to Doms (Ex. 17P; Add. 20). 
The action proceeded through a lengthy discovery process and the consolidation with 
another case, Civil No. 10066 (Supp. R. 244). Civil No. 10066 (the "tax sale case") was filed 
by Plaintiffs in December of 1988 to declare unconstitutional and set aside the May 1987 
tax sale of Rossi Hills to Summit County and to quiet title to the property in Plaintiffs 
(Supp. R. 2-66). The Summit County tax sale was subsequently declared void and set aside 
by the trial court upon stipulation of all of the parties in the tax sale case (C. of L. 42; Judg. 
11 16). 
In February of 1989, Plaintiff Jeanne Scott filed a Petition in the Utah Supreme Court 
for Permission to File an Interlocutory Appeal from an Order of the trial court denying her 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of In Personam Jurisdiction over her in the action (Add. 21). 
Pursuant to a Minute Entry dated March 9, 1989, the Supreme Court denied this Petition 
for an Interlocutory Appeal (Add. 22). 
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Shortly thereafter, in June of 1989, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ 
in the Utah Supreme Court, seeking to restrain and prohibit the Third Judicial District 
Court and the judges thereof from proceeding further in the trial of this case based upon 
exactly the same in personam jurisdiction arguments which were rejected by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Plaintiff Jeanne Scott's Petition to File an Interlocutory Appeal (Add. 
23). In an Amended Minute Entry, dated July 31, 1989, the Supreme Court denied this 
Petition for Extraordinary Writ (Add. 24). 
In a bifurcated trial, the trial court first decided to resolve the issue of whether or not 
the Rossi Hills transaction should be rescinded (R. 7315). Following three days of trial on 
April 17-19, 1990, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision denying rescission based 
upon the doctrine of laches (R. 4188-95; Add. 25). 
The remainder of the trial was held on August 21-24, 1990, and related primarily to 
the issue of damages suffered by Doms as a result of the encumbrances on Rossi Hills (R. 
7753-8285, 6541-89). Following this portion of the trial, the trial court issued a Memoran-
dum Decision which ruled that Doms suffered $83,000.00 in damages as a result of the loop 
road and other encumbrances existing on Rossi Hills as of March of 1982, when the 
transaction was closed and the warranty deed delivered (R. 4348-54). 
Subsequently, a hearing was held on December 31, 1991, to determine which parties 
were entitled to awards of attorney's fees and costs in the action (R. 6360-6540). Plaintiffs 
and Doms submitted attorney's fees affidavits, memoranda of costs, other documents 
regarding expenses; and Plaintiffs' counsel and Doms' counsel testified at this hearing. 
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Following extensive objections, motions and argument by the parties over the 
appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, the trial court entered its final 
Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 6874-99; Add. 5) and Second 
Amended Judgment (R. 6900-07; Add. 6) on June 23, 1992. 
Both parties appealed the trial court's rulings in numerous respects. On November 
4,1994, this Court filed a Memorandum Decision that disposed of almost all of these issues. 
See Anderson v. Poms, No. 920653CA, (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1994) (Memorandum 
Decision) (Add. 1). The Court concluded that the lower court had erroneously applied the 
doctrine of laches to bar rescission because the trial court had made no findings on the 
second prong of laches, i.e., prejudice, from Doms' delay in pursuing rescission. The Court 
therefore remanded this matter "for the purpose of entering findings of fact relevant to 
whether appellants were prejudiced by any delays in Doms pursuing his counterclaim." Id. 
at 3. This Court further ruled that "[I]f the trial court cannot find from the evidence 
presented that the appellants were prejudiced by the delay, the equitable doctrine of laches 
should not bar the remedy of rescission." IdL 
The trial court on remand was not pleased with the decision issued by this Court. 
At the October 27,1995 hearing, the trial court began the proceeding by stating, "It appears 
to me from reading the [Utah Court of Appeals'] memorandum that the issue here is with 
regard to rescission. . . . I thought I made that quite clear that I would not allow the 
rescission at the time we started this case." (Add. 4 at p. 1). The court later stated, 
"[Ljaches wasn't the only basis upon which I made my decision . . . and in order for them 
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[the Utah Court of Appeals] to latch onto this one issue, I think is out in left field, if you 
want to know the truth of the matter." Id at p.4 (emphasis added). The lower court 
concluded, "I don't think [sic] even laches is a necessary issue in this case. . . .1 don't care 
what the—I shouldn't say I don't care. But I think they [the Utah Court of Appeals] are off 
on the wrong tact [sic] in this case and I am going to go back over the Findings and then 
we will submit that; and then if they want to reverse me again, that is fine." Id. at pp. 5-6 
(emphasis added). 
Despite this Court's very clear instructions in the Memorandum Decision that the 
remand was limited to entering findings of fact regarding the prejudice prong of laches, the 
trial court entered additional findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting other 
theories, besides laches, which would bar rescission in this case. The trial court also entered 
vague and conclusory findings regarding prejudice. Both parties have again appealed the 
trial court's rulings. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This second appeal is far simpler than the first. The primary issue is whether the trial 
court erred in concluding from its supplemental findings of fact on remand that Doms' delay 
in seeking rescission prejudiced Plaintiffs such that rescission of the underlying real estate 
transaction is precluded. The secondary issue concerns the only other issue remaining 
undecided from the prior appeal after this Court's Memorandum Decision—the trial court's 
treatment of certain attorney fee issues. 
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In reviewing the trial court's supplemental findings of fact concerning prejudice, it is 
crucial to understand the difficulty of the task that the trial court had undertaken. This 
Court instructed the trial court to make its supplemental findings on prejudice based upon 
the "evidence in the record." See Anderson v. Doms, No. 920653CA at 3, fn 1 (Utah Ct. 
App. Nov. 4,1994) (Add.l). The trial court, as amply demonstrated by its statements at the 
hearing on remand, was adamantly opposed to permitting rescission, and fully intended to 
enter additional findings of fact to this effect. However, at trial Plaintiffs had evidently not 
realized that prejudice was an issue, and had never introduced evidence on this subject. 
There simply was no record evidence on the issue of prejudice for the trial court to include 
in its supplemental findings of fact. 
With this understanding, the trial court's supplemental findings of fact on remand 
begin to make sense. The findings are, beyond a doubt, vague and conclusory. In many 
instances, they are also oddly irrelevant to the issue of prejudice. The simple explanation 
for these findings is that the trial court had no actual additional evidence of prejudice it 
could cite from the record, and so it was limited to inferring prejudice where it might seem 
plausible. 
As a particularly egregious example, Finding of Fact 10c states that Plaintiffs have 
been prejudiced by Doms' delay in seeking rescission because "D.C. Anderson, one of the 
principals in the transaction, died while Doms was in possession of the property, thus 
making it impossible to elicit testimony from the decedent." (Add. 2 at 11 10c). It is 
impossible to draw a conclusion of prejudice from this fact. The trial court did not state 
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what evidence Mr. Anderson could have provided, nor how this evidence would be related 
to a finding of prejudice. Mr. Anderson's death is simply an unrelated fact, from which the 
trial court infers prejudice. 
Another example of the trial court's attempts to infer prejudice is set forth in Finding 
of Fact lOd where the court finds prejudice "because witnesses would be unavailable and 
memories are dimmed by the lapse of time." Id. at U lOd. In so finding, the court does not 
refer a single particular witness who is unavailable, or provide any specifics regarding how 
memories have dimmed and how this impacts Plaintiffs. The reason for this omission is, of 
course, that the court cannot refer to any such witnesses. Plaintiffs did not raise this issue 
at trial, and hence there is no evidence on this subject. 
In fact, the only real evidence referred to in the Supplemental Findings of Fact is the 
evidence concerning the diminution of value of the subject property. However, this 
evidence was included in the original Findings of Fact, and was specifically identified by this 
Court as inadequate to support a finding of prejudice. Poms, No. 920653CA, at 2-3 fill. 
(Add. 1). Accordingly, the trial court has failed on remand to enter additional findings of 
fact supporting a conclusion of prejudice, and there is no longer any reason why Doms 
should not be granted the equitable remedy of rescission. 
The only other outstanding issue concerns the trial court's rulings on attorney fees. 
The trial court erred by refusing to award attorney's fees and appropriate costs to Doms for 
sustaining his title to Rossi Hills against Plaintiffs' foreclosure and quiet title actions. In 
addition, the trial court erred in its award of attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 
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are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs because Doms is the prevailing parly in this 
lawsuit and was never in default under the trust deed and trust deed note, which provided 
the only possible basis upon which Plaintiffs could make a legitimate claim for attorney's 
fees or costs. 
Plaintiffe are also not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in their petitions 
to the Utah Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal and extraordinary writ because 
Plaintiffe lost both of these petitions. Further, Plaintiffe are not entitled to any attorney's 
fees or costs pursuant to their motions for sanctions in regard to Doms' objections to 
discovery requests because all of Doms' objections were substantially justified under Rule 
37(a)(4), U.R.C.P. Finally, Doms is entitled to a refund of a substantial amount of the 
attorney's fees and costs paid to Plaintiffe as a condition of the trial court setting aside the 
default judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING 
THAT PREJUDICE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, 
A. The trial court did not comply with this Court's mandate on remand. 
This case was remanded to the trial court pursuant to the Court of Appeals' June 4, 
1994 Memorandum Decision on very narrow and specific grounds. See Anderson v. Doms, 
No. 920653CA, (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1994) (Add. 1). In short, the trial court had found 
a breach of the statutory covenants contained in the Warranty Deed, but denied Doms the 
remedy of rescission based upon application of the doctrine of laches. However, while the 
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trial court had entered findings of fact regarding the first prong of laches-delay in bringing 
an action-it had failed to make any findings regarding the second prong—prejudice. 
Accordingly, this Court remanded this matter to the trial court with instructions to 
"enterQ findings of fact relevant to whether appellants were prejudiced by any delays in 
Doms pursuing his counterclaim." Id. at 2-3. This Court concluded, "If the trial court 
cannot find from the evidence presented that appellants were prejudiced by the delay, the 
equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the remedy of rescission." Id at 3 (emphasis 
added). 
The trial court was extremely reluctant to comply with this Court's mandate. At the 
October 27, 1995 hearing on remand, the trial court began the proceeding by stating, "It 
appears to me from reading the [Utah Court of Appeals1] memorandum that the issue here 
is with regard to rescission. . . . I thought I made that quite clear that I would not allow the 
rescission at the time we started this case." (Add. 4 at p. 1). The court later stated, 
"[LJaches wasn't the only basis upon which I made my decision . . . and in order for them 
[the Utah Court of Appeals] to latch onto this one issue, I think is out in left field, if you 
want to know the truth of the matter." Id at p.4 (emphasis added). The lower court 
concluded, "I don't think [sic] even laches is a necessary issue in this case. . . .1 don't care 
what the—I shouldn't say I don't care. But I think they [the Utah Court of Appeals] are off 
on the wrong tact [sic] in this case and I am going to go back over the Findings and then 
we will submit that; and then if they want to reverse me again, that is fine." Id. at pp. 5-6 
(emphasis added). 
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Despite the very clear instructions from this Court, the trial court on remand entered 
additional findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting other theories, besides laches, 
which would bar rescission in this case. For example, in Supplemental Conclusion of Law 
la, the trial court stated that Doms did not have a sufficient interest in the Rossi Hills 
Property to be entitled to rescission. (Add. 2 at p. 9). In Supplemental Conclusion of Law 
lb the trial court stated that Doms could not invoke the doctrine of rescission because he 
is a "person in default." Id. 
It is not necessary to address the merits of these legal conclusions because they are 
entirely outside the scope of the remand. Doms notes, however, that Supplemental 
Conclusion of Law la is contradicted by the trial court's additional Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law issued on September 8, 1997. In the latter Conclusions of Law, the 
Court stated that "[d]espite intervening conveyances between Doms and McCoy to Domcoy, 
[etc.] Doms presently holds clear title to the property and his right to pursue his 
counterclaim is not affected." (emphasis added) (Add. 3 at p. 5 11 1). 
This Court has already concluded that rescission is appropriate under the facts of this 
case unless it is barred by the doctrine of laches. This case was remanded for the specific 
purpose of entering findings of fact bearing on the second prong of laches—not to permit 
the trial court to entirely revisit the issue of whether rescission is appropriate. As noted in 
Bailev-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet. 945 P.2d 180 (Utah App. 1997), "v "[Pronouncements of 
an appellate court on legal issues . . . become the law of the case and must be followed in 
subsequent proceedings!/,] • • • [thus] the lower court must implement both the letter and the 
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spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the 
circumstances it embraces.'"" Id at 185 (citing Slatteiv v. Covev & Co. Inc., 909 P.2d 925, 
928 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added)). 
In particular, "vit is only when issues are left open by an appellate decision that the 
trial court has discretion to deal with those issues as it sees fit.'" IdL Thus, because the trial 
court's findings and conclusions are beyond the scope of remand, and in fact contradict the 
directions on remand, they should be summarily disregarded by this Court. 
B. The trial court's findings of fact on remand are legally insufficient to support a 
conclusion of prejudice. 
The real focus of this appeal is whether the trial court's findings on remand support 
its conclusion that the existence of the second prong of laches—prejudice—precludes the 
application of rescission in this case. The trial court made eight purported findings of fact 
supporting its conclusion that Plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms' delay in bringing his 
counterclaim. These findings are manifestly insufficient to support the court's legal 
conclusion that Plaintiffs were prejudiced because they are vague, conclusory, and largely 
irrelevant. 
As an initial matter, Doms is well aware of his burden to marshal the evidence 
supporting challenged findings of fact. However, "there is, in effect, no need for an 
appellant to marshal the evidence when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be 
meaningfully challenged as factual determinations." Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,477 
(Utah App. 1991). Inadequate findings are those that do not "embody sufficient detail and 
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include enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence upon which they are grounded," 
id., or that are "conclusory, and reflect an intention to merge the trial court's ultimate 
factual determinations with [a particular legal test]." IdL at 478. In such cases, "appellant 
need not go through a futile marshalling exercise. Rather, appellant can simply argue the 
legal insufficiency of the court's findings as framed." Id. at 477-78. 
1. Finding of Fact #10a is Conclusory, Insufficiently Detailed, and Lacks 
Evidentiary Support. 
Finding of Fact 10a states as follows: 
Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the 
exclusion of the plaintiffe. He purchased the slipper parcel and 
attempted to formulate a plan for a three-parcel integrated 
development, but was unsuccessful. The plaintiffe are now 
foreclosed from developing an integrated development because 
Doms has an interest in the slipper parcel and the likelihood of 
Doms cooperating with the plaintiffe in an integrated 
development is remote. 
(Add. 2 at pp. 4-5). 
There are a number of very serious problems with this finding. To begin with, its 
factual premise is completely erroneous. Doms' interest in the slipper parcel was foreclosed, 
and he has had no interest at all in this parcel for several years. Moreover, even if Doms 
were still in possession of the slipper parcel, there is no absolutely no evidence in the record 
supporting a finding that Doms would not cooperate with Plaintiffe in a development 
project. Whether Doms would or would not cooperate with Plaintiffe in the event of 
rescission was not even explored at trial because the trial court had no intention of ever 
granting rescission. Thus, because Finding of Fact 10a is conclusory, recites no evidentiary 
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detail and is, in fact, completely without evidentiary foundation in the record, it cannot 
support a conclusion of prejudice as a matter of law. 
2. Finding of Fact #10b is Irrelevant. 
Finding of Fact 10b states: 
Doms failed to pay the property taxes for the years 1982, 
1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986, which resulted in a tax sale and 
required the plaintiffs to initiate legal action to clear the title. 
(Add. 2 at p. 5). 
Finding of Fact #10b is absolutely correct and absolutely irrelevant. Doms did fail 
to pay the property taxes for the years 1982 through 1986, there was a tax sale, and Plaintiffs 
were required to bring an action to clear the title. However, the action was resolved by a 
stipulation in which the parties agreed that the tax sale would be declared void and 
Plaintiffs' lien declared valid. Accordingly, because the status quo was reestablished by the 
stipulation of the parties, there can be no prejudice arising from these events. Therefore, 
Finding of Fact #10b also does not support a conclusion that Plaintiffs were prejudiced by 
Doms' delay. 
3. Finding of Fact #10c is Irrelevant and Conclusorv. 
Finding of Fact 10c states: 
D.C. Anderson, one of the principals in the transaction, 
died while Doms was in possession of the property, thus making 
it impossible to elicit testimony from the decedent. 
(Add. 2 at p. 5) 
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The third Finding of Fact is a conclusoiy statement that Plaintiffe are prejudiced by 
Doms* delay because D.C. Anderson is dead, and cannot provide testimony. However, the 
Finding does not mention to which facts Mr. Anderson would testify, and whether others 
could testify regarding these same facts. Moreover, there was no proffer made at trial 
regarding Mr. Anderson's testimony, and no attempt to admit statements he made to third 
parties prior to his death. Therefore, it is impossible to ascertain from the Finding of Fact 
whether Plaintiffe were in fact prejudiced by Mr. Anderson's death. This sort of conclusoiy 
and irrelevant Finding cannot support a determination of prejudice. 
4. Finding of Fact #10d is Conclusorv and Unsupported by the Record, 
Finding of Fact lOd states: 
Doms' delay of more than six (6) years before he sought 
to rescind the transaction adversely affected the plaintiffe' 
opportunity to resolve the encroachment and easement 
problems because witnesses would be unavailable and memories 
are dimmed by the lapse of time. 
(Add 2. at p. 5). 
This fourth Finding of Fact is yet another example of the inaccurate, speculative and 
conclusoiy nature of the trial court's findings. First, the court's statement that Doms waited 
six years to seek to rescind the transaction is simply and flatly wrong. The undisputed 
evidence is that Doms attempted to rescind the transaction within three years. However, 
this Court has already determined that Doms delayed in bringing his action for rescission, 
so the point is moot. 
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The real difficulty with this Finding of Fact is that the trial court is merely speculating 
that the alleged six year delay prejudiced the Plaintiffs because "witnesses would be 
unavailable," Nowhere does the Court list who these "imavailable" witnesses might be, or 
what the subjects of their testimony would be. Again, the real reason for this absence of 
evidentiary detail is that there was no testimony on this issue at trial. Hence, the court has 
no record evidence to cite in support of its conclusions. 
The same arguments apply to the court's speculation that memories would be 
"dimmed" by the passage of time. Whose memories? Memories of what? What, precisely, 
was the prejudice? There is no record evidence to support this vague assertion, it is simply 
the court's opinion, couched as a "finding of fact." 
5. Finding of Fact #10e is Insufficient Alone, to Support a Conclusion of 
Prejudice. 
Finding of Fact lOe states: 
During the time that Doms. Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. 
and Summit County were in possession of the property, the 
property suffered a 50% reduction in its value. 
(Add. 2 at pg. 5). 
Doms does not challenge Finding of Fact #10e, but reminds the Court of its footnote 
1 in the Memorandum Decision stating that a mere decrease in property value does not 
alone convert delay into laches (Add. 1 at pp. 2-3, fa. 1). Further, Doms points out to the 
Court that the reason that the property decreased in value was that the encumbrances on 
the property made it undesirable for development. Plaintiffs' failure to give good title to 
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the property and its consequent devaluation should not permit Plaintiffs to claim that they 
have been prejudiced by the reduction of the property's value. 
6. Finding of Fact #10f Simply Restates Finding lOe. 
Finding of Fact lOf states: 
Doms5 inexperience in developing property or inability 
to sell the property impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of 
down turn in the real estate market and the increased costs to 
develop the property if they chose to do so. 
(Add. 2 at p. 5). 
Finding of Fact lOf is simply a rewording of Finding of Fact lOe done in attempt to 
give the Findings of Fact more substance and bulk. Again, Doms does not challenge that 
a downturn in the market may have occurred, or that there would be increased costs 
involved in developing the property. However, both factors are part of the "mere decrease 
in property value" that this Court has determined do not, alone, constitute prejudice. 
Further, the increased costs involved in development are directly due to the encumbrances 
that are on the property. These encumbrances were not created by Doms' delay, they have 
existed from the outset. Hence, this Finding of Fact also does not support a finding of 
prejudice. 
7. Finding of Fact #10g is a Conclusion of Law, 
Finding of Fact lOg states: 
Doms should not benefit from his poor decisions at the 
expense of the plaintiffs. To allow that to happen would be 
inequitable. 
(Add. 2 at pp. 5-6). 
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This "Finding of Fact" is actually a conclusion of law. Moreover, it does not speak 
to the issue of prejudice. Accordingly, this Finding of Fact is irrelevant, and should be 
disregarded. 
8. Finding of Fact #10h is a Conclusion of Law, 
Finding of Fact lOh states: 
Doms was in default; therefore, could not invoke the doctrine 
of rescission. 
(Add. 2 at p. 6). 
This "Finding of Fact" is also a conclusion of law, similar to "Finding of Fact" lOg. 
It does not discuss prejudice, and is irrelevant. 
Finally, some of the "Conclusions of Law" are in actuality additional "Findings of 
Fact," and require discussion. In Conclusion of Law 2c, the trial court states that Doms 
"had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the Plaintiffs, changed the 
condition of the property in relation to adjacent properties and foreclosed the Plaintiffs from 
taking any prompt corrective action in relation to encumbrances." (Add. 2 at p. 12). There 
is no evidence to marshal in support of this finding of fact because there is no testimony 
that supports it. None of the witnesses testified that there were any changes to the property 
since the date of purchase, and there is no other evidence suggesting that this was the case. 
The trial court simply invented this "fact." 
Finally, in Conclusion of Law 2f, the trial court throws out a hodge-podge of facts 
and ultimate conclusions that appear to have no bearing on the issue of prejudice, but 
probably require some attention. Id. at p. 13. For example, in Conclusion of Law 2f(3) the 
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court cites the fact that "the entire Rossi Hill Property had been conveyed by Doms and 
McCoy to a third party, to wit, Domcoy Enterprises" as support for its determination that 
Plaintiffs were prejudiced. Id. Doms is at a complete loss as to how this fact has any 
bearing whatsoever on the issue of prejudice. Moreover, the trial court later itself concluded 
in paragraphs 1-4 of the September 8, 1997 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that 
Doms had 100% ownership interest in Rossi Hills, thus eliminating any such ground for 
prejudice, even if it were assumed to be valid. (Add. 3 at p. 5). 
Similarly, Doms has no idea why the trial court thought that the fact that "Doms as 
an equal fifty percent (50%) shareholder in Domcoy, received the full benefit of the value 
of the Rossi Hill Property because his shareholding interests would have been increased by 
the value which the Rossi Hill Property contributed to the net worth of Domcoy" has 
anything to do with prejudice. See Add. 2 at pg. 13. The final "fact" concerning prejudice 
cited by the trial court in paragraph 2f is "at the time the defendants conveyed their interest 
to Domcoy, the Property was worth as much as it was when they purchased the Property 
from the Plaintiffs." Id Again, if there is any connection between this fact and the issue 
of prejudice, it escapes ready understanding. 
In brief, the trial court on remand was unable to find any evidence supporting a 
conclusion of prejudice beyond the evidence of diminution of value that was already before 
this Court. Because the trial court was unable to make any real additional findings of fact 
regarding prejudice, the laches defense to rescission fails as a matter of law. Consequently, 
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this Court should order rescission of the real property transaction at issue, as stated in the 
Memorandum Decision. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO AWARD 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND APPROPRIATE COSTS TO POMS. 
A. Poms is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs for sustaining 
his title to Rossi Hills against Plaintiffs' foreclosure and quiet title actions. 
Plaintiffs' foreclosure action in the main case (Civil No. 8339) and quiet title action 
in Count 2 of the tax sale case (Civil No. 10066) have assailed and disputed Doms' title to 
Rossi Hills, and required Doms to incur substantial attorney's fees and costs. In Forrer v. 
Sather, 595 P.2d 1306 (Utah 1979), citing its previous decision in Van Cott v. Jacklin, 226 
P. 460, 463 (Utah 1924), the Utah Supreme Court stated that under these circumstances, 
an award of attorney's fees and costs is appropriate. In particular, the Court observed: 
This court has further approved as an additional element of damages 
for breach of the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment, the 
recovery of a reasonable sum as attorney fees that plaintiff has paid 
or has become legally obligated to pay, together with the costs, in 
attempting to sustain the title to the premises conveyed. 
595 P.2d at 308 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
Because the trial court has ruled that Plaintiffs violated the "covenants of warranty and 
quiet enjoyment," this Court should follow Forrer and Van Cott, and award attorney's fees 
and costs in this case to Doms, the prevailing party. 
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B. Doms is entitled to prejudgment interest on any awards of attorney's fees. 
Utah case law holds that it is appropriate to award prejudgment interest on an award 
of attorney's fees.2 Therefore, Doms should be awarded prejudgment interest on any awards 
of attorney's fees in the instant case. 
C. Doms is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred on this 
appeal. 
Utah case law holds that when a party entitled to attorney's fees for the trial of an 
action prevails on appeal, that party is also entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
incurred on the appeal.3 Therefore, Doms should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs in regard to prosecution of this appeal. 
D. Doms is entitled to an award of appropriate costs, including costs of depositions. 
The trial court awarded Doms a total of only $101.50 in costs, and only for the 
prosecution of his Second Amended Counterclaim (F. of F. 60; C. of L. 56; Judg. 11 25). 
Doms filed a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements with the trial court requesting 
$5,913.81 (R. 5619-23), and an affidavit regarding travel expenses requesting $2,701.22 
(Attorney's Fee Ex. 2D). Thus, the costs and expenses claimed by Doms totalled $8,615.03. 
Doms submits that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the paltry amount 
of $101.50 to Doms for his costs in the instant case. In particular, the depositions taken by 
2
 See, e ^ First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feed Yards Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 
1982); Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co.. 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983); P.A.D.D. v. Gravstone 
Pines Homeowners Ass'n.. 789 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990); Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 
1375 (Utah App. 1987). 
3
 See e.g.. Management Servs. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 
1980); Brown V. Richards. 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah App. 1992). 
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Doms were clearly taken in good faith and were essential for the development and 
presentation of the case, and should be taxable as costs. See Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d 
771, 774 (Utah 1980^: Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing. Ltd.. 753 P.2d 507,512 
(Utah App. 1988). 
E. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded with directions to 
award Doms attorney's fees and costs consistent with this Court's decision. 
The trial court erred in its ruling that Doms is not entitled to attorney's fees (F. of F. 
58; C. of L. 55; Judg. U 23). Therefore, this Court should remand this matter one last time 
to permit the trial court to determine reasonable attorney's fees and costs which should be 
awarded to Doms. Doms' counsel, Lany R. Keller and Craig L. Boorman, filed affidavits 
regarding attorney's fees with the trial court. Keller's affidavit established that Doms 
incurred out-of-pocket and reasonable attorney's fees to him of $70,822.75 as of the date 
of the affidavit (R. 5663-5716). Boorman's affidavit established that Doms incurred 
additional out-of-pocket and reasonable attorney's fees for his services of $79,330.00 as of 
the date of the affidavit (R. 5624-62). Thus, the total amount of attorney's fees incurred by 
Doms as of the dates of these respective affidavits was $150,152.75. On remand, the trial 
court would need to determine additional attorney's fees and costs incurred by Doms 
subsequent to those already claimed and submitted to the trial court as set forth above. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS, 
On December 31, 1991, the trial court held a hearing on attorney's fees and costs, 
which included the submission of affidavits and other documentation, the testimony of the 
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parties, and oral argument by the parties regarding awards of attorney's fees and costs (R. 
6360-6540). Plaintiffs' counsel, James A. Mcintosh and Irving H. Biele, submitted affidavits 
and other documents requesting a total of $300,659.57 in attorney's fees up to the date of 
the hearing (Attorney's Fees Exs. IP, 3P, 4P, 5P, 7P; R. 6408-09). Plaintiffe also requested 
costs and disbursements in the total amount of $26,272.44 (Ex. 2 and Ex. 7 attached to 
Attorney's Fee Ex. 3P). Thus, Plaintiffe requested a total amount of $326,932.01 as 
attorney's fees and costs through December 30, 1991. These exorbitant amounts are 
representative of the "stubbornly litigious" posture taken by Plaintiffe throughout the history 
of this case. As a comparison, Doms' counsel requested less than one-half the amount 
requested by Plaintiffe' counsel. 
With the exception of amounts awarded pursuajit to previous orders of the trial court 
regarding discovery sanctions and setting aside the default judgment, all of the attorney's 
fees and costs awarded to Plaintiffe by the trial court are based on the legal conclusion that 
Doms was in default under the trust deed and trust deed note. However, as discussed 
earlier, this conclusion was rejected by this Court in the June 4, 1994 Memorandum 
Decision. Instead, this Court found that Plaintiffe were the party in breach, and that Doms 
was entitled to the remedy of rescission, provided that his delay in seeking rescission did not 
make damages a more suitable remedy. Finally, the trial court made no findings of fact 
which support the amounts of attorney's fees awarded to Plaintiffe, and therefore all of such 
awards constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 
764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988); Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App 1992); Matter of 
Estate of Ouinn. 830 P.2d 282 (Utah App. 1992). 
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A. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in Civil No. 8339, 
the main case. 
Plaintiffe have no statutory claim to attorney's fees, and the trust deed and trust deed 
note contain the only possible contractual provisions upon which Plaintiffe can make a claim 
for attorney's fees and costs in the main case. See Turtle Management Inc. v. Haggis 
Management. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); Canyon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 
P.2d 414, 419 (Utah 1989). An award based upon a contract must be "in accordance with 
the terms of the parties' agreement," and "a party is entitled only to those fees attributable 
to the successful vindication of contractual rights within the terms of their agreement." 
Travner v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856. 858 (Utah 1984V4 
Plaintiffe have absolutely no legal basis to claim an award of attorney's fees or costs 
because they have utterly failed to vindicate any of their contractual rights within the terms 
of the trust deed and trust deed note. Doms was excused from performance and never in 
default under the trust deed and trust deed note, and, because this Court has determined 
that rescission is appropriate in the absence of laches, Plaintiffe are the losing party on their 
complaint for foreclosure. 
B. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in Civil No. 10066, 
the tax sale case. 
Plaintiffe are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs in the tax sale case for the 
same reasons set forth above in subpoint A in regard to the main case. The only possible 
contractual basis upon which Plaintiffe can make a claim for attorney's fees and costs in the 
4
 See also Turtle Management. Inc.. supra; Stubbs v. Hemmett 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 
1977). 
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tax sale case are the provisions of the trust deed and trust deed note. Since Doms was 
excused from performance and not in default under the trust deed and trust deed note, 
Plaintiffs have absolutely no basis upon which to claim attorney's fees or costs. 
Furthermore, it would clearly violate basic principles of equity to award Plaintiffe any 
attorney's fees or costs in regard to the tax sale case. At a hearing held before the trial 
court on March 20, 1990, Plaintiffe, Doms, Domcoy and Summit County (the parties to the 
tax sale case) entered into a stipulation in open court at the suggestion of the trial court that 
the tax sale would be declared void and Plaintiffe' Ken declared vaKd as evidenced by their 
trust deed and trust deed note (R. 7060-72). 
The stipulation of the parties was set forth in an Order issued by the trial court (R. 
3968-78), which is reflected in Conclusions of Law 42 and 43 and 11 16 of the Judgment. 
Doms would never have stipulated to the suggestion of the trial court that a simple solution 
was to declare the tax sale void and Plaintiffe' Ken vaKd, if Doms had had any idea that the 
trial court would subsequently award attorney's fees to Plaintiffe as to Count 1 of the tax 
sale case. It is simply unconscionable for Plaintiffe to even request attorney's fees and costs 
in regard to the tax sale case. 
In addition, and perhaps the most important fact is that Count 1 was against Summit 
County and not against Doms. Doms had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the 
manner in which the tax sale was conducted by Summit County. If any party is liable for 
the alleged attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiffe in Count 1 of the tax sale case, it is Summit 
County, not Doms. Doms cannot be held responsible for any alleged failures of Summit 
County to provide Plaintiffe with adequate notice of the tax sale of the property. 
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It should also be pointed out that Plaintiffe failed completely on Counts 2 and 3 of 
their Complaint in the tax sale case. Count 2 was Plaintiffe' action to quiet title to Rossi 
Hills, and Count 3 was their action against Summit County, which was dismissed on motion 
for summary judgment by Summit County early in the tax sale case (Supp. R. 169-70). 
The trial court awarded Plaintiffe $5,245.00 for Mcintosh's attorney's fees in the 
"lawsuit to set aside tax sale" (F. of F. 70(a)(i)), and $1,050.00 for Biele's attorney's fees for 
exactly the same thing (F. of F. 70(b)(ii)). These rulings by the trial court are clearly in 
error and must be reversed. 
C. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in their Petition for 
an Interlocutory Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, 
On or about February 6, 1989, Plaintiffe filed a Petition for Permission to File an 
Interlocutory Appeal in the Utah Supreme Court, requesting permission to appeal an Order 
of the trial court denying Plaintiff Jeanne Scott's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of In 
Personam Jurisdiction (Add. 21). Plaintiffe' Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal was denied 
by the Utah Supreme Court on March 9. 1989 (Add. 22). 
The trial court awarded Plaintiffe $2,730.00 for Mcintosh's attorney's fees incurred in 
regard to the Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal (F. of F. 70(a)(ii)). This award by the 
trial court constitutes clear legal error and must be reversed. First and foremost, Plaintiffe 
lost on their petition and cannot possibly make a legitimate claim for attorney's fees. 
Secondly, Plaintiffe are not the prevailing party in this lawsuit, and have no statutory or 
contractual basis upon which to make a claim for attorney's fees for filing this petition. 
Next, this petition was filed in defense of Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim, and 
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Plaintiffe cannot recover attorney's fees or costs incurred in defense of Doms' Counterclaim. 
Travnor v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 858, fn 6 (Utah 1984); Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. 
Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981). 
Finally, it is the prerogative of the Supreme Court to award fees on matters it decides, 
not the trial court. 
D. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs incurred in their Petition for 
an Extraordinary Writ to the Utah Supreme Court 
On or about June 23,1989, Plaintiffe filed a Petition for an Extraordinaiy Writ in the 
Utah Supreme Court, in which Plaintiffe sought an extraordinary writ to restrain the trial 
court from proceeding with the trial against Jeanne Scott and Ellen Anderson, personally, 
on exactly the same in personam jurisdiction grounds argued by Plaintiffe in their earlier 
Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal (Add. 23). On July 31. 1989, the Supreme Court filed 
an Amended Minute Entry denying Plaintiffe' Petition for an Extraordinary Writ on the 
grounds the trial court had jurisdiction over Jeanne Scott and Ellen Anderson because they 
were grantors on the warranty deed conveying Rossi Hills and because both were proper 
parties to Poms' Second Amended Counterclaim pursuant to Rules 13 and 19. U.R.C.P. 
(Add. 24). 
For exactly the same reasons as set forth immediately above in regard to Plaintiffe* 
Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal the trial court's awards of attorney's fees to Plaintiffe 
for the Petition for an Extraordinary Writ are clearly in error and must be reversed. The 
trial court awarded Plaintiffe $2,160.00 for Mcintosh's fees for the Petition (F. of F. 
70(a)(iii)). and $2.740.00 for Biele's fees for the same thing (¥. of F. 70(b)(iii)). 
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E. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or costs pursuant to their motions for 
sanctions in regard to Poms' objections to discovery requests. 
In February and March of 1989, Plaintiffs served Doms with Requests for Production 
of Documents and Requests for Admissions (R. 1213-15; 1222-24). In March of 1989, Doms 
served his responses to these discovery requests (R. 1341-42). Doms made full or partial 
objections to many of Plaintiffs' requests on the grounds they were not relevant to the 
subject matter of the pending action; not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence; and they constituted harassment, annoyance, oppression and would 
create an undue burden or expense. 
A typical example of the inappropriate and oppressive nature of Plaintiffs' requests 
is Request No. 12 of Plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents, which requested 
Doms to attempt to locate thousands of irrelevant documents: 
12. All diaries, journals, or other records kept by you from the 
period of time commencing January 1, 1978, and continuing to the 
date of your deposition, and which refer to, reflect upon, discuss, or 
relate to any purchases or sales of property by you, your wife, Michael 
R. McCoy, Mr. McCoy's wife, or any partnership, joint venture or 
other business relationship between you and Mr. McCoy, or any other 
third parties for the years from January 1, 1975, through the date of 
your deposition. 
On April 21, 1989, Plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions against Doms with 
voluminous supporting memoranda (R. 1401-1539). Doms filed a memorandum in 
opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions, which included numerous exhibits (R. 1574-
1674). 
On June 22,1989, the trial court issued a Minute Entry granting Plaintiffs' motion for 
sanctions "to the extent that the discovery sought relates to real property transactions (as 
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opposed to personally)," and granting Plaintiffs "reasonable attorney fees . . . to be 
determined at trial" (R. 1739; Add. 26). The trial court subsequently entered an Order 
regarding this Minute Entry ruling (R. 2329-33). 
Doms was surprised by the ruling of the trial court, because the trial court did not 
allow an opportunity for a hearing before awarding attorney's fees and expenses as required 
by Rule 37(a)(4), U.R.C.P. (Add. 27). Rule 37 of the Utah Rules is patterned after and 
virtually identical to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respected authorities 
point out that under Rule 37(a)(4) of the Federal Rules, a court must allow an opportunity 
for a hearing before awarding expenses and attorney's fees.5 
All of Doms' objections were "substantially justified" under Rule 37(a)(4), and 
therefore Plaintiffs were not entitled to any awards of attorney's fees or expenses. If the 
dispute over discovery between the parties is genuine, about which reasonable people could 
differ, then sanctions under Rule 37(a)(4) are inappropriate.6 Furthermore. Doms was in 
fact the prevailing party, at least in part, in regard to many of Plaintiffs' discovery requests 
because Doms' objections to Plaintiffs' requests regarding personal property were sustained 
in the trial court's Minute Entry ruling. Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4), Doms is entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees and expenses in regard to these objections, and/or the reasonable 
5
 See 8 C WRIGHT AND A. MILLER FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES § 2288 
(1970); 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE U 37.02[10] (1988). 
6
 See Advisory Committee Note to the 1970 Amendment to Rule 37(a), F.R.C.P.; 8 C. 
WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2288 (1970); 
4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 37.02[10] (1988). 
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expenses incurred by both Plaintiffs and Doms should be apportioned because Plaintiffs' 
motion was granted in part and denied in part. 
Under Rule 37(a)(4), the trial court is required to make findings and rule on each 
discovery request and objection thereto, in order to sufficiently identify the expenses or 
attorney's fees to which a party is entitled. Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950, 965-66 (Utah App. 1989). Such findings were never made by the trial court, and 
the award of attorney's fees to Plaintiffs ultimately made by the trial court must be reversed 
and remanded. 
Doms pointed out all of the foregoing case law and authority to the trial court in a 
motion for a hearing on the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Plaintiffs (R. 1740-42, 
1948-67). Contemporaneously with this motion for a hearing, Doms filed a motion for 
clarification of the trial court's Minute Entry ruling of June 22, 1989, and a motion for 
extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests (R. 1746-66,1767-71). Before 
Doms even had the opportunity to file his reply memorandum to Plaintiffs' responsive 
memoranda, the trial court issued another Minute Entry ruling on August 10,1989, in which 
all of Doms' motions were denied and additional attorney's fees were granted to Plaintiffs' 
to be determined at trial (R. 1968; Add. 28). This Minute Entry ruling was later issued as 
an Order of the trial court (R. 2362-70). Doms submits it was clearly inappropriate for the 
trial court to further sanction Doms in regard to his motion for hearing and motion for 
clarification (especially since the requested hearing is required by Rule 37(a)(4)), and 
therefore Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorney's fees or expenses in regard to these 
motions. 
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The trial court awarded Plaintiffs $4.750.00 pursuant to the June 22 and August 10, 
1989, Minute Entry rulings (F. of F. 70(a)(v)). This award constitutes an abuse of discretion 
by the trial court and must be reversed. 
F, Doms is entitled to a refund of a substantial amount of the attorney's fees and costs 
paid to Plaintiffs as a condition of the trial court setting aside the default judgment 
The trial court set aside the default judgment against Doms on the conditions that 
Doms pay attorney's fees to Plaintiffs pursuant to affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs' counsel, 
and obtain new counsel (R. 126-27). Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit and a supplemental 
affidavit in support of attorney's fees and costs in the total amount of $4,467.60 (R. 29-33, 
60-63; Add. 29). 
Doms paid the $4,467.60 pursuant to the Order of the trial court to comply with the 
conditions of setting aside the default judgment (R. 76-78). The trial court subsequently 
ordered that the amount of attorney's fees to which Plaintiffs were entitled would be 
decided by the trial court at a final disposition of the case on its merits (R. 245-47; Add. 
16). 
Plaintiffs are entitled only to those attorney's fees and costs directly incurred in 
obtaining the default judgment and the setting aside of the default judgment.7 An 
examination of Plaintiffs' affidavit and supplemental affidavit of attorney's fees and costs 
clearly reveals that Doms should receive a substantial refund of the $4,467.60 he paid to 
have the default judgment set aside. The trial court awarded the full $4,467.60 to Plaintiffs, 
7
 See, e ^ C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 2700 (1983); Annotations, 3 A.L.R. FED. 956 (1970); Nichiro Gyogvo Kaisha v. Norman, 
606 P.2d 401, 403 (Alaska 1980); Weitz v. Yankoskv. 409 P.2d 700, 706-07 (Cal. 1966). 
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thus allowing them to keep the money they had already been paid by Doms (F. of F. 
70(b)(i)). This ruling must be reversed and remanded with directions to award Plaintiffe 
only these attorney's fees and costs incurred in regard to the default judgment. 
G. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded. 
The trial court awarded Plaintiffe a total of $27,185.00 in attorney's fees for the 
services of Mcintosh, $13,790.00 in attorney's fees for the services of Biele, and $358.20 in 
costs (C. of L. 51-53; Judg. 1111 19-21). Plaintiffe are not entitled to any of these awards of 
attorney's fees and costs, and these rulings of the trial court should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's "findings of fact" on remand regarding alleged prejudice suffered by 
Plaintiffe through Doms' delay in seeking rescission are a complete fiction. There were no 
additional findings to be found in the record regarding prejudice because it simply was not 
an issue at trial. Because the trial court was unable to enter real additional findings of fact 
concerning prejudice on remand, Doms is entitled to rescission. 
In addition to rescission, Doms is entitled to fees at trial, and on appeal as the 
prevailing party at each. For the same reason, the trial court's award of fees to Plaintiffe 
should be vacated. Finally, Doms' overpayment of fees to Plaintiffe with respect to the 
default judgment should be refunded. 
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DATED this 2frc day of Hf&L , 1998. 
f&fL. 
iLLER 
Attorney'for Defendant/Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee Eugene E. Doms 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing, first class 
postage prepaid, on this 22*&day of Apri\ 1998 to: 
Irving H. Biele 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees and 
Cross-Appellants 
1351 Normandie Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
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ADDENDUM 1 
rr^-** 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Ellen Andersen, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D-C. Anderson; 
Ellen Andersen, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Michael R. McCoy; and Eugene E. Poms. 
Defendant, Appellee, and 
Cross-Appellant, 
Ellen Anderson, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D.C- Anderson; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Third-Parry Plaintiffs, Appellants, 
and Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Summit County Title Company, a Utah 
corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants, and 
Appellees, 
Ellen Anderson, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D^C. Anderson; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Summit County, a body corporate and 
politic of the State of Utah; and Blake 
L. Frazier, in his official capacity as 
Summit County Auditor; Gump & Ayers Real 
Estate, Inc., a Utah corporation; Victor 
R. Ayres; Dcmcoy Enterprises, Inc., a 
Utah corporation; Eucene E, Doras: 
unknown defendants described as John 
Does 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, 
Defendants, Appellees, and 
Cross-Appellant. 
MOV 0 4 tSS* 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
(Not For 
Publication) 
Case No- 920653-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 4, 1994) 
Third District, Summit County 
The Honorable John A- Rokich 
Attorneys: Irving H. Biele and Curtis C. Nesset, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
Larry R. Keller and Craig L. Boorman, Salt Lake City, 
for Cross-Appellant Eugene Doms 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellants raise several challenges to the trial court's 
determination to alicv appellee (Doms) to proceed with his 
counterclaim. Appellants7 arguments relating to the counterclaim 
include whether the statute of limitations barred the 
counterclaim, whether the counterclaim related back to the date 
appellants filed their foreclosure action, whether the deed Doms 
obtained from Dcmccy was valid, whether Doms was the real party 
in interest, vhe*cher Doms was a remote grantee, and whether the 
trial court improperly joined involuntary plaintiffs. We agree 
with the trial court's decision to allow .Doms to proceed with his 
counterclaim and find appellants7 arguments to be without merit. 
Thus, we decline to address them. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 
336, 396 (Utah 1939} (court may decline to address arguments 
without merit en appeal). 
In his cross-appeal, Doms asserts that the trial court 
improperly applied the equitable doctrine of laches and refused 
to rescind the Rossi Hills transaction. "To successfully assert 
a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the 
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the 
defendant was prejudiced by that delay." Borland v. Chandler, 
733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987); accord Paoanikolas Brothers Enter, 
v. Sucarhcuse Shoreinc Canter Assocs.. 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 
1975) ; Utah Deot. of Transo. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. , 
751 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1988) (defendant must establish 
prejudice before laches defense may be successfully asserted) ; 
see In re Petition of Merrill Cook. 249 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 
1994) (denying petition because petitioners failed to act with 
reasonable diligence and because relief requested "could work a 
substantial hardship on the State"). 
The trial ccurt made findings concerning Doms's delay in 
bringing the action but made no findings as to whether appellants 
were prejudiced by the delay.1 Therefore, we remand this case to 
1. We note that we do not agree that any time property increases 
or decreases in value, the prejudice prong of the laches defense 
is automatically met. See Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 988 
(Utah 1953) ("natural increment" in value of property does not 
constitute prejudice in laches claim); see also West Los Angeles 
Institute for Career Research v. Maver, 366 F.2d 220, 228 (9th 
Cir. 1965) (mere increase or decrease in property value does not 
(continued«...) 
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the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact 
relevant: to whether appellants were prejudiced by any delays in 
Dons pursuing his counterclaim. If the trial court cannot find 
from the evidence presented that the appellants were prejudiced 
by the delay, the ecuitable doctrine of laches should not bar the 
remedy of rescission*2 Accordingly, we remand this case to the 
trial court. 
Norman H. Jackson^Cucge 5^5 
WE CONCUR: 
CKadiHh M. B i l l i n g s , Judge 
greenwood, i Judge 
1. (. ..continued) 
alone convert delay into laches) ; Fitzgerald v. O'Connell, 386 
A.2d 1334, 1388 (R.I. 1978); (fact that property appreciated does 
not in and of itself convert delay into laches) ; Lincoln v. 
Fisher, 339 P.2d 1084, 1093 (Or- 1959). 
A chance in property value is one factor courts should 
consider in determining prejudice. Lawson v. Hanves, 170 F.2d 
741, 744 (10th Cir. 1943); Filler v. Richland County, 806 P.2d 
537f 540 (Mont. 1991); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 159 
(Utah 1976) . Further, other courts have determined that a change 
in property value did not prejudice landowners because the change 
could be taJcen into account by a court of equity in fashioning a 
just remedy. Small v. Badenhop, 701 P.2d 647, 658 (Haw. 1985). 
2. Because it is possible that the trial court will order the 
contract rescinded due to lack of evidence in the record 
concerning prejudice, we need not address the other claims 
raised. However, in the event the trial court does not rescind 
the transaction, the trial court should note that its findings 
and conclusions do net adequately treat the effect of the 
intervening conveyances to and from Domcoy on Doms,s right to 
pursue his counterclaims and the effect of the default judgment 
entered against McCoy and the sheriff's sale of McCoy's interest 
in Rossi Hills on Dcms's ownership interest in the property and 
any damages for breach of title warranties. 
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IRVING H. BEELE, USB #A0317 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
J A M E S A MCINTOSH, U S B #2194 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
1399 South 700 East, Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 
By 
FILED DtSTaCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 0 4 1996 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
OoutyCJam 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
D. C. Anderson, DAN SCOTT, 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EUGENE E. POMS and 
MICHAEL R. McCOY, 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AS PER THE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 8339 
Judge John A. Rokich 
From the evidence and law adduced at trial of this case, the Court makes the following 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The real estate transaction between the plaintiffs and the defendants relating to the 
Rossi Hills Property in Summit County, State of Utah, was an arms-length transaction conducted 
in good faith and wherein the Defendant Doms had full knowledge of the encumbrances (Second 
Amended Findings of Fact #41 and #43) and as heretofore found there was no fraud or 
misrepresentation involved in the sale. 
2. Doms determined that the property value could be enhanced if it was developed 
with two other adjoining parcels and purchased an interest in one of the adjoining parcels, 
slipper parcel, so that an integrated development could take place and he proceeded to try to 
develop the properties even though he had no experience in that area. 
3. Doms did not raise the issue of rescission at the time of the conveyance from him 
and McCoy to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. on August 30, 1983. (See Ex. 16), nor did he raise 
the issue of rescission when he requested and obtained a warranty deed to the property from 
Domcoy on August 20, 1988. Doms' actions and conduct indicated he wanted to own the subject 
property despite the encroachments and prescriptive easements and did not act to rescind the 
transaction. 
4. The findings of fact heretofore made by this Court found that Doms had 
familiarized himself with the property, knew of the encroachments, the loop road and that 
Anderson's property development could be enhanced if developed with two other adjoining 
parcels. Doms proceeded to try and develop the property even though he had no experience in 
developing real estate and was unfamiliar with land development in the Park City area. 
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5. It was evident to the Court that Doms was motivated by the lure of a quick profit 
and did not take the time or make the effort to make a sound economic evaluation for the 
development of die property. 
6. Doms' motivation caused him to purchase an interest in the slipper parcel so that 
an integrated development could take place. However, he was unsuccessful in obtaining the 
I 
third parcel which would have made the project more feasible and profitable. 
7. The Defendant Doms' claim for rescission was based on two theories, the first 
being stated in the first cause of action of the Counterclaim which claimed a violation of the 
covenants against encumbrances as the same were contained in the warranty deed; and the 
second claim was contained in the third cause of action which claimed rescission based on fraud. 
I 
(See Second Amended Counterclaim). 
a. In relation to the first cause of action, the court found that all the 
preliminary documents were merged into the warranty deed (Second Amended Findings 
of Fact #54 and Second Amended Conclusions of Law #7) and the doctrine of Bersstrom 
v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984) did not apply as this was an executed contract 
rather than an executory contract as existed in Bersstrom v. Moore. Mavnard v. 
Wharton. 284 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, (Utah Ct. App. February 23, 1996) citing other Utah 
Appellate Court Decisions, some of which were discussed by this Court in its Second 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
b. The Defendant Doms abandoned his claim for fraud and misrepresentation 
as set forth in the third cause of action of the counterclaim and the court concluded that 
there was no fraud or negligent misrepresentation in this matter. Plaintiffs had* not made 
representations which were false or that would have induced Doms to enter into the 
transaction to his injury and damage. Furthermore, there was no showing that the 
plaintiffs were in a superior position and negligently made false reprsentations about the 
property which they could expect Doms to rely and act thereon. (Second Amended 
Conclusion of Law #41) 
8. During March 1982 the Deed, Note and Trust Deed were all signed, delivered 
and recorded (Exhibits #1 and #3). The purchase price was paid by cash and the execution of 
the Promissory Note. 
9. The defendants entered into possession of the real estate and commenced 
negotiations for a three-parcel integrated development with adjoining property owners (Second 
Amended Findings of Fact #46 and Exhibits #81 and #82). 
10. The first offer for rescission by either of the defendant parties was made by Doms 
through the filing of his second amended counterclaim on or about June, 1988, which was more 
than six (6) years after the completion of the purchase agreement and after he obtained 
knowledge of the claimed defects (R. 6882-3 and Second Amended Finding of Fact #43). The 
Court found and now finds that this is a grossly unreasonable delay in requesting rescission 
(Second Amended Conclusions of Law No's. 33, 35, 39, 40) for the following reasons: 
a. Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. 
He purchased the slipper parcel and attempted to formulate a plan for a three-parcel 
integrated development, but was unsuccessful. The plaintiffs are now foreclosed from 
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developing an integrated development because Doms has an interest in the slipper parcel 
and the likelihood of Doms cooperating with the plaintiffs in an integrated development 
is remote. 
b. Doms failed to pay the property taxes for the years 1982, 1983, 1984, 
1985 and 1986, which resulted in a tax sale and required the plaintiffs to initiate legal 
action to clear the title. 
c. D. C. Anderson, one of the principals in the transaction, died while Doms 
was in possession of the property, thus making it impossible to elicit testimony from the 
decedent. 
d. Doms' delay of more than six (6) years before he sought to rescind the 
transaction adversely affected the plaintiffs' opportunity to resolve the encroachment and 
easement problems because witnesses would be unavailable and memories are dimmed 
by the lapse of time. 
e. During the time that Doms, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. and Summit County 
were in possession of the property, the property suffered a 50% reduction in its value. 
f. Doms' inexperience in developing property or inability to sell the property 
impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of down turn in the real estate market and the 
increased costs to develop the property if they chose to do so. 
g. Doms should not benefit from his poor decisions at the expense of the 
plaintiffs. To allow that to happen would be inequitable. 
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h. Doms was in default; therefore, could not invoke the doctrine of 
rescission. 
11. On August 30, 1983, the defendants and each of them, by warranty deed, 
conveyed the Rossi Hills Property to a corporation named Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. (Exhibits 
81 and 82) If Doms is claiming that this deed conveyed all of Mr. McCoy's interest so that it 
was not subject to foreclosure, then it also conveyed all of Doms' interest and he would have 
no basis for rescission or enforcement of plaintiffs' March 10, 1982 warranty deed to him and 
Mr. McCoy. 
12. Neither of the defendants had title or color of title to the subject premises between 
August 30, 1983, when they deeded the premises to the corporation, until August 20, 1988, 
when the dissolved corporation, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., delivered a conveyance of the subject 
Property to Mr. Doms. (Exhibit 12). 
13. The trust deed required the defendants and each of them to pay the accruing taxes 
on the Property (Exhibit 2) and the defendants failed to pay the taxes for the years 1982, 1983, 
1984, 1985 and 1986. 
14. The defendants and each of them were in substantial default under the provisions 
of the Trust Deed as they failed to pay the required real estate taxes which resulted in the sale 
of the Property to Summit County on May 27, 1987 (Notice of Final Tax Sale - Exhibit 5 to 
Complaint in consolidated case #10066). 
15. Subsequent to the said tax sale on May 27, 1987, Summit County, as a body 
corporate and politic of the State of Utah, held the fee simple title to the Rossi Hill Property 
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until on or about August 24. 1988. See §59-2-1357, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
which was in effect at the time of the said tax sale and the Utah Supreme Coun case of Hanson 
v. Burris. 46 P.2d 400, 403, 406 (Utah 1935). 
16. The result of a valid Auditor's Deed conveying the fee simple title to the Rossi 
Hill Property to Summit County, would cause the security represented by the Trust Deed to be 
extinguished. See Hanson v. Burris. 46 P.2d 400, 403, 406 (Utah 1935). Therefore, plaintiffs, 
in order to protect their security interests, were required to institute an action against Summit 
County to set aside the Auditor's Tax Deed. This coun found the sale to be unconstitutional and 
therefore plaintiffs' Trust Deed was reinstated. (Consolidated Case #10066 and Exhibit 5 to the 
Complaint in such consolidated case.) 
17. Defendant Michael R. McCoy defaulted in this case, a judgment was entered 
against him (R. 34-40; R. 572,3) and in accordance with said judgment, his undivided one-half 
interest was sold at sheriffs sale as per the Certificate of Sale which is attached hereto. There 
is no evidence that Doms made any attempt to redeem the property at any time subsequent to 
said sheriffs sale, nor did the said defendant, Michael R. McCoy, join in the actions for 
rescission or tender his interest in the subject real estate. Under these circumstances McCoy's 
former interest in the property could not be conveyed to the plaintiffs in any attempted rescission 
by Doms. 
18. The defendants and each of them were in default as the payments required by the 
Promissory Note to be made after September, 1984, were not paid (Exhibit 6), nor were the 
taxes paid. 
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19. One of the grantors, Mr. D. C. Anderson, died in Salt Lake City, Utah on 
September 20, 1983, making it impossible to elicit testimony from him. Mr. Anderson's estate 
was duly probated and his wife, Ellen R. Anderson, was duly appointed personal representative 
of his estate and has been acting as such since November 30, 1983. Neither of the defendants 
filed a claim for either damages or rescission against the estate. (R. 7988) 
20. From August 30, 1983 (when Doms and McCoy conveyed their title in the 
property to Domcoy) through the date of the tax sale on May 27, 1987 (when Summit County 
acquired fee simple title to the property) the corporation, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., was the sole 
owner of the Rossi Hills Property having acquired title thereto subject to the trust deed, by 
reason of a warranty deed from both defendants to it dated August 30, 1983. (Exhibits 81 and 
82). The Defendant Doms did not reacquire any interest in Rossi Hills Property until August 
20, 1988, when the dissolved corporation, Domcoy, delivered a conveyance to Mr. Doms. 
(Exhibit 17) 
21. During the time that Doms, Domcoy Enterprises, and Summit County had title 
to the property, the property suffered a 50% reduction in its value. 
22. At no time, by pleading or otherwise, did the Defendant Doms or any other party 
owning an interest in the Rossi Hills Property make a legally sufficient tender the same to the 
plaintiffs. 
23. The March 10, 1982 deed from plaintiffs to the defendants and involving the Rossi 
Hills Property created a fully integrated contract involving two grantees or purchasers, each of 
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whom acquired an undivided one-half interest. (Exhibit 1, Second Amended Findings of Fact 
#54, and Second Amended Conclusions of Law #7.) 
SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Doctrine of Rescission was not available to the defendant and counterclaimant 
Doms for the following reasons: 
a. The Defendant Doms obtained only an undivided one-half interest in the 
Rossi Hills Property by reason of die March 10, 1982 deed (Exhibit 1) and a joint action 
by all co-owners is required in order to repudiate or rescind the contract. 
b. The default of the defendants in failing to pay accruing taxes and to 
continue the payments required by the contract constituted substantial defaults and a 
person in default cannot invoke the doctrine of rescission or repudiation. 
c. In order to rescind, it must be possible to return all parties to the status 
quo and this is not now possible because: 
i. no claim for either damages, rescission, or other relief was made 
against the estate of D. C. Anderson and it cannot be required to regurgitate 
payments made to it; 
ii. the defendant/co-owner Michael McCoy's undivided one-half 
interest has been sold at sheriffs sale and is not available to return the parties to 
the status quo; and, 
iii. Doms, being motivated by the lure of a quick profit, did not take 
time to make a sound evaluation for the development of the property. 
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It would be inequitable to allow Doms to rescind under these circumstances. 
d. The Defendants had no right, title or interest in and to the real estate 
subsequent to August 30, 1983, when they conveyed the Rossi Hills Property to Domcoy 
Enterprises, Inc. or prior to August 20, 1988, when the dissolved corporation attempted 
to convey the Property to Mr. Doms. This constitutes the entire pleading stage of the 
action and since the defendants during that period had no interest in the Rossi Hills 
Property, they could not tender the same to the plaintiffs. 
e. Since all prior Uniform Real Estate Contracts and representations were 
merged into the final document, the March 10, 1982 deed, (Second Amended Finding 
of Fact #54) this is a fully executed contract and the doctrine of rescission espoused in 
Bersstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984) is not applicable since that case 
pertains only to executory contracts where the sale documents are still in escrow and 
have not been delivered or recorded and the purchase price has not been paid (Second 
Amended Conclusions of Law #7 and #11). 
f. Doms did not have the grounds for rescission based upon fraud or 
negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs had not made representations which were false 
or that would have induced Doms to enter into the transaction to his injury and damage. 
Furthermore, there was no showing that the plaintiffs were in a superior position and 
negligently made false representations about the property which they could expect Doms 
to rely and act thereon. 
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g. It was evident to the Court that Doms was motivated by the lure of a quick 
profit and did not take the time or make the effort to make a sound economic evaluation 
for the development of the property. 
h. Doms' motivation caused him to purchase an interest in the slipper parcel 
so that an integrated development could take place. However, he was unsuccessful in 
obtaining the third parcel which would have made the project more feasible and 
profitable. 
i. This Court now concludes that when Doms realized he did not have the 
experience to develop the property, that he was in over his head in the transaction, and 
when the bottom fell out of the real estate market in Park City, he sought to rescind, 
which was an unavailable remedy in this Court's opinion. In other words, Doms was 
suffering from buyer's remorse and trying to find a way out by trying to rescind. 
2. The plaintiffs were substantially prejudiced as a result of: 
a. The failure to pay the real estate taxes for the years 1982, 1983, 1984, 
1985 and 1986, caused Summit County, a body corporate and politic, of the State of 
Utah, to hold a tax sale on May 27, 1987 and since no one made a bid on the Property 
at such sale, an Auditor's Tax Deed conveying the fee simple title to the Rossi Hills 
Property in Summit County was executed which if valid would have eliminated all right, 
title and interest of the plaintiffs in and to the Property, Hanson v. Bums, 46 P.2d 400, 
403, 406 (Utah 1935). 
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b. The failure to pay real estate taxes which resulted in a tax sale of the 
subject Property to Summit County required plaintiffs to institute an action against 
Summit County to declare that the Auditor's Tax Deed conveying fee simple title to the 
Rossi Hill Property to Summit County was void thereby reinstating the plaintiffs' Trust 
Deed which required the expenditure of substantial sums by the plaintiffs. (Second 
Amended Findings of Fact, #42 and #43) 
c. Doms, Domcoy, and Summit County for over six (6) years (March 10, 
1982 - August 26, 1988) had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the 
plaintiffs, changed the condition of the property in relation to adjacent properties and 
foreclosed the plaintiffs from taking any prompt corrective action in relation to 
encumbrances. 
d. The death of D. C. Anderson and the failure to file any claim against his 
estate made it impossible to elicit his testimony in relation to the terms and conditions 
of the sale or to require his estate to participate in any judgment or decree. 
e. The delay of approximately five years after knowledge of the encumbrance 
and before requesting rescission was unreasonable and allowed market forces to adversely 
affect the value of the subject Property to the prejudice of the plaintiffs. 
(iJ This Court recognizes the doctrine of prejudice established in the Utah 
Supreme Court case of Jacobson v. Jacobson. 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976), cited by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in its Memorandum Decision. This Court believes all the 
elements found to exist in Jacobson are also present in the instant case as more fully 
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described in the Findings of Fact above including the fact that (1) an original seller D. 
C. Anderson, had died and his testimony as to the transaction was no longer available; 
(2) the Rossi Hill Property had a 50% reduction in value during the five years when 
Doms and Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. had the exclusive possession of the property; (3) the 
entire Rossi Hill Property had been conveyed by Doms and McCoy to a third party, to 
wit, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc.; (4) Doms as an equal fifty percent (50%) shareholder in 
Domcoy, received the full benefit of the value of the Rossi Hill Property because his 
shareholding interests would have been increased by the value which the Rossi Hill 
Property contributed to the net worth of Domcoy; and (5) at the time the defendants 
conveyed their interest to Domcoy, the Property was worth as much as it was when they 
purchased the Property from the plaintiffs. 
g. The undivided one-half interest of Michael R. McCoy, a defendant in the 
case, was sold at sheriffs sale so that only a 50% interest in the Property could be 
tendered for rescission. 
h. Doms had the use and benefit of the property to the exclusion of the 
plaintiffs. He purchased the slipper parcel and attempted to formulate a plan for a three-
parcel integrated development, but was unsuccessful. The plaintiffs are now foreclosed 
from developing an integrated development because Doms has an interest in the slipper 
parcel and the likelihood of Doms cooperating with the plaintiffs in an integrated 
development is remote. 
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i. Doms' inexperience in developing property or inability to sell the property 
impacted the plaintiffs greatly because of down turn in the real estate market and the 
increased costs to develop the property if they chose to do so. 
j . Doms should not benefit from his poor decisions at the expense of the 
plaintiffs. To allow that to happen would be inequitable. 
k. Doms was in default; therefore, could not invoke the doctrine of 
rescission. 
3. The other matters referred to in the court of appeals' note 2 are reserved for 
additional hearing and consideration. 
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CERTD7ICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
CAROL A. DeMILL, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and that she caused the attached SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS PER THE MEMORANDUM DECISION OF THE COURT 
OF APPEALS to be served upon counsel of record by causing the same to be hand 
delivered as follows: 
Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
KELLER & LUNDGREN 
(Attorney for Defendant Eugene E. Doms) 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on this 15th day of May, 1996. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of May, 1996. 
NOTARY PUBLIC fj 
Residing at Salt Lake County, UT * 
My Commission Expires: 
RED NOTE. a« SK ^_ 
„g H. B i e l e , A0317, o-f, 
k HASLAM J< HATCH 
Ineys -for F l a i n t i - f - f 
e et Broadway, Four th F l o o r 
La*:e C i t y , Utah 84101 
304242 
89 FEB - 8 AH 9: 32 
ALAN SPRIGGS 
SUMHIT COUNTY RECOROER 
REC'D BY. 
CERTIFICATE OF SALE 
IN THE"THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
N ANDERSON as Personal 
t e n t a t i v e -for t h e E s t a t e o-f 
I ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT, ELLEN 
[SON p e r s o n a l l y , and JEANNE 
!T, 
P l a i n t i -f-f s , 
v s 
aEL R. MCCOY AND EUGENE E. DOMS. 
Civil No. 8339 
Judgment Rendered 
January 20, 1988 
Order o-f Sale Issued; 
October 21, 198S 
Property Sold: 
December 12th, 1988 
De-f endants 
The Sheriff o-f Summit County, State o-f Utah, hereby certifies as -follows: 
1- On December 12th, 1988, pursuant to Rule 69 (e) o-f the Utah Rules 
livil Procedure, the undersigned Sheri-f-f conducted an order o-f sale on 
*ain Real property located in Summit County, Utah, legally described as 
bws: 
PARCEL NO. 1: 
All o-f Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 
29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to 
the amended plat thereo-f, as filed and o-f record in the 
o-f-fice o-f the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: 
A l l o-f Lo ts 17 and 19 , Block 5 9 , Park C i t y S u r v e y , according 
t o t h e amended p l a t thereo- f , as - f i l e d and o-f r e c o r d i n the 
o-f -f i c e o-f t h e Summit County Recorder , e x c e p t i n g the re f rom 
any p o r t i o n l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h e r e a i l r o a d r i g h t s o-f way as 
d e s c r i b e d i n t h o s e c e r t a i n documents recorded as E n t r y No. 
8176 i n Book C a t Page 4 0 1 , E n t r y No. 13316 i n Book H a t 
Page 3 2 6 , and E n t r y No. 13610 in Book H a t Page 3 7 3 , records 
o-f Summit County , U t a h . 
PARCEL NO. 3i •». 5U«t3G8_2Cfi 
of the Summit Co* "»ty Recorder, excepting r-retrom any portion 
located within t, . railroad rights of way . , described in 
those certain documents recotded a^.Entry No, .8176 in Book C 
at Page. 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book. H at Page 326, and Entry 
No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah. 
TOGETHER WITH AN EASEMENT FOR UTILITIES, 
WATER LINES OVER AND SOUTHERLY FIVE FEET 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED LOTS. 
INCLUDING SEWER AND 
AND NORTHERLY FIVE FEET OF 
• All o-f Lot 14, the South 1/2 o-f Lot 15, Block 58, Park City 
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as -filed and o-f 
record in the o-f-Fice o-f the Summit County Records, 
The above described real property is located in Park City, 
Summit County, Utah. 
2— All right, title, interest and claim o-f said De-fendant, Michael R. 
:y in and to the above described property, including the seller's interest 
any real property contract relating to that above described real property 
:onveyed to Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative -for the Estate o-f 
Anderson, Dan Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne Scott. 
3— The above described property was sold -for a total purchase price paid 
[lien Anderson as Personal Representative -for the Estate o-f D.C. Anderson, 
Scott, Ellen Anderson personally, and Jeanne Scott, in the amount o-f 
500.00, leaving a balance due on judgment in the amount o-f $339,942.94. 
This real property listed above is subject to six month redemption 
DATED this 15th day o-f December, 1988. 
Sheriff Fred Eley 
Summit County Sheriff D e p t , 
*TE OF 
M
* Sll^gQg 
s s . 
"" *~ ~ * " "•
 ?d b e f o r e me F r e d 
of Summit C o u n t y , 
<h H h e / s i g n e r ** o f t h e a b o v e i n s t r u m e n t , who d u l y acknowledged t o me t h a t he 
t u t e c f ' t K e '-saifa*. 
• Or^  ^H<^%-15fch; d | y o f D e c e m b e r , 1 9 8 8 , p e r s o n a l l y appearec 
V \ w K o r b e i n g B l t l y s w o r n d i d s a y t h a t h e i s t h e S h e r i f f -
a r y Publytyi 
H d i n g : pfens 
C o m m i s s i o n A 
* / f e r , Ut 
L::pi r e s : J u l y 15, 1991 
ADDENDUM 3 
LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
KELLER & LUNDGREN, L.C. 
Attorney for Defendant Eugene E. Doms 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal, 
Representative of the Estate 
of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT, 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY AND 
EUGENE E. DOMS, 
Defendants. 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal, 
Representative of the Estate 
of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT, 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Third Party Defendant. 
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BEST YBfic 539 
ORDER ON COURTS 
MINUTE ENTRY OF 
MAY 6, 1997 
Civil No. 8339 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D.G ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and 
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee, 
Plaintiffs, 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of 
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his 
official capacity as Summit 
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS 
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah 
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS; 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a 
Utah corporation; EUGENE E. 
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 10066 
The above-entitled matter came before me, the Honorable John A. Rokich, Senior 
District Court Judge, pursuant to remand from the Utah Court of Appeals requiring 
additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating to the above-entitled matter. 
The Court having reviewed its notes and the memoranda filed by respective 
counsel, concludes that the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed by 
Defendant Doms on March 10, 1997 are adopted by the Court. By the adoption of these 
Facts and Conclusions, which will follow, the Court in its opinion has adequately treated 
the effect of the intervening conveyance to and from Domcoy on Doms' right to pursue 
2 
his counterclaims and the effect of the Default Judgment entered against McCoy and the 
sheriffs sale of McCoy's interest, if any, in Rossi Hills on Doms' ownership interest in 
the property and any damages for breach of title warranties. 
The Court allowed an additional hearing at which both parties were heard through 
their respective counsel on January 28, 1997. Respective counsel also submitted 
memoranda and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court. 
Being fully advised of the parties' positions herein, the Court herein makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendants Doms and McCoy, as tenants in common, conveyed Rossi Hills 
to Domcoy, Inc., a Utah corporation, by warranty deed dated August 20, 1983. 
2. The two corporate officers of Domcoy at that time were McCoy as 
president, and Doms as secretary/treasurer, and the directors were Doms and his wife, 
and McCoy and his wife. 
3. In March of 1985, McCoy and his wife irrevocably tendered all their voting 
rights in their shares of Domcoy, Inc. stock to Defendant Doms and resigned from the 
corporation. 
4. Prior to this time, Doms' wife, who was never involved in the business of 
Domcoy, had also resigned from Domcoy. 
5. Doms became the only officer and director of Domcoy, and still is the only 
officer and director to this date. 
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6. On December 31, 1986, Doms allowed Domcoy to be involuntarily 
dissolved by the Utah Division of Corporations for failure to file annual reports because 
Doms was the only remaining officer and director of Domcoy; and Domcoy, therefore, 
no longer had the minimum number of officers and directors required by Utah law and 
the Certificate of Incorporation of Domcoy. 
7. By August of 1988, when Domcoy deeded Rossi Hills to Doms, Domcoy 
was no longer conducting any business except "winding up" its affairs as a dissolved 
corporation. 
8. As a result of these transactions, Domcoy had no board of directors which 
could adopt a resolution regarding the transfer of Rossi Hills, and Doms was the only 
shareholder entitled to vote because McCoy and his wife had irrevocably tendered their 
voting rights and their shares of Domcoy stock to Doms in March of 1985. 
9. A sheriffs sale occurred on December 12, 1988, by the Sheriff of Summit 
County and a corrected sheriffs deed bears the date of June 26, 1989, transferring the 
interests of defendant McCoy in the Rossi Hills property to plaintiffs. 
10. At the time of the issuance of the sheriffs deed, defendant McCoy had no 
ownership interest whatsoever in the Rossi Hills property. 
11. Doms and McCoy did not purchase the property as a partnership, and at 
no time did either party hold the property as a partnership. 
12. Plaintiffs have not sued Doms and McCoy in this lawsuit as a partnership, 
and have never obtained or attempted to obtain a Judgment against Doms and McCoy as 
4 
a partnership. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Despite intervening conveyances between Doms and McCoy to Domcoy, 
the foreclosure upon title to the Rossi Hills property by Summit County, and the 
subsequent reconveyance to Doms by Summit County, Doms presently holds clear title to 
the property and his right to pursue his counterclaim is not affected. 
2. Plaintiffs lack standing to attack the validity of the Warranty Deed 
conveying Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms which is a valid deed vesting title to the 
property in Doms. 
3. Doms is prosecuting his Second Amended Counterclaim as the real party 
in interest, because Rossi Hills was never partnership property. 
4. The Default Judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriffs sale of 
McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills has no effect on Doms' ownership interest in the 
property and his ability to collect damages for breach of title warranties, because McCoy 
had no ownership interest in Rossi Hills when the sheriffs sale pursuant to the Default 
Judgment against McCoy was conducted; and plaintiffs, therefore, acquired no ownership 
interest in the property from the sheriffs sale. 
5. Since rescission has been denied by this Court based upon the doctrine of 
laches, Doms still has available to him the remedy of damages based upon plaintiffs' 
breach of the warranty against encumbrances. 
6. This Court now concludes that it has now met the requirements of the 
5 
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decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in remanding this case back to this Court for 
further Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and this Order shall be deemed final 
for purposes of appeal on the date in which it is signed. 
DATED this ff day oiS^fT&~ , 1997. 
o^li'Ljj"/// 
> 
~ \ 
A. ROKICH 
IOR DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be 
mailed, by first class U.S. postage prepaid, this £>j<\ day of \ lliflf , 1997, to: 
Irving H. Biele 
Nygaard, Coke & Vincent 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
James A. Mcintosh 
James A. Mcintosh & Associates 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
JUlJbi OlQ^a 
Oftft'\7 \T THfir r t. I. 
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The above-entitled cause of action came on 
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Senior Judge pro tern of the Third Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah, at Summit County, on Friday, 
October 27, 1995. 
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vs. Michael ?. 
: 2". 1995, Judge Rokich, in the conference 
.::r. senior pro tern Judge. 
::-:i COURT: Lee m e — Ellen Anderson et al. 
llz Zzy, et al., Case No. 8339, and the 
• needing today is to either set a 
ierer.ee or maybe get it resolved here this 
rpears to me from reading the memorandum 
here is with regard to rescission. 
EL. KELLER: That is correct, Your Honor. 
~'£Z ZOURT: I thought I made that quite 
:--li net allow the rescission at the time we 
:av= a: 
I!?.. 3ISLE: You did. 
HR. EZLLER: Your Honor
 r if I may. We are 
:ty initially. We filed the first motion to 
Zzizz of Appeals1 decision. I would like tc 
:unity to explain that to you if ycu will let 
THE COURT: Yes. I just wanted to know that 
is :e issue. 
a * • * « . « • ) . . • r f*** 2i ^ "•• ** ' 
. *vZLLER: It is the issue, Judge, but 
:g cf rescission is the issue. 
Essentially v'-zz the Court of Appeals has said is they 
found zhaz your Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
tc the issue cf unreasonable delay were appropriate. You 
found -ha- -here was unreasonable delay. But what they 
•hen said was -hat is not enough to implement the 
affirmative defense of laches. That, in fact, in order to 
prevail- rescission through laches as you have done, you 
have -o make Findings of Fact regarding prejudice to the 
?ar~7 that is alleging the laches- So even though you 
found there was nc rescission because of the unreasonable 
delay, ycu made nc findings whatsoever with regard to the 
issue cf prejudice. And the Court of Appeals is very 
specific. Judge, and essentially they upheld you- Do you 
have that Court cf Appeals1 decision? 
7HZ COURT: Yes, I have it now. 
M?.. 3CELLER: On the second page, Your Honor. 
I ask ycu :: read along so there is no question. The very 
first paragraph Judge Jackson talks about the challenges 
raised :: Ccms* counterclaim for rescission. They list 
si:c cf these challenges and they state, "We agree with the 
trial court's decision to allow Doms to proceed with his 
counterclaim and find appellant's arguments to be without 
merit. Thus we decline to address them." So they first 
upheld you en your decision to allowing Doms to proceed 
with counterclaim. 
Then with regard to the issue of laches, the 
court states that, "To successfully assert a laches 
defense," I am reading the second paragraph now, "a 
defendant must: establish both that the plaintiff 
unreasonably delayed in bringing an action, and that the 
defendant was prejudiced." 
In the last paragraph on that page, before 
the footnote it begins, "The trial court made findings 
concerning Dents' delay in brining the action but made no 
findings as to whether appellants were prejudiced by the 
delay." In the footnote they note that, "We do not agree 
that any time property increases or decreases in value the 
prejudice prong of the laches defense is automatically 
met." 
That footnote goes on to the next page, 
Your Honor, and they cite several cases for that 
proposition and they say a change in property value is one 
factor the court should consider in determining prejudice. 
So then the last sentence on the second page before the 
footnote is, "Therefore, we remand this case to," over to 
page. 3, "the trial court for the purpose of entering 
findings of fact relevant to whether appellants were 
prejudiced by any delays in Doms pursuing the 
counterclaim. If the trial court cannot find from the 
evidence presented," and I am reading just above, up here 
Judge. "If the trial court cannot find from the evidence 
presented that the appellants were prejudiced by the 
delay, the equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the 
remedy cf rescission. Accordingly, we remand this case to 
the -rial court." 
So it is cur position in this motion, Judge, 
that the plaintiffs now have the burden of coining forward 
and establishing zc you the prejudice from the record. I 
mean, this is not a situation where we are opening 
anything up. 
THE COURT: I think probably what has 
happened here. I go through my notes, is the fact that 
laches wasn't the only basis upon which I made my 
decision. That is the thing. In fact, I recall from 
going back from my recollection, a number of factors that 
I considered in outlining my decision. I think one cf 
them was your client couldn't wait to get into that 
property. I didn't find fraud. I didn't find 
misrepresentation. It was just an out-and-out sale of the 
property which he bought. And in order for them to latch 
onto this one issue, I think is out in left field, if you 
want to know the truth of the matter. 
MR. KELLER: May I respond briefly to that, 
Judge? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. KELLER: I respect your opinion, but I 
would like for you to understand that essentially the 
Court of Appeals is saying that whether you found that 
f 
ether issuss should control this case or not, they believe 
-ha- rescission should control unless you find the second 
prong cf laches. 
THE COURT: I don't think even laches is a 
necessary issue in this case. That is my— And I went 
ever -his. Luckily I have kept: my notes, and I don't 
find— I was surprised a~ this decision that laches was a 
con-roiling issue. I don't find that to be the case. 
MR. KELLER: But the Court of Appeals 
decided otherwise. Judge, and now they have asked you to 
do something specific. The question is what are you going 
wO cc rrcm nere." 
THE COURT: I will have to go back through 
my notes and I will just write— I don't know the 
necessity of another hearing. 
MR.. KELLER: I propose, Judge, that what we 
maybe ought to dc is have them present to you their 
position with regard to what prejudice is, and then let us 
respond to that. 
THE COURT: I don't think that is absolutely 
necessary. I don't think that is absolutely necessary. I 
am going to go back through my notes and I will review and 
I have to go back through your proposed Findings. I may 
have created the problem for not including Findings in my 
memorandum decision. Whoever prepared the final Findings 
didn't address "his issue and so, therefore, what I would 
suggest and what Z have beer, thinking about, is why don't 
you each prepare seme proposed Findings with regards to 
this issue of rescission- It might be repetitive of what 
you did before, and file those and then we can have 
another hearing and I will review them with you. But I 
will give you each ten days to file some proposed findings 
concerning the issue of rescission, and I will go back 
over my notes that I kept and review them and review what 
Z do have and if Z don't have all of them I will call you, 
but that is what Z am going to do. I don't see the 
necessity cf another hearing in this case. 
MR. KELLER: Well, there is something mere 
here too ycu need to understand, Judge. The court has 
also instructed ycu that if you find there was adequate 
prejudice tt establish that the doctrine of laches should 
prevent the rescission in this case, then it says in 
footnote two, it is very important. 
THE COURT: I don't care what the— I 
shouldn't say Z don't care. But I think they are off on 
the wrong tact in this case and I am going to go back over 
the Findings and then we will submit that; and then if 
they want to reverse me again, that is fine. 
MS.. KELLER: But, Judge, there are some 
specific instructions too. 
THE COURT: They may give me those 
instructions. They may give me chose specific 
instructions. The appellate court is not always right. 
And when Z nade that decision, I recall specifically that 
was the first thing we decided in this case, remember: 
vr
—~hsr :: rescind and take the counterclaim. And I, at 
that time. Z made my ruling that laches and prejudice was 
~-~. Sc whoever read the transcript, whether they did or 
didn't. Z ±z-'z know, but they only read what you submit 
zz then. And I think the appellate court doesn't have all 
of the farts for them to make such a ruling. That is my 
MR. KELLER: Judge, I have the highest 
regard for ycu, sir. I want you to know that. I am 
asking ycu new if. on the record, ycu are stating that you 
den't intend to fellow the direction of the Court of 
Appeals? Is that what ycu are saying? 
THE COURT: No, I am not saying that. I am 
saying that Z am going back and review my notes and find 
cut eicacnly what I based my decision on, and then I am 
gcing to have the three of you review it. But at this 
juncture Z don't think that this issue they raised is the 
basis u?cn which I made my decision. This happened a 
couple cf years ago and this case has gone on forever. 
I will get that resolved in the next— We 
will se: a hearing date so I can gee you back together 
here. Z will ss: it right new so that we can get that 
case resolved. And I will review the case in line with 
this case and in line with my notes, 
Mr.. 3ISLE: You would like us to submit 
proposed Findincs? 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. KELLER: 3ut not legal argument or 
cases, just prepesed Findings? 
THE COURT: Proposed Findings. I will go 
ever the- ~ith my notes and I will get back to you, get 
back together and then we will have argument. 
MR. 31ELE: If we need to go further, then 
we will lock at footnote two. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. KELLER: Judge, will you just allow me 
to address the subject of other things that the Court of 
Appeals has asked you to do? 
THE COURT: Sure. I don't preclude 
anytning. 
MR. KELLER: I understand you think the 
Court of Appeals was wrong on laches. I appreciate that. 
In footnete two they suggest that if you decide there was 
adequate prejudice in this case to allow the second prong 
of laches to prevent rescission for Doms, there are other 
findings ycu need to make. It seems to me what you are 
saying, ycu think "here was adequate prejudice. You are 
grir.g " r: bark zz ycur notes and lock at this, and then 
ycu will h = -.-s us argue that. But it is clear that isn't 
the only -hing ycu have been instructed to do* Ycu 
THE COURT: But my concern is, in the first 
instance, is -ha- this was net a contract wherein there 
v a s
 — T —isrerresentaticn, any fraud. 
MR. SELLER: Doesn't need to be, Judge. 
THE 30URT: It was an arm's-length and your 
client wanted zz rescind. 
11?.. SELLER: Right, because of the statutory 
warranty against encumbrances which was violated. You 
found it --as violated. Ycu said rescission was no good. 
Yru found that they were in violation of the statutory 
V£r
^anty against encumbrances and you awarded damages to 
THE COURT: Right. 
2!?.. SELLER: In addition to other remedies 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. SELLER: The issue here is the Court of 
Appeals is saying to you, sir, you were wrong in making 
the decision based upon the Findings of Fact. You held 
that laches should prevent rescission and if ycu don't 
find prejudice frcr. this, then rescission should apply. 
That is what -hey are saying- You understand? 
7HI COURT: I understand what they have 
said, but my concern is whether that is the basis upon 
which the decision was made or why that was raised. 
MR. KELLER: That is the fundamental issue 
in this case. It truly is. 
THE COURT: I don't know why the appellate 
court even raised the issue. 
MR. KELLER: We raised it. That was our 
appeal. 
THE COURT: I don't know why they latched on 
to that defense, that is the point I am making. Why did 
they pick out that specific point to have it come back for 
further f indings ? 
MR.. 3IELE: What I see then is we make our 
proposed Findings. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. 3IELE: We then have a meeting. 
THE COURT: Right. We will discuss that 
and, if necessary, we go onto the other things that have 
to be established. 
THE COURT: Right. That is what we will do. 
MR. McINTOSH: When did you want to have 
that nex: meeting? 
THE COURT: Let me look at the calendar. 
Today is the 27. 
MR. McINTOSH: You will give us ten days to 
file seme simultaneous findings? 
THE COURT: Yes. You can file on the 10 of 
November. Why don't we plan en meeting on the 17 here at 
10 o'clock, or in the afternoon. I can meet almost any 
time Friday. 
MR. KELLER: The 17th at 10 o'clock is fine 
wi th me. 
MR. McINTGSH: I will probably be down in 
St. George that day, but Kank can carry it. 
THE COURT: Any Friday you are free, at 10 
o'clock on Friday to get it taken care of. I will go back 
over it. If you will make your appearances for the record 
please. 
MR. 3IELE: Irving H. Biele and James A. 
Mcintosh appearing for the plaintiffs. 
MR. McINTOSH: On that regard, Your Honor, I 
have not been in this case since June 23 of 1992. 
Mr. Bielefs office and other attorneys have handled all of 
the appeal proceedings. I have just this week filed a 
Notice of Appearance, as co-counsel for the plaintiffs, in 
the Summit County offices in Coalville. Mr. Biele will be 
the lead attorney in this case and I am co-counsel with 
MR. KELLER: And Larry R. Keller for 
defendant Doms in this case. 
THE COURT: All right, we will get it done, 
Lee me write this down. November 17 at 10 a.si. I will 
juggle ray Tooele calendar. If anything comes up, I will 
call ycu. 
MR. KELLER: Judge, may I request of you, 
because there are a couple of interesting twists to this. 
THE COURT: Mere than one. 
MR. KELLER: Well, procedurally, this is a 
Sumr.it County case and apparently the file for this case 
is still in Summit County. 
THE COURT: I got the file. They brought it 
down. 
MR. KELLER: You do have the file? 
THE COURT: I have it at home. If either 
one of you need the file, I will leave it here with Susie 
downstairs here and then you can get it from her. 
MR. KELLER: In our memorandum on proposed 
Findings of Fact we will be submitting to you, or our 
proposed Findings of Fact, wouldn't it be appropriate to 
ask the plaintiffs to cite to the record the evidence that 
they believe establishes prejudice beyond just the 
increase cr decrease in value? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. Yes. 
MR. KELLER: If we had an appraisal again 
today, I think we would find the value is significantly 
sere than it was originally purchased for. 
THE COURT: I'll Say. 
MR.. KELLER: Nevertheless, we are stuck with 
the record and Z recognize that. If they would be 
required to cite to the record— 
THE COURT: You have a copy of the 
transcript? 
MR. 3ISLE: The transcript is— 
THE COURT: Voluminous? 
MR. 3IELE: Yes. 
MR. SELLER: If they come in and say 
something is a fact, they need to cite that to you and 
tell you where it is a fact. So do I take on that 
responsibility? 
THE COURT: I don't have the transcript 
here. Who has the transcript, the Summit County 
Courthouse? 
MR. 3IELE: I guess it will be up at the 
courthouse. 
THE COURT: I will ask Ms. Sundberg to see 
if they can deliver it down here. 
MR. KELLER: I feel that if we could get 
these down here in Salt Lake, it would make it easier for 
bcth cf us. 
T£Z COURT: I think I could get Melba to get 
them. Z thin:-: it would be easier to get Susie or Mike 
Halverscn, one c'f ~he two. I will ask then to order the 
file dewr., all cf them. Everything that is up there to 
bring then down. 
MR. McINTOSH: What do you have at your 
^»/*«-»0 .""* * * *^  C" e* ^  
THE COURT: Just two files. 
MR.. McINTOSH: There is a lot more than 
that. 
THE COURT: I have the most recent files. 
MR. McINTOSH: Is this going to interfere 
with the filing cf the briefs on November 10th? 
Suppose it is net down here? 
MR. 3IELE: If it does, we will contact you. 
THE COURT: As soon as I finish here I will 
have then crder it and bring everything down. All the 
files in this case and the transcript. 
MR. KELLER: Judge, one concern that I have 
is that the Court cf Appeals has squarely put it, put the 
burden en the plaintiffs to show you that there is 
prejudice sc ycu can establish it. 
JLD 
THE COURT: Right. 
ME.. KELLER: In filing simultaneous briefs-
THE COURT: Okay, you dcn't have to do it 
:nen. 
MR. KELLER: Could I have ten days after? 
THE COURT: Ten days after. What we ought 
to do is kick the scheduling to sometime in December. 
Let's get the transcripts down here and I will get a 
telephone conference and set a date after the documents 
are here. 
MR. KELLER: That will be good. The date of 
both first submissions, you agree I can have ten days 
after they present theirs? 
THE COURT: Right. If we are going to do 
that, sure you can have the time. We will set it for some 
time in December. 3ut as soon as I get word that the 
documents are here, then from that date forward I will set 
a date in which you have to have the findings in to me, 
okay. 
MR. 3IELE: Now, there are more than one 
basis for rescission. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. BIELE: And if the court determines 
that there is a different basis than they had in mind, 
then ycu will have to make the findings as to that basis. 
THE COURT: That is the point I was trying 
tc make earlier. That is what I was saying about this 
opinion, if there are ether bases upon which the 
rescission was refused, then laches is not applicable. 
MR. McINTOSH: You gave that as the basis 
for your decision. You said we will not get to that 
because you went into the rescission issue on laches. 
That is what you based it on. They have cited Bergstrom 
vs. Moore, and I think that needs to be addressed. 
MR. KELLER: We are not submitting arguments 
or law, just proposed Findings and the evidence upon which 
you are relying. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. 3ISLE: Because the timing of various 
things is important in this case, I have prepared a 
time-line draft. 
MR. KELLER: Your Honor, I object to this. 
The one they presented in the Court of Appeals was not 
accurate. I have never seen this before. We are not to 
introduce new evidence. The court is very clear, it is 
from the record. This is new stuff. I object to it. I 
don't think the court should consider it. 
MR. McINTOSH: Judge, that is illustrative. 
It would help you tie all of these things together. 
THE COURT: You can offer it. If you 
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object, I will withhold accepting it until you have an 
opportunity to review. 
MR. KELLER: I object to any party 
presenting any new evidence for illustrative purposes or 
otherwise. 
THE COURT: All right, no problem. 
MR. BIELE: Mr. Keller, let's net get: into 
hassling about things that are not important. This is not 
new evidence. This is illustrative of the evidence. 
MR. KELLER: That was not presented in the 
trial of this case. It is new evidence, whether 
illustrative or otherwise. 
THE COURT: If there is an objection, I 
won't look at it. 
MR. KELLER: I object. 
THE COURT: Fine, nc problem. That will 
take care of it. 
MR. BIELE: I would like you to keep this 
and the record will note that I have submitted it as being 
illustrative of the timing in this case and to assist the 
court. 
MR. KELLER: I will be happy to keep it. 
MR- McINTOSH: I guess you wouldn't have 
any objection to us attaching it to any documents we file 
in court? 
THE COURT: No, he is objecting to it. 
Don't attach anything to the documents. I don't want any 
problem. I will get it resolved one way or the other. If 
I am wrong, I am wrong. If I am right, I am right. 
MR. KELLER: You thought you had retired. 
MR. McINTOSH: Thank you, Judge. 
(Hearing adjourned.) 
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representative of the Estate of : 
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON : 
personally, DAN SCOTT and : 
JEANNE SCOTT, : 
Plaintiffs : 
VS. ; 
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE : 
E. DOMS, : 
Defendants : 
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal 
representative of the Estate of : 
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON : 
personally, DAN SCOTT and 
JEANNE SCOTT, : 
Third-party Plaintiffs : 
vs. : 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Third-party Defendant 
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*
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ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal : 
representative of the Estate of : 
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and : 
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee, : 
Plaintiffs : 
vs. : 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate : 
and politic of the State of : 
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his : 
official capacity as Summit ; 
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS : 
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah : 
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS; : 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a : 
Utah corporation; EUGENE E. : 
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS : 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, i 
2, 3, 4, and 5, : 
Defendants 
: Civil No. 10066 
: (Judge John A. Rokich) 
Trial in the above-entitled matter came before the Court April 
17, 18, and 19, 1990, and August 21, 22, 23, and 24, 1990. An 
evidentiary hearing dealing with the issues of attorney fees and 
costs was held on December 31, 1991. At all times, Plaintiffs were 
represented by James A. Mcintosh, Esq., and Irving H. Biele, Esq.. 
Defendant Eugene E. Doms was represented by Larry R. Keller, Esq., 
and Craig L. Boorman, Esq.. Third-Party Defendant, Summit County 
Title Company, was represented by Brant H. Wall, Esq.. After 
hearing the oral testimony of witnesses, reviewing such documentary 
evidence as was admitted, memoranda filed by counsel herein, 
considering the oral argument of counsel, and good cause appearing, 
the Court having heretofore on September 9, 1991, signed certain 
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"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and "Judgment;" the 
parties having filed certain motions to amend the said Findings, 
Conclusions, and Judgment; the Court thereafter on May 6, 1992, 
having signed certain documents entitled "Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law," "Amended Judgment," and heaving further 
signed those certain documents entitled "Supplement to Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law," and "Supplement to Judgment;" which 
supplemental documents pertain primarily to the issue of attorney 
fees and Court costs; the Court desiring to consolidate the said 
amended and supplemental pleadings; hereby enters its "Second 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" as follows: 
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs in this case, as grantors, conveyed to 
Defendant Eugene E. Doms and one Michael R. McCoy, pursuant to a 
form Warranty deed upon which the word "Special" was typed, Lots 
in Block 58 and 59, Park City Survey, State of Utah, and more 
particularly described in Plaintiffs1 Exhibit IP as follows: 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, 
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat 
thereof, as filed and of record in the office 
of the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City 
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, 
as filed and of record in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom 
any portion located within the railroad rights 
of way as described in those certain documents 
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 32 6, 
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed 
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and of record in the office of the Summit 
County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of 
way as described in those certain documents 
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 
4 01, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 32 6, 
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 37 3, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and 
water lines over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five 
feet of the following described Lots. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City 
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Records. 
The property so described shall be referred to hereafter as 
the "Rossie Hills Property." 
2. The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated 
November 12, 1981 (see Defendant's Exhibit 63D) , is a valid 
contract for the sale of the Rossie Hills Property, and 
specifically states that the conveyance of said property is to be 
by "Warranty Deed." 
3. All subsequent documents of sale involving the parties 
in this action leading up to the transfer of the Rossie Hills 
Property by the aforementioned Warranty Deed referred to the 
documents of transfer as a "Warranty Deed." 
4. The aforementioned Warranty Deed, executed by all four 
of the Plaintiffs in this matter as grantors did not have the word 
"Special" typed at the top of the document at the time the grantors 
executed said Deed nor was it on the Deed when said Deed was 
delivered to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982. 
5. Said Warranty Deed did not contain any of the language 
which could lead the Court to the conclusion that it may have been 
a "Special Warranty Deed," even if such were officially recognized 
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under Utah law. 
6. Said Warranty deed contained no exceptions or limiting 
language with regard to certain encumbrances and easements which 
shall be hereafter discussed in these Findings. 
7. Access to the Rossie Hills Property at thektime Doms and 
McCoy purchased the property was via a graded right-of-way 
extending in a northeasterly direction from the old rail right-of-
way south of Block 59 as shown in Defendant's Exhibit 77D. 
8. After accessing the Rossie Hills property, the roadway 
continued to Lot 21 of Block 58, made a loop through what was 
designated as McHenry Avenue and Lots 24 and 25. This roadway will 
hereafter be designated as the loop road. (See Defendant's Exhibit 
77D.) 
9. The loop road which is approximately 10-15 feet wide has 
been in use for in excess of 40 years. 
10. Said loop road has been used openly, notoriously, 
continuously, and adversely by the residents who reside on Ontario 
Avenue and whose rear property borders, or intrudes upon the Rossie 
Hills property, for a period in excess of 40 years as of the date 
of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery of the Warranty Deed by 
grantors to Defendant doms. Such use was for ingress and egress 
to the rear of their property, and for parking. 
11. Along the westerly boundaries of the lots in Block 58 are 
encroachments such as sheds, fences and decks owned and used by 
adjoining property owners to the west. (See Defendant's Exhibit 
77D.) 
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12. The encroachments protrude from 12-16 feet onto the 
Rossie Hills Property. 
13• These encroachments, including the backyard areas 
bordered by said fences, had been used openly, notoriously, 
continuously and adversely for a period in excess of twenty years 
as of March 23, 1982, by the aforementioned property owners, and 
such use continues through present time. 
14. At the time of the delivery of the Deed to the Rossie 
Hills Property, Plaintiffs had knowledge of the aforementioned 
encroachments, either directly or through the knowledge of their 
agent, Mike Sloan. 
15. Plaintiffs made no effort to remove or extinguish the 
aforesaid encumbrances prior to the delivery of the Deed to 
Defendant Doms, or at any time thereafter. 
16. Plaintiffs made no effort to quiet title to the Rossie 
Hills Property and cause McHenry Avenue to be vacated; therefore, 
Plaintiffs made no effort to mitigate Defendant's damages as such 
damages related to these aforementioned encumbrances. 
17. The purchase price for the rossie Hills Property was the 
amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($276,750.00). (See Defendant's Exhibit 69D.) 
18. The Plaintiffs received the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00) as earnest money in the aforementioned transaction, 
and a down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($72,500.00), leaving a balance due on the purchase price of One 
Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($194,250.00). 
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19. In consideration for the transfer of the Rossie Hills 
property by Warranty Deed, Defendant Doms and one Michael R. McCoy 
executed a Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982* 
(See Plaintiffs1 Exhibits 2P and 3P.) Said Trust Deed Note was in 
the amount of One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars (!$194,250.00) and called for interest payments monthly up 
to and including January 10,1 985* The Note also provided that the 
entire unpaid principal, together with interest, was due on January 
25, 1985. 
20. The amount of each monthly payment was to be Two Thousand 
Two Hundred Sixty-Six and 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25). 
21. Said Trust Deed Note provided that "each payment shall 
be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the 
reduction of principal." 
22. Plaintiffs received the sum of Seventy-Two Thousand Five 
Hundred Twenty and 25/100 Dollars ($72,520.25) as monthly payments 
pursuant to the aforementioned Trust Deed Note. (See Plaintiffs1 
Exhibit 6P.) 
23. The property conveyed to Eugene E. Doms and Michael R. 
McCoy was located in a platted subdivision. 
24. The Rossie Hills Property as platted showed that the lots 
in Block 58 and 59 were accessible by McHenry Avenue. (See 
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 99P.) 
25. The recorded plat of the Rossie Hills Property was not 
a true reflection of the actual physical layout of the land because 
of the contour and fact that McHenry Avenue was never constructed 
as a roadway. 
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26. The Rossie Hills Property was purchased for residential 
development. 
27. At the time the Rossie Hills property was purchased, it 
was zoned HR-1, which allowed historical uses and allowed single, 
duplex and tri-plex dwellings to be constructed upon-the property. 
28. The utilization of all of the Rossie Hills Property is 
affected by the contour of the land, the loop road, encroachments 
and McHenry Avenue being undeveloped. 
29. Plaintiffs1 appraiser, Mr. Pia, concluded that as of 
March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills Property subject to 
the loop road and encroachments was around Two Hundred Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00). 
30. Defendant Doms1 appraiser, Mr. Webber, concluded that as 
of March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills property was One 
Hundred Sixty-Six Thousand Dollars ($166,000.00) if the 
encumbrances and loop road can be relocated and One Hundred Ten 
Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($110,700.00) if the loop road and 
encumbrances cannot be relocated. 
31. McHenry Avenue had not been vacated by Park City or by 
a judicial determination. 
32. Plaintiffs did not or could not have conveyed good and 
marketable title to any part of McHenry Avenue at the time of the 
execution of the warranty Deed to Doms and McCoy. 
33. Defendant Doms met with Mike Sloan, a real estate agent, 
in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and purchase of the Rossie 
Hills Property. 
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34. Defendant Doms also met with Dewey Anderson, one of the 
sellers of the Rossie Hills Property, once before Doms and McCoy 
purchased the property. 
35. Both Sloan and Anderson represented that the property was 
a prime piece of development property and its highest and best use 
would be as an integrated development with the two adjoining 
parcels referred to as Block 62 and the Slipper parcel. 
36. Defendant Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the 
Slipper parcel in October of 1982. 
37. The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and McCoy to 
further the integrated development of the three parcels and to 
equalize their position with the developers of the Slipper parcel 
and Block 62. 
38. In October of 1982, Doms engaged Mr. Gerald H. Kinghorn, 
an attorney, for the specific purpose of closing the purchase of 
the Slipper parcel and continuing the negotiations with the owners 
of Block 62 for the purpose of developing the three parcels as an 
integrated development. 
39. Prior to Doms' purchase of the rossie Hills Property, 
Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the development of the 
three parcels of property prepared by the architect, Mr. Richard 
Kohler. 
40. Doms knew or should have known at the time he purchased 
the Rossie Hills Property and the Slipper parcel that the 
integrated development of the three parcels had failed because of 
the problems with the Rossie Hills property and the inability of 
the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each parcel. 
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41. Doms walked the Rossie Hills property with Mr. Sloan in 
the fall of 1981 and knew that there were roads and sheds on the 
property. 
42. Mr. Sloan informed Defendant doms that the encroachments 
would not affect development and an access road to the property 
would be in the same place as the loop road. 
43. Doms had actual notice of the easement encroachments for 
the first time sometime between October 22, 1981, and November 7, 
1981, and had further notice during 1982 and up and through 1984. 
44. Doms did not give notice of his intent to rescind until 
January of 1985, and said notice was by way of a settlement offer 
in lieu of making the One Hundred Ninety Four Thousand Two Hundred 
Fifty Dollar ($194,250.00) payment due on January 25, 1985. Said 
settlement offer in January of 1985 was an offer made to Plaintiffs 
through Defendant Doms1 attorney, Gerald H. Kinghorn, in which 
Defendant Doms offered to deed back the property to Plaintiffs in 
return for Plaintiffs' cancellation of the aforementioned Trust 
Deed Note. 
45. Plaintiffs did not respond to said settlement offer, but 
rather filed a Complaint to foreclose on the property in June of 
1985. 
46. Doms' purchase of Slipper parcel, the negotiations to 
develop the three parcels as an integrated development, the 
subsequent negotiations about credits and defining the problems 
with the Rossie Hills property, affirm the fact that Doms had 
personal knowledge of the road and encroachments no later than 
October of 1982. 
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47. It was not until Plaintiffs1 action to foreclose was 
filed that Defendant Doms filed his Amended Counterclaim in June 
of 1988 seeking to rescind the Warranty Deed. 
48. Defendant Doms failed to file his claim for damages 
against the Estate of D.C. Anderson within three months after the 
date of the first publication of Notice to Creditors as provided 
in Section 75-3-8 03 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
49. The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment signed 
on September 9, 1991, were filed in the office of the Summit County 
Clerk on October 22, 1991, which the court finds is the date of 
Entry. 
50. The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment were not 
"final" because there were several issues to be decided which the 
Court had not included in the said documents, which consisted of 
several items including determination of attorney fees and costs. 
51. The Court does not believe it should interfere with the 
agreements entered into by the client and the attorney for services 
to be rendered when the attorneys, as in this case, have fully 
apprised the clients of the fees and costs at the outset of the 
case. 
52. The attorneys for plaintiffs and defendant have kept 
detailed records of the time spent in the prosecution of this case 
and have billed regularly so that the client was always aware of 
what was transpiring in the case. 
53. The Court's decision as to fees and costs is not to be 
construed as negating the client's obligation to pay the attorneys 
in accordance with the terms of the attorney-client agreement. 
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54. The Court finds that the "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase" which was signed by some of the parties in November 
1981 was merged into the later Warranty Deed dated March 10, 1982. 
Esoinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.. 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979). 
(a) The said Warranty Deed did not provide for payment 
of attorney fees in an action based upon breach of warranties 
contained in the said Deed. 
55* The Court finds that purchasers of real estate are not 
entitled to attorney fees absent an express agreement providing 
therefore, unless the purchaser commences a separate action against 
third parties to remove encumbrances. George A. Lowe Co. v. 
Simmons Warehouse Co., 39 Utah 395, 117 Pac. 874 (1911). 
(a) Doms has not commenced a separate action against 
third parties to remove encumbrances. 
56. The Court finds the plaintiffs1 complaint in foreclosure 
as well as all other actions by the plaintiffs were not instituted 
or prosecuted in bad faith. 
57. The Counsel for plaintiffs and Doms aggressively and 
zealously presented their cases and neither party acted in bad 
faith. 
58. The Court finds that Doms is not entitled to attorney 
fees. 
59. The defendant Doms is not entitled to any prejudgment 
interest on the $83,000.00 damages. 
60. Doms is entitled to the following costs for the 
prosecution of his Second Amended Counterclaim: 
(a) Service of process on Jeanne Scott $ 12.00 
(b) Service of process on Ellen Anderson $ 12.75 
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(c) Service of trial subpoena: Mike Sloan 
(d) Witness fees: Elden and Ella Sorensen 
(e) Recording fee for corrected Sherifffs 
Deed 
(f) The said costs awarded to Doms total 
61. The issue of plaintiffs being entitled to attorney fees 
and costs can be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs because the 
provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed provided 
that all costs and expenses of collection including reasonable 
attorney fees can be charged against the maker. 
62. The Court finds that counsel for the plaintiffs and 
defendant have expended many hours in the prosecution of this case 
and their time sheets so reflect. 
63. The Court finds that hourly rates charged by counsel for 
plaintiffs and defendant were reasonable. 
64. The Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel, James A. 
Mcintosh, at page 12 of his affidavit dated December 6, 1991, 
states, "Most of the services rendered were in connection with the 
Second Amended Counterclaim." 
(a) The time spent on collection of the Note and 
foreclosure action by plaintiffs1 counsel was nominal in comparison 
to all the hours expended in this case. 
(b) The Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to 
recover attorney fees for the time spent on the collection of the 
Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed foreclosure action but not for 
any time spent in defending against any of the causes of action in 
the Second Amended Counterclaim. 
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65. The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney 
fees for legal services incurred in the prosecution of the 
collection of the Note foreclosure action, the motion to set aside 
default, to compel sanctions, setting aside the tax sale, 
intermediate appeal and petition for extraordinary writ to the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
66. In addressing the issue of these fees, the Court will 
take into consideration the effect of the attorney fees awarded the 
plaintiffs by Judge Pat B. Brian in the amount of $4,467.60 as a 
condition of setting aside the Default Judgment against Doms. 
67. The Court will also make an award to plaintiffs based 
upon Judge J. Dennis Frederick's ruling that plaintiffs were 
entitled to a reasonable fee for bringing a motion to compel and 
for sanctions before the court. 
68. The criteria for the Court's decision awarding attorney 
fees is set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 
(Utah 1988). 
69. The Court understands the amount in controversy can be 
a factor in determining a reasonable fee, but the Court is not 
putting much reliance on this factor. 
70. The Court finds the plaintiffs should be awarded attorney 
fees as follows: 
(a) FOR PLAINTIFFS1 COUNSEL, JAMES A. MCINTOSH. ESQ.: 
(i) Lawsuit to set aside tax sale $ 5,245.00 
(ii) Petition for intermediate appeal $ 2,730.00 
(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ $ 2,160.00 
(iv) For the foreclosure complaint $12,300.00 
(v) For the motion to compel and for 
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sanctions as per Judge Frederick's 
minute entries $ 4,750,00 
(vi) The total amount to be awarded for 
Mr. Mcintosh's fees is $27,185,00 
(b) FOR PLAINTIFFS1 COUNSEL IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ,: 
(i) Motion to set aside default $ 4,467.00 
(This amount has already been 
paid by Doms) 
(ii) Lawsuit to set aside tax sale $ 1,050.00 
(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ 
and mandamus $ 2,740.00 
(iv) For the foreclosure complaint $10,000.00 
(v) The total amount to be awarded 
for Mr. Biele's fees is $13,790.00 
71. The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to the 
following costs: 
(a) Summit County Clerk — filing Complaint $ 50.00 
(b) Richie Zabriskie — fee for service 
of Third-Party Summons and Complaint $ 16.50 
(c) Summit County Clerk — filing fee for 
Complaint in Civil No. 10066 $ 75.00 
(d) Richie Zabriskie — fee for service 
of process in Civil No. 10066 on Domcoy 
Enterprises Inc. $ 24.70 
(e) Utah Supreme Court — docketing fee 
for filing Petition for Intermediate 
Appeal $125.00 
(f) Utah Supreme Court — filing fee for 
Petition for Extraordinary Writ of 
Prohibition $ 50.00 
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(g) Summit County Clerk — fee for 
certification of order $ 3.50 
(h) Steve Deckert — witness fee for 
attending trial $ 30.00 
(i) LeRoy J. Pia — witness fee 
to attend trial $ 50.00 
(j) The total amount of the said costs 
to be awarded to the plaintiffs is $358.20 
72. The Trust Deed Note dated March 10, 1982, provides for 
payment of interest in the amount of fourteen percent (14%) per 
annum prior to default, eighteen percent (18%) per annum after 
default. 
SECOND AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Deed which transferred the Rossie Hills property was 
a Warranty Deed under Utah law and conveyed with it all of the 
statutory warranties and covenants contained in U.C.A. Section 57-
1-12. 
2. The loop road, sheds, fences, backyard areas bordered by 
said fences, and decks are encroachments and constitute 
encumbrances upon the property. 
3. Said encumbrances existed on the Rossie Hills property 
on the date of the delivery of the Deed, which was March 23, 1982. 
4. Said encumbrances constitute a breach of the statutory 
covenants contained in the Warranty Deed pursuant to U.C.A. Section 
57-1-12. 
-16-
ru'\Cu«Q 
5* The aforesaid statutory covenants contained in the 
Warranty Deed were breached upon the delivery of the Warranty Deed 
to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982. 
6. The Warranty Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed 
prepared at the same time do not constitute a single contract. 
7. The Court believes that the law applicable to this case 
is: The acceptance of the Deed completes the execution of the 
contract, and the Deed become final and conclusive evidence of the 
contract under which it is executed (84 A.L.R. 1009). 
8. The Court concludes that the Utah case of Reese Howell 
Company v. Brown. 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684, 689 (1916), sets forth 
the controlling law which must be applied in the instant case 
regarding the issue as to whether or not the Warranty Deed, Note 
and Trust Deed constitutes a single contract. 
9. The fact that a Trust Deed and Note were executed at the 
same time does not make them part of the contract to purchase the 
property. The Trust Deed and Note are documents executed to secure 
the payment of the property, and have no bearing upon whether the 
property is free and clear of encumbrances. 
10. Defendant Doms1 remedy in this case is for a breach of 
the statutory covenants of warranty. 
11. The utilization of the Rossie Hills Property is adversely 
affected by the encroachments and loop road to the extent that the 
value of the property is diminished. 
12. Defendant Doms has been damaged by virtue of Plaintiffs1 
breach. 
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13. Defendant Doms1 damages should be measured as of the date 
of the breach, which is March 23, 1982, the date of the delivery 
of the Deed. 
14. Said damages should be measured with all of the 
encumbrances in place and as they existed on March 23, 1982. 
15. The proper measure of damages under Utah law is the 
difference in the value of the property without any encumbrances 
minus the value of the property with the encumbrances. 
16. The loop road does have a beneficial value for the 
development of the Rossie Hills Property. 
17. Under Utah law, it was the Plaintiffs1 burden and 
obligation to mitigate the damages suffered by Defendant doms 
because Plaintiffs were in breach of the statutory covenants 
contained in the Deed at the time the Deed was delivered. 
18. Plaintiffs had the obligation of quieting title to the 
Rossie Hills property and causing McHenry Avenue to be vacated; and 
if Plaintiffs had done so, Defendant Doms1 damages would have been 
mitigated. 
19. As a result of the encumbrances existing on the Rossie 
Hills Property on March 23, 1982, Defendant Doms has suffered 
damages in the sum of Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00). 
20. Defendant Doms is entitled to an offset against the Two 
Hundred Seventy=Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($276,750.00) purchase price of the property, in the amount of 
Eighty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($82,500.00), which 
represents the earnest money payment of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00) and the down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five 
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Hundred Dollars ($72,500.00). 
21. The remaining balance due after said offset of Eighty-
Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($82,500.00) is One Hundred 
Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) , which 
represents the principal balance of the Trust Deed Note as of the 
date of the execution of said Note and the Trust Deed. 
22. Defendant Doms is further entitled to an additional 
offset of Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00), which 
represents the damages suffered by Defendant Doms as a result of 
the encumbrances on the property as set forth above. 
23. Therefore, the remaining unpaid balance under the Trust 
Deed Note and Trust Deed was One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($111,250.00) as of March 23, 1982, the date 
of the delivery of the Warranty Deed. 
24. From April 0, 1982 through January 10, 1985, monthly 
interest payments under the Trust Deed Note were received by 
Plaintiffs on an unpaid principal balance of One Hundred Ninety-
Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00), rather than 
One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($111,250.00), which the court has concluded was the unpaid balance 
due under the Trust Deed Note at that time. 
25. under the terms of the Trust Deed Note, the amount 
actually due in monthly interest payments on the un paid principal 
balance of one Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
(111,250.00) was Forty-One Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Three and 
44/100 Dollars ($41,533.44). 
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26. Since Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments in 
the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty and 25/100 
Dollars ($72,520.25), Defendant Doms is further entitled to an 
additional off-set of Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Six and 
81/100 Dollars ($30,986.81), which represents the difference 
between the interest paid on One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) and the interest which was 
actually due on One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($111,250.00) for the same period. 
27. Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due 
under the Trust Deed Note is Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-
Three and 19/100 Dollars ($80,263.19), as of January 25, 1985, the 
date said principal amount was due under the terms of the Trust 
Deed Note. 
28. Inasmuch as Defendant Doms1 damages were not determined 
and a Judgment has not been entered for said damages, Plaintiffs1 
action for a judgment of foreclosure is premature. 
29. Without the necessity of refiling this action to 
foreclose the Trust Deed, the Court will require Plaintiffs to give 
Defendant Doms a Notice of Default and Defendant Doms shall have 
the right to pay the entire amount due under the terms of the Trust 
Deed Note and Trust Deed, together with costs and attorney fees, 
as determined ny the Court, within 90 days from receipt of the 
Notice of Default. The giving of the Notice of Default shall not 
take place until after the Judgment is entered and notice can be 
served on Defendant Doms and/or his attorney. Service on the 
Defendant Doms may be made by mailing the said notice to the 
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Defendants last known address. 
30. The Court recognizes that there are two options by which 
to foreclose a note and trust deed, administratively or judicially. 
Due to the circumstances in this case, the failure of Plaintiffs 
to ascertain damages prior to proceeding with the foreclosure 
action, Defendant Doms should be given 90 days1 notice to satisfy 
the Note before Plaintiffs can proceed with the foreclosure action. 
31. Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the unpaid balance 
of Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Three and 19/100 Dollars 
($80,263.19) from January 25, 1985, the date the unpaid principal 
balance was due under the terms of the Trust Deed Note. The 
interest rate to be used in determining the amount due Plaintiffs 
as interest on said unpaid principal balance shall be fourteen 
percent (14%) per annum. 
32. If Defendant Doms fails to pay the balance due and owing 
after notice, Plaintiffs shall have Judgment of foreclosure upon 
filing an affidavit that Defendant Doms has failed to pay. The 
Plaintiffs will have the sole option at their discretion to a 
Judgment of foreclosure based either on the administrative 
foreclosure proceedings set forth in Sections 57-1-23 et. seg., 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or the judicial foreclosure 
proceedings provided in Sections 78-37-1 et. seg.. 
33. In regard to the issue of whether or not Defendant Doms 
was entitled to rescind the contract, the Court concludes that 
Defendant Doms was bound to take remedial action after the Fall of 
1981 which the Court determined to be the date he was made aware 
of the encroachments and loop road, and which was prior to the 
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purchase of the Slipper parcel. 
34. It was not necessary for Defendant Doms to obtain a legal 
opinion that the loop road was a prescriptive easement or that the 
shed and fences had a legal basis for being on the Rossie Hills 
Property before he could make his tender to rescind-
35. Once Defendant Doms knew of the road and the 
encumbrances, he should have taken action within a reasonable time 
to notify the sellers of his intent to rescind the transaction. 
36. The Court concludes that the case of Eaeter v. West and 
North Properties. 758 P.2d 361 (Ore. App. 1988), is not applicable 
to this case in that Eaeter stands for the proposition, among 
others, that an unmaintained dirt road that showed little use and 
brush and trees had to be removed to drive on it was not so open 
or notorious that purchasers would be chargeable with knowledge of 
its existence. 
37. Eaeter is readily distinguishable from the facts of the 
instant case because there is not question that the road in this 
case has been used and was being used. 
38. The Eaeter case is applicable to the instant case in the 
sense that it stands for the proposition that the person seeking 
to rescind the contract must do so promptly after obtaining 
knowledge of the facts constituting the grounds for rescind so long 
as he acts within a reasonable time. 
39. Defendant Doms did not act within a reasonable time after 
he obtained knowledge that the loop road and the encroachments were 
upon the Rossie Hills Property. 
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40 • The Court concludes that Defendant Doms waited an 
unreasonable amount of time to seek rescission; therefore, 
rescission is not the appropriate remedy in this case and is barred 
by the doctrine of laches. 
41. Defendant Doms presented insufficient evidence to carry 
the burden of proof that Plaintiffs committed fraud and 
misrepresentation in this matter. 
42. With regard to Civil No. 10066, and Count I of 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint contained therein, pursuant to Stipulation 
of the parties and a previous Order of the court, the May 27, 1987, 
Tax Sale of the Rossie Hills Property by Summit County should be 
declared to be null and void. 
43. The foregoing Conclusion of Law shall be deemed not to 
affect the Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982, in any adverse manner 
by the said tax sale. The rights, title, liens and interest of the 
Plaintiffs and Defendant Eugene E. Doms and Domcoy Enterprises, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, shall not be deemed to be affected by the 
said tax sale. The Court's previous Order invalidating the tax 
sale does not in and of itself either validate or invalidate any 
subsequent deeds issued regarding the Rossie Hill Property. 
44. The Warranty Deed dated August 26, 1988, in which Domcoy 
Enterprises, Inc., as grantor, conveyed the Rossie Hills Property 
to Defendant Doms, as grantee, is a valid Deed which transferred 
legal title to Defendant Doms. 
45. In regard to Count II of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil 
No. 10066, title to the Rossie Hills Property should be quieted in 
Defendant Doms, subject to Plaintiffs1 right to foreclose as 
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previously set forth in these Conclusions of Law. 
46. In regard to Count III of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil 
NO, 10066, said Count III has been previously dismissed by the 
Court on Motion of Summit County. 
47. In regard to Plaintiffs1 Third-Party Complaint against 
Third-Party Defendant Summit County Title Company in Civil No. 
8339, said Third-Party Complaint has been previously dismissed by 
the Court on Motion of said parties. 
48. Defendant doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim seeking 
damages against Plaintiff Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of D.C. Anderson is barred by the three-month filing 
period limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to Section 
75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, as said section relates 
to the issues of damages. 
49. This Court has ±n personam jurisdiction over Plaintiff 
Jeanne Scott pursuant to a ruling by the Utah Supreme Court 
contained in an Amended Minute Entry denying Plaintiffs' Petition 
for an Extraordinary Writ under Rule 65B(B)4, Supreme Court Case 
No. 890269. In said Amended Minute Entry, dated July 31, 1989, the 
Utah Supreme Court denied said Petition for an Extraordinary Writ, 
and ruled that this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff Jeanne 
Scott because she was a grantor on the Warranty Deed, and is a 
proper party to Defendant Doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim under 
Rules 13 and 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
50. Plaintiffs1 remaining objections to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment dated September 9, 1991, are 
denied. 
00G3S7 
51. The plaintiffs should be awarded attorney fees of 
$27,185.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, James A. 
Mcintosh, Esq. 
52. The plaintiffs should be awarded attorney fees of 
$13,790.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, Irving H. 
Biele, Esq. 
53. The plaintiffs should be awarded $358.20 for costs which 
they have incurred in these proceedings. 
54. The plaintiffs should be awarded interest of fourteen 
percent (14%) per annum on all principal amounts the court has 
determined were due and owing on the Trust Deed Note dated March 
10, 1982, both before and after default. 
55. The defendant Doms should not be awarded any attorney 
fees for services rendered by his counsel in either Civil No. 8339 
or Civil No. 10066. 
56. The defendant Doms should not be awarded any prejudgment 
interest on the $83,000.00 damages described in the original 
Judgment dated September 9, 1991. 
57. The defendant Doms should be awarded $101.50 for costs 
for prosecution of the Second Amended Counterclaim. 
DATED this ,/fc day of June 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
\\ C*/h* '' « 
HONORABLE JOHN A 
-District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of May, 1992, a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand delivered to the following: 
Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/ 
/ / - , . - / • 
JAMES A . MCINTOSH 
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ADDENDUM 6 
IRVING H. BIELE, . .). — No. 0317 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. — NO. 2194 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
A Utah Professional Law Corporation 
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal : 
representative of the Estate of : 
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON 
personally, DAN SCOTT and : 
JEANNE SCOTT, : 
Plaintiffs ; 
V S . J 
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE : 
E. DOMS, s 
Defendants : 
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal 
representative of the Estate of : 
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON : 
personally, DAN SCOTT and 
JEANNE SCOTT, J 
Third-party Plaintiffs 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Third-party Defendant 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
FILED 
; JI;:; 2:; ;~2 / 
! Car* - :-.-XIT s^ ai.ty . 
ST.•••••••^-• • • _ 
: Civil No. 8339 
: (Judge John A. Rokich) 
CONSOLIDATED HEADING CONTINUED OF NEXT PAGE 
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ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal : 
representative of the Estate of : 
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and : 
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee, : 
Plaintiffs : 
vs. : 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate : 
and politic of the State of : 
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his : 
official capacity as Summit : 
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS : 
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah j 
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS; : 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a : 
Utah corporation; EUGENE E. : 
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS : 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, : 
2, 3, 4, and 5, ; 
Defendants J 
Civil No. 10066 
(Judge John A. Rokich) 
Based upon the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, entered contemporaneously herein, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. In regard to Civil No. 8339 and Count II of Plaintiffs1 
Complaint in Civil No. 10066, title to the property which is the 
subject of the above-entitled matters is quieted in Defendant 
Eugene E. Doms, subject to the right of Plaintiffs, Ellen Anderson, 
as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan 
Scott, to foreclose their Trust Deed against said property as 
hereinafter set forth in this Judgment. Said property is more 
particularly described as follows: 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, 
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat 
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thereof, as filed and of record in the office 
of the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City 
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, 
as filed and of record in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom 
any portion located within the railroad rights 
of way as described in those certain documents 
recorded as Entry No. 817 6 in Book C at Page 
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, 
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed 
and of record in the office of the Summit 
County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of 
way as described in those certain documents 
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, 
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373,-
records of Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and 
water lines over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five 
feet of the following described Lots. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City 
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Records. 
2. Plaintiffs1 Complaint for foreclosure in Civil No. 8339 
is premature, in as much as Defendant Doms1 damages were not 
determined and a Judgment has not been entered for said damages. 
3. Defendant Doms is awarded Judgment in Civil No. 8339 on 
his Second Amended Counterclaim for damages for breach of 
warranties and covenants against encumbrances contained in the 
Warranty Deed conveying the Rossie Hills property, pursuant to 
U.C.A. Section 57-1-12. 
4. Defendant Doms is awarded damages for said breach of the 
warranties and covenants against encumbrances in the amount of 
Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00). 
- 3 -
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5. The original principal balance due from Defendant Doms 
to Plaintiffs Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan Scott, on the Trust Deed Note and 
Trust Deed held by said Plaintiffs was One Hundred Ninety-Four 
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250,00), as of the date 
of the execution of said Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed. 
6. Said amount of One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) due under said Trust Deed Note 
and Trust Deed shall be offset by the Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars 
($83,000.00) which the Court has awarded Defendant Doms as damages 
for breach of the warranties and covenants against encumbrances. 
7. Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due 
from Defendant Doms to said Plaintiffs under the Trust Deed Note 
and Trust Deed was One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($111,250.00) as of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery 
of the Warranty Deed. 
8. Since Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments in 
the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty and 25/100 
Dollars ($72,520.25), Defendant Doms is further entitled to an 
additional off-set of Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Six and 
81/100 Dollars ($30,986.81), which represents the difference 
between the interest paid on One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) and the interest which was 
actually due on One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($111,250.00) for the same period. 
9. Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due 
under the Trust Deed Note is Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-
KJQKNNfflGE 1 3 0 0 S 9 0 3 
Three and 19/100 Dollars ($80,263-19), as of January 25, 1985, the 
date said principal amount was due under the terms of the Trust 
Deed Note. 
10. Without the necessity of refiling this action to 
foreclose the Trust Deed, the Court will require said Plaintiffs 
to give Defendant Doms a Notice of Default and Defendant Doms shall 
have the right to pay the entire amount due under the terms of the 
Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed, together with costs and attorney 
fees, as determined by the Court, within 90 days form receipt of 
the Notice of Default. The giving of the Notice of Default shall 
not take place until after the Judgment is entered and notice can 
be served on Defendant Doms and/or his attorney. Service on the 
Defendant Doms may be made by mailing the said notice to the 
Defendant's last known address. 
11. Said Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the unpaid 
balance of Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Three and 19/100 
Dollars ($80,263.19) from January 25, 1985, the date the unpaid 
principal balance was due under the terms of the Trust Deed Note. 
The interest rate to be used in determining the amount due 
Plaintiffs as interest on said unpaid principal balance shall be 
fourteen percent (14%) per annum. 
12. If Defendant Doms fails to pay the balance due and owing 
after notice, said Plaintiffs shall have Judgment of foreclosure 
upon filing an affidavit that Defendant Doms has failed to pay. 
The Plaintiffs will have the sole option at their discretion to a 
Judgment of foreclosure based either on the administrative 
foreclosure proceedings set forth in Sections 57-1-23 et. seg., 
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or the judicial foreclosure 
proceedings provided in Sections 78-37-1 et. seg.. 
13. Defendant Doms is not entitled to the remedy of 
rescission of the transaction conveying the aforementioned property 
because the remedy of rescission is barred by the doctrine of 
laches. 
14. Defendant Doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim, as it 
relates to the remedy of damages, is dismissed as against Plaintiff 
Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C. 
Anderson, as said claim is barred by the three-month filing period 
limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to Section 75-3-
803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
15. Defendant Doms1 causes of action relating to fraud and 
misrepresentation in Civil No. 8339 are dismissed, the Court 
finding no cause therefore. 
16. In regard to Count I of Plaintiffs' Complaint in Civil 
No. 10066, and pursuant to Stipulation of the parties and a 
previous Order of the Court, the May 27, 1987, tax sale of the 
Rossie Hills property by Summit County is declared to be null and 
void. 
17. In regard to Count III of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil 
No. 10066, said Count III has been previously dismissed by the 
Court on Motion of Defendant Summit County. 
18. In regard to Plaintiffs1 Third Party-Complaint against 
Third-Party Defendant Summit County title Company in Civil No. 
8339, said Third-Party Complaint has been previously dismissed by 
the Court on Motion of said parties. 
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19. The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $27,185.00 in attorney 
fees for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, James A. 
Mcintosh, Esq. 
20. The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $13,790.00 in attorney 
fees for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, Irving H. Biele, 
Esq. 
21. The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $358.20 for costs which 
they have incurred in these proceedings. 
22. The plaintiffs are hereby awarded interest at the rate 
of fourteen percent (14%) per annum on all principal amounts which 
this court has determined were due and owing by the defendant Doms 
pursuant to the terms of the Trust Deed Note dated March 10, 1982
 r 
both before and after default in payment by the said defendant. 
23. The defendant Doms is not entitled to any attorney fees 
for services rendered by his counsel in either Civil No. 8339 or 
Civil No. 10066. 
24. The defendant Eugene E. Doms is not entitled to any 
prejudgment interest on the $83,000.00 damages. 
25. The defendant Doms is hereby awarded $101.50 for costs 
for prosecution of the Second Amended Counterclaim. 
DATED this /j^. day of June 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
s{fjb~^ //* r\ rJ<^t 
HONORABLE JOHN A 
-District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of May, 1992, a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
was hand delivered to the following: 
Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
• 11 eU" 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
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ADDENDUM 7 
FIIZ NO. 4914 
Recorded at Request of 
at M. Fee Paid |L 
Enfry No l f e ^ . V & ' Roe* ^ ^ul^ 
RErn—n3.-23.-i2** 3 " * M page *£?-
RFO? ,;c 1UMMJI CO. TITLE 
P»£E _ v ~" 
5 /Z'.<?<2-
INDEXED 
—: l ^ - i - ^ ••»• ,»[* - r •fCOKPE*
by- Dep. Book Pa^e Ref.: — _ . „ ^ 
2850 Ocean Park Boulevard, Suiu^ 300 
Mail tax notice
 f n Grantee/ M ^ ^ c ^ AHrir»«c Santa Etanica, California 90405 
(SPECIAL) 
WARRANTY DEED 
DeWAYNE C. ANDERSON ate D.C. ANDERSON aka DEWEY D.C. ANDERSON and EIIEN R. 
ANDERSON, h i s wife, and DAN SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT , h is wife , grantors 
o f Park City, Utah t county of Suninit f s t a t e o f U t a h, h e r e b y 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
EUGENE E. DC*€ and MICHAEL R. McCOY, as tenants in caiman 
0f Santa Monica, California 
TEN AND NO/100 
(and other good and valuable considerations) 
the following described tract of land in Summit 
State of Utah: 
SEE ADDENDUM ATTACHED TO AND MADE A PART HEREOF: 
grantee 
for the sum of 
— DOLLARS, 
County, 
INDEXED: 
CTV'-NTIO?*: ..-a£t— 
UV 
71 TO THE GENERAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR IHE YEAR 1982 AND THEREAFTER, AND 
ANY SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS NOW DUE OR TO BECOME DUE. 
EXCEPTING ALL OIL, GAS AND/OR OTHER MINERALS WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY RESERVED. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 
, A. D. 19 82 
10th day of 
March 
Signed in the Presence of $*4 SCOTT f ^ 
£OOTT (Jeanne) 
Pe^ BVYNE C. ANDERSON aka D.C. ANDERSCN aka 
/ • j ' h , . / \ t . IU rvv:„ DEWEY D.C. Al NUfci«xa: 
ELLEN P. ANDERSON 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Sunmr 
On the March t ^ D# 19 82 
•me? •),^ e»www& C. ANDERSON , aka D.C. ANDERSON / aka* 
3na KfJEN ft. ANDERSCN, h i s wi fe , 
executed the 
personally apfearefffe^me?'"V,b %NE .  ,  . . C  
DEWEY D.85 ANIpEgCfy,ancL; Elf
the*^fne%^4k>Whe within instrument,:who duly acknowledged to me that ^hey 
My commission expires 9-28-62 Residing in Park City, Utah 
Notary Public. 
Park City, Utah 
BLANK #101—WAMUNTT D K O — C OCM rre. co. — •»•> »o l«oo «»»r — «»LT L»KI CITT 
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ADDENDUM 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of lots 17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31, 
and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to the 
amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office 
of the Sunmit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey, according 
to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described 
in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book 
C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and 
Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Sunmit County, 
Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to the 
Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office of 
the Sunmit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion 
located within the County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described 
in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book 
C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and 
Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Sunmit County, 
Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water lines 
over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five feet of the following 
described Lots. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey according 
to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in the office of the Sunmit 
County Records. 
BOOKUalSPAGEA'tB 
STATE OF VKCtlMG ) 
COUNTY CF MPMAJU-. ) 
On the « ? £ > K - « 1 day of T f e j & k ^ A.D., 1982 personally 
appeared before me DAN SCOTT andi\3SHN'#2£CTT the signers of the within instalment, 
who duly acknowledged to me tfet_£6e£.executed the same. 
/••';-"" V \ 
My Camiission expires: £ ;- , • • ' • / \ ~~ r 
My Corcnsssion expires JanuoyjUS^ - ^ . ^ s " | ^ Q u ^ £ ^ & . Q ? J T U A 
\ /-. ' -' ->!-* " / / Notary Public - * " 
'\\ %c. . c ' r ' / Residing a t : 2nJLtuL4*» LLJJUI n*^ 
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THIS IS A lECAUY U N I _ ^ 1 N T » A C T , If NOT UNOEUSTOOO, St ( • r T E N T > O V I « J 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE, 
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J MMJf fUtMMJ £MaM -^ A Ay*' 
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ADDENDUM 9 
FHZ ' C . 4914 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
Space Above Thia Line For Recorder's Uae 
TRUST DEED 
With Assignment of Rents 
THIS TRUST DEED, made thia ..A0***. day of !**** , 19...??. 
between J^*?:' . . . .^. . . .^^ 
, as TRUSTOR, 
whose addreat is 2 8 5 0 Ocean Park Blvd., Suite 300, Santa Monica, Calif., 90405 
iSirmt • •« Humbert (City) (SUW) 
^ ! 5 ? . . 0 g ! W , as TRUSTEE/ and 
D?C«. AW^^ «B to m 
«:4^M..^...i!*«»t
 § ^  BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in S9W** 
County, State of Utah: 
tJ 
A/* SMC2LH0. IS All of Iota 17,13,19,20,21,22,23,24,23,26,27,23,25,30,31 
A
 ani 32, 'JLocfc 52, l*r5c City Sunwy, accariing t D t h a a m 
. pUt tharaof, as fiLad and of xwxcd in tbi at firm of the 
{ Swrl t Ooaitry lijoor^er. 
PMCa 110. 2: til cf i£c« 17 JUU. 13, .'lcvk 3!\ ?*ri» City - \m' ', v-mUflg 
fc:. ch* .1* ••.•>: ••3«*t. ••••*r,-«i\ in ^ l . . % Vi» c*1 - jjnrt !•• ^he 
orf portion located within t t e railroad rights of %*y as 
cancribol in tlicac onrralTi docrants nioopisrt as Story » • 
317f. in Deck C «t Pugs 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at 
Pags 326, and ttttry No* 13610 in Book R at Fags 373, raoards 
of Sumtt auxty , otsh. 
PARCEL » • 3t All of lot IB, Block 59, Park City tunny, anonrrling to ths 
taanlad Plat trmaof, as fllad and of saoocd in ths offioa of 
tho Surodt County Aaoocdaar, swnspting thnaftom mtf portion 
located within ths railroad rights of way as il—iriliH in 
thcss osrtain aajuaiits raoocdad as Entry Mb, 8176 in Book C 
at tag. 401, fctry Mo. 13316 in Book H at Paga 326, and Entry 
No. 13610 in Book H at Fags 373, rsoocds of Suaatt Cdtttty, Utah. 
Together with all buildings, futures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
. * . ._ t * 194,250.00 „ , , .
 K„ 
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ . maae py 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at (he times, in the manner and with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
•NOTE Trustee must hr a member of the Utah Slate Bar a bank, huildinf an J loan association or savinf* 
and loan association authoriied to do inch business in Ulah. a corporation authorized lo do a trust business in 
Iliak- nr • title insurance or abstract company authority u> do such business in Utah 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED TRUSTOR AGREES 
1. To keep said proper* \ in good condition and repair not i«, remove or demolish an\ hutldint: thereon to 
complete or restore prompiK and in good ami workmanlike mann.r anv IMI.1,1,,^ XN|,„I, ma\ Iv constructed 
damaged or dcstroyi-d t U n n l . . comply with all law. «ov.naiits anil re>tru -lion, .,u,M „ „ . %;ill| ..ro,M.ri% not 
to commit or permit wa»tr iln rcuf. not to commit, suffer or jM-rmit anv an uj«m said propt-m in violation ..I law tr 
do all other arts which from the character or u v ot said propcm mav In- reasonuhlv necess.uv the specific 
enumeration* herein not ext-1 tiding the general, .ttvl if tin- loan secured herehv «.r an\ pan i h m o f is heing oh-
Lamed for the purf>ose uf financing construction of tmprov .m.-nu on s.» I prt»|N*rt\ Trustor lurt lor agrees 
(a) To commence < onstruciion promptly. AIUI to pursue same with reasonable •iili^« n,,- to
 t oniph tion 
in accordance with plans and |*«. if nations satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
<b) To allow Heneficiary to inspect said property at all turn-* during construction 
Trustee. u|M>n presentation t.« it of an affidavit signal l.v Iteticficiarv setting forth fails showing a default 
by Trustor under this tuimJ* r, <| paragraph, IN authorize! lo acicjn as trio- ami conclusive all ia»i» ami state 
ments therein, and to ai l thereon hereunder. 
2. To prnvtle and maintain insurance, .if sucii lvp« ..r t \p«s and amounts as Itenelii iar\ mav require on 
the improvements now existing or Itercafter erected or pl.t. e.l on «,.»MI pro|N-rt\ .Nu« h uisor on •• *h.ill U- «arrusl 
in companies approved h\ liem-ln i.irv with loss pavahh- i l . i» .> to i.ivor ..( .m,l 01 |.<rto .«... pi.ihl. to It* lo-lu iar\ 
In event of loss. Trustor shall give iiuuw-diale nnin •• •<• lieueli< i.trv nit.. m.tx m.ik. po«.l ot J.~.* .U H | e.i, h insurance 
company cunivrmtl is herehv authorized and directed to <n.iki- p.tvuteni tor -.«#• h Jt.s-. dir.i ilv to li.ueficiary 
instead of lo Trustor and lieiteh< tarv i«»nill\ and th«- tUMtrai»«e pr«*»eds. ,.r anv part thereof, mav in- applu*d 
by livncfictary. at its option, to reduction o| the indebtedness hereby secured or to the respiration or repair ol 
the property damaged 
3 To deliver lo. pav for and maintain with lienefn iarv until the indebtedness scrur.-d herehv is |tai<) in full, 
such evidence of title as lieneficiary mav require, including a)»siract.s ol title or policies ot nth- insurance and 
any eitensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto 
4 To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purt«>rting to aflect IIM* seeuntv hereof, the title to 
said property, or the rights or flowers of Ueneficiarv or Trustee, and should llenefuiarv or Trustee elect to 
also appear in or defend anv such action or proceeding, to pay all cost* and exfiense*. including cost of evi-
dence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee 
JA*> T O pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessment* affectinc said property, including 
all assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and chances for water, appurtenant to or 
used in connection with said property; to pay. when due. all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, 
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all cosU. 
fees, and expenses of this Trust. 
6. Should Trustor fail to make Mny payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or 
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing 
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may 
deem necessary to protect the security hereof. Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized lo enter upon said 
property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase, contest, or compromise any 
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in ex-
ercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem 
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees. 
7. To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, 
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid, and the repay-
ment thereof shall be secured hereby. 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement 
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary shall be 
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option 
to commence, appear in and prosecute in it* own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compro-
mise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. AH such compensation, awards, damages, rights 
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property, 
•re hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney s fees, 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any 
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require. 
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and pre-
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and 
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indehtednes* secured hereby. 
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property: lb) join in granting any ease-
ment or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed 
or the lien or charge thereof, id) reconvey. without warranty, all or any part of said property The grantee in 
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or |»ersons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any 
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustees 
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
10. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all 
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property 
located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per-
formance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rente, issues, royalties, 
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable If Trustor shall default as aforesaid. 
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without 
taking possession of the property effected hereby, to collect alt rente, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or 
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to tune to collect any such moneys shall not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. 
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be. or be construed to 
be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a 
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in 
person, by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment ol 
Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or 
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, leas 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorneys fees, upon any indebtedness 
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
12. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collecton of such rents. i**ue*. • « * 
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking dr 
damage of »mid property, and the application or release thereof as sforesaid. shall not cure or waive any 
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
IJf The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as 
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other 
or subsequent default 
M. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured here-
by or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due 
and payable at the option of Beneficiary In the event of such default. Beneficiary mav execute or cause Trustee 
to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligatjona 
hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or 
parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and ail documents evidencing 
expenditures secured hereby. 
15. After the lapee of such ti. at may then be required by law following recordation of said notice of 
default, and notice of default and notice of sale having been given as then required . , law. Trustee, without demand 
on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the time and place designated in Mid notice of sale, either aa 
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to 
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), st public 
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States st the time of 
sale. The person conducting the sale may. for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to 
time until it shall be completed and. in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration 
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale: provided, if the sale is postponed 
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the 
same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con-
veying sard property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the 
Deed of any matters or facte shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Bene-
ficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and 
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's 
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale end revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; 
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date 
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persona 
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County 
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums 
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceed-
ing all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be 
fixed by the court. 
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From 
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority 
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
IS. This Trust Deed shall apply to. inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees. 
devisees, adminstratora. executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and 
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor. Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trustee. 
20. This Trust Dead shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah 
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
Signature of Trustor -
TvUGfrlP . ITTMB 
MZOIMSL R« MnOGBf 
(If Trustor an Individual) 
STATE OF UTAH, 
COUNTY OFSuradLt •*• 
On the Mtfc day of **&*>. , A.D. 19...$?., personally 
appeared before me i*SE».....A. U ^ , 
the aigner(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that „.he..Y. executed the 
Notary Public residing at: 
M y Cs^!^n Expires: Sale Irf-a Oity, Utah 
(If Trustor a Corporation) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
On the ... day of , A.O. 19 , personally 
appeared before me , who being by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the of 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-iaws (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said acknowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public residing at: 
REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE 
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full) 
TO: TRUSTEE. 
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured 
by the within Trust Deed. Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust 
Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and directed, on payment 
to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said note above 
mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you 
herewith, together with the said Trust Deed, and to reconvey. without warranty, to the parties 
designated by the terms of said Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder. 
Dated. 19 
Mail reconveyance to 
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ADDENDUM 10 
FILE NO. 4914 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: Wton paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered 
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
$. 194^250.00^ . ? . ^ . „ ? i & . ? . . . y ^ 
March 10 ,
 19 82 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
D.C. ANDERSON as to an undivided one-half interest and DAN SCOTT as to an 
undivided 1/2 interest 
together with interest from date at the rate of ?5^££™?. per cent (.^.:.9..%) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY SIX AND 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25) towards 
interest only on the 10th day of April, 1982, and a like amount to interest 
on the 10th day of each and every month thereafter to and including January 
10, 1985. 
The entire unpaid principal, together with interest is due on January 25, 1985. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal Any 
i installment not paid when due s 
cent (JiL.Q.%) per annum until paid. 
such hall bear interest thereafter at the rate ol.~~~£}. per 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
1 / 1 . 
EUGENEE. DGMS 
BLANK NO. 813 © OCM *TC. CO. — 3219 so. 2«oo CAST — SALT urn* cmr 
ADDENDUM 11 
VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY 
ESCROW DEPARTMENT 
P.O. BOX 450 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110 
(801) 481-5396 
April 6, 1990 
Nygard, Coke & Vincent 
Irving H. Biele 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103-1215 
Re: Contract # 001-00624 
Dear Mr. Biele: 
Enclosed is a History of the payments received on the 
above contract in 1982, 1983, and 1984, and a History showing 
no payments were received in 1985. 
I have verified at the bottom of each of the Histories 
that they are a true and correct statement of the payments we 
received. 
If you need anything further, please contact me. 
^Jery truly yours, 
ng 
Assistant Vice President 
jc 
Enclosures 
MEMBER FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 
NAME; G(- BUYER X / 1 / J / / 
OR MAKER EU.GEHE...Z..-I3.0KS AMn...MICHAEl...R.....MC....CQY. _.<<?..- kD^cJ^ 
ADDRESS- ^ ^ l O g g ^ L ! ^ . . ^ 1 7 5 ? 0 ° -"-ITA VOMICA CAL" 90WU5 fr,.6fc, 3 p 4 • A W . A , ^ 
SELLER OR PAYEE £aeu7AMDERSGM--«HW>AM-SCaXS — — _1U; 
ADDRESS „..*^*r„.SI...MAEYS...J}IL.SL.„C....U.IAH aW.Q.8. 
DESCRIPTION: NOTE K... REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OTHER _ . „ 
DOCUMENT DATED ! l l 0 . . 9 . ! ! ORIS. AMT. S . i ^ ' ^ O C ^ $.H^..?1°_:.?.?. Int. .t i ! A Paid to . . - ! : !? . : . „... 19 = 
In monthly pvmts commencing 4-10-82 in« the amount of $2,266.25 as interst or. 
Principal. Interest.- etc.. p a y a b l e i £ S ^ . J f f i j L i i J [ c i ! ^ . 
35. 
Collection Fee.. Dote Received by VALLEY BANK Alfo TRUST COMPANY JASB^M.. 
*$"i45V82~"'s£l^eFKing Bank # 7 3 - 0 2 / ^ ^ ^ r o s P e c t o r De^* Co.J ; and"$Y,06o722**VBST 
CREDIT PROCEEDS TO#l£L 
Sheridan Wyom. 82801 Dan Scott 
OTHER INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS: 
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I (We) hereby acknowledge receipt of oil documents described above ond of oil turn* collected tfcereon by the VALLEY SANK AND TRUST COMPANY, ond 
hereby release said bonk from oil further liability for said collection. 
Dated.. ... 19 
nix 
THE VALLEY 3A."JKS 
ESCROW INTEREST INCOME STATEMENT 
ESCROW # 0524 / ORDER * 10-10524 
THE VALLEY 3ANKS 
P.C ECX 450 
TRUST DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84: 
ELLEN ANDERSON 
DAN SCOTT 
2134 ST MARYS DRIVE 
SLC UTAH 341 OB 
FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF EACH INSTALLMENT RECEIVED ON I'OUR ESCROW 
FOR THE YEAR ie&S; THIS REPORT WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH DETAILS OF 
INTEREST INCOME FOR THE YEAR. PLEASE KEEP THIS FOR YOUR RECORDS. 
NOTE: IF YOU HAVE SOLD/PURCHASED THIS ESCROW DURING THE PAST YEAR, PLEASE 
INCLUDE ONLY THOSE PAYMENTS WHICH YOU ACTUALLY RECEIVED OR PAID. 
CURRENT YEAR PAYMENTSi 
-*- -DUE-
1. 12/10 
2. 01/10 
3. 02/10 
4. 03/10 
5. 04/10 
6. 05/10 
7. 06/10 
3. 07/10 
9. 0S/10 
10. 09/10 
11. 10/10 
-FO- -
03/08 
Oa/27 
04/27 
07/0B 
07/08 
08/16 
06716 
10/24 
10/24 
12/15 
11/15 
-AR0UNT • 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
-INTEREST— 
2266.25 
2246.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
-RESERVES— • 
0.00 
0.00 
coo 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.0C 
* r ««rifi^ i« A uu " ~ 
0*00 
coo 
0»00 
0.00 
0*00 
M Aft 
j .00 
0.00 
0.00 
y* vv 
0.00 
•PRUCIPtt.-
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3.30 
o.oc 
-HEH PRIfC.-
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250,00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
1*4250.00 
194250.00 
-HEW dNPAID-
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Q.OO 
COO 
0.00 
coo 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
coo 
TOTALS: 24926.75 24928.75 0.00 0.00 COO 
TOTAL INTEREST INCOME FOR THE YEAR: 2 4 5 2 S . , 
I c e r t i f y that the above l i s t i ; 
of payments is a true and corn 
statement. 
C7 
THE VALLEY Bfiftks 
E S C R 0 U H I S T O R Y P R I N T 
eSCSCW * 06Z4 / ORDER » 10-00624 AS OF 2 / 3 U W * 
2. SELLER INFORMATION: 
1. LAST HARE....ANDERSON 
2. FIRST NARE...ELLEN 
3. ADDRESS-1....DAN SCOTT 
4 . ADDRES3-2....2134 ST KARYS DRIVE 
5 . CITY ST I I ? . , S L C UTAH 84103 
3 . BUYER IhiFOPIViTION: 
1. LAST NAHE....BCHS 
2 . FLSST NAFtE...EUGENE E 
3 . ADDRE33-1....MCHAEL R HCCOY 
4 . a » R E S S - 2 - . . P 0 BGX 3614 
5 . CITY ST ZIP..HISSIOH VIEJO CA 92690 
4 . PAYEE INFORMATION: 
-» - -LAST NAflE 
1 . ANDERSON 
2 . SILVER KING BANK 
CHECK » ' S i 1:26736 
3 . i^ B&T CHEEKING ACCT 
CHECK « ' S : 1:26787 
4 . BANK OF COMMERCE 
CHECK «'S: 1:26738 
5. ESCROW FEES 
CHECK «'S: 1:2673? 
-PUT AMOUNT- -PENALTY-— 
{ADVISORY) 0.00 
- -FIRST MADE ADDRESS flEDUHT N U M B E R -
ELLEN DAN SCOTT 
2134 ST MARYS DRIVE 
SLC UTAH MIOS 
PROS?ECTGRS«73022233 144.31 0.00 
2:32424 3:32423 4;32432 5:27174 6:37178 7:3910? 8:40999 9:*3649 10:49426 11:49430 
27 117545 ANDERSON 1055.22 0.00 
2:32425 3:32429 4:22433 5:37175 6:37179 7:39110 8:41000 9:43650 10:4942' 11:49421 
J SOUTH RAIN «0-0608-7 1055.22 0.00 
SHERIDAN UY B28G1 
2:22426 3:32420 4:22434 5:37176 6:37180 7:39111 6:41001 9:43651 10:49428 11:49432 
30001S181 11.00 0.00 
2:32427 3:22431 4:22435 5:37177 6:27131 7:39112 3:41002 9:43652 10:49429 11:49433 
•t EXCESS— 
0.00 
50.30 
0.00 
TOTALS: 2266.25 COO 100.00 
. CONTRACT INFORMATION: 
1. CONTRACT DATE.,.03/10/32 
2. INT BEGIN DATE..03/10/82 
3. POT BEGIN DATE..04/10/82 
4. INITIAL ART... 
5. INTEREST RATE. 
6. UNPD INT SEP..Y 
7. P+I AMOUNT..,. 
194250.20 3. PENALTY CDDE..C 
18.0000 9. BEGIN YR BAL.. 194250.00 
10. BEGIN YR UNPD, 0.00 
2266.25 11. ESCROW CODE...C 
12. NEXT DUE DATE..11/10/.33 
13. NEXT LATE DATS.00/00/00 
14. If" PAID THRU..10/10/85 
6. CURRENT 
-«- -DUE? 
1. 11/10 
2. 12/10 
3. 01/10 
4. 02/10 
5. 03/10 
6. 04/10 
7. 05/10 
3. 06/10 
9. 07/10 
10. 08/10 
11. 09/10 
YEAR PAYMENTS: 
-PAID- -AHGUNT-
01/26 
04/16 
04/16 
04/16 
06/21 
06/21 
07/18 
08/15 
10/01 
12/31 
12/31 
-INTEREST RESERVES PENALTIES- -PRINCIPLE-- -NB» PRINC.- -NEW UNPAID-
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
2266.25 
T0T&L3: 24928.75 24923.75 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
o.oo 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.C0 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
194250.00 
1?4250.00 
194250.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
ti. CONTROL INFORMATION: 
1. LOCKED N 
2. EXPLANATION.. 
SETUP DATE...12/03/82 
LAST CHANGE..05/30/e5 
LAST COUPON..02/10/85 
PRINTED ON...02/10/84 
3. EXPIRE BATE..01/10/85 
4. EXPIRE CODE..00 
5. FLAGS........ 
6. NOTZS-1...... 
7. NOTES-2.....• 
I certify that the above listing of 
payments is a true and correct statemer 
Vice President 
THE vALLEY WsttS 
S S C R O J J K I S T G S Y P S I N T 
ScwfflH « 0624 / i&DEt « 10-0U*2« A!S Or 12 /31 /85** 
2 . SELLER IHFORHATIOit 2- BUYER IS^FORTKTIGw: 
1 . LASTNAKE....ANDERSOM 1. LAST H H l S . . . . 2 0 5 
2 . FIRST HAKE...ELLEN 2 . FIRST K£fS...SJG£KE £ 
3 . A0DRESS-1....5Afc SCDTT 3 . ADDRESS-i...MICHAEL R .'CCOY 
4 . ADDRES8-2....2134 37 BASKS DRIVE 4 . AMRE33-2. . . . ?G BOX 3614 
5 . CITY ST 2 P . . 2 L C UTAH 34108 5 . CITY 3T ZIf.,.TiI£SIOfl vIEJO -A v2i<?C 
4 . PAYEE INF2RRA7IDH: 
- « - -LAS" NATE FIRST NAHE ABCRSS aCUUHT NUffflS f W APSUNT- -PENALTY % IXCESS--
1 . ANDERSON ELLEK DAN SCOTT (ADVISORY) 0,00 :.:*. 
2.34 ST BARTS DRIVE 
SLC 17AH 34105 
2 . SILVER KING BANK l*G=?EC70RS873C'222S2 I44.il 0.00 CK 
3 . UBiT CHECKING ACCT 27 117545 ANDERSON 1055.22 O.CC 50.CC 
4 . BANK DF CDHTERCE 4 SOUTH I1AIH *O-Oc0c-7 1035.22 3 .00 5O.0C 
SHERIDAN UY S2SC1 
5 . ESCROW FEES 300212131 11,00 0.00 0, : ; : 
TOTALS: 22i*.25 0,0D . .100.5 ' . 
5 , CONTRACT IMFDFtfJATIOHt 
1 . CSKTRACT DATE. . .03/10/82 4 , INITIAL A m . . . 1*4250.30 ft. PE*L7Y CQDE..0 1 2 . >£<T SUE DATE..12/1Q/34 
2 . INT SSGIN DATE. . 0 3 / 1 0 / 8 2 5 . INTEREST RATS, 16.0000 9 . BSSJN YR BAL.. 1V4Z50.00 1 3 . NEXT LATE DATE.00/00/00 
3 . P W BESIH DATS..04/10/82 6 . UNPB INT a E r . . Y 10. 3E3IN YR UHFD. 13921.25 14 . 2ff PAH THRU..12/1S/6* 
7 . P+I AflQUff.... 2913.7S 2 1 . ESCROW C0DE.. .0 
a . CURRENT YEAR WffRSNTS: 
•:MD PRWSNTS LISTED) 
. 3 . CGNTKL IMFCRKATICN: 
1 . LOCKED...... . ,N Z, Sir'IRE Jfi?£..Si/l(j/S5 
2 . EXPLANATION.. 4 . EXPIRE CODE..00 
SETUP DATE... 12 /02 /32 5 , FLAGS 
LAST CHANGE..04/21/84 
LAST CDUPDN. . 0 3 / 1 0 / 8 6 6 . NWES-1 . . . . . . 
PftlKTSD 0 N . . . C £ ' 2 2 / a 5 7 . HCT2S-S 
I certify that there were no payments received 
in 19f" 
g, Assistant//ice President 
ADDENDUM 12 
Enir. No 
"2SU 
""J^ I ^CUEIST OF WgTIgN37ATP^T^r WJJEN RECORDED, J1AIL TO: 
^ S L / 1 ^ O T T ^ M *FHW\ Space Above for Recorder's Use 
RECORDED SEP 
: DEPOSITION 
§ EXHIBIT^ 
i\/lD 
W A R R A N T Y D E E D 
MICHAEL R MC COY and EUGENE E. DOMS 
of Salt Lake 
, grantors 
,State of Utah, 
hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC, 
of Salt Lake , County of Salt Lake 
for the sum of TEN 
. grantee 
,State of Utah, 
DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Summit County, State of Utah, 
to-wit: 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, 
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in 
the office of the-Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City 
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting 
therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of way 
as described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No, 
817C in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 
326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit 
County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in 
the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described in 
those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at 
Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 
13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sever and water 
lines over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the 
following described lots. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey 
according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in* the 
office of the Summit County Recorder. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this^Pday of 0*^\ #1951 
Signed id the^ rf?ps-&aca of 
npn 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
MM 273*A5E£3d 
County of «3. C • ^ ) ^ , 
On the 7 o dayv of &*~T-~*T 
personally appeared before* me %***M~^t-^ 
the signer* ..of the . above, instrument, 
that v^^kAjexecuted the same. 
Notary--PTro\3)c. "•
 ;- \ . 
My commission expires- L-~T~4 ^5t$~" Residing in *2^<~.C' ,>CL>«-
o duly acknowledged tg me»" "'-V 
A* * 
' 7 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County cf Summit ) 
t. AJ2* 5prigg3. County Recorder in and lor Summit County. State of Utah, 
do htfieby certify thai the attached aforegoing * a fufl, truo and correct copy 
of dial certain ^ ^ ^ ^ T Aj>U^t 
which anpoars of record in my office In Ecofc ^ 7<3*~ • P a 9 * J^-^^" 
being Cntry Kz.^^/se £ ^i-
\H WITNESS WHEREOF, t have hereunto est my *-
officii siai. mis /^x^MJay of U.^^-^,'-/? f ? 
hand and affixed my 
2-, / . ^ J. /^A-JQUMSZ-
Sum.nJ County Recorder (J 
ADDENDUM 13 
March 15, 1985 
Mr. Eugene E. Doms 
Domcoy Enterprises Inc. 
23276 South Pointe Dr. 
Suite 204 
Laguna Hills, CA 92653 
Dear Gene, 
Pursuant to our discussion and verbal agreement, I hereby irrevocably tender to 
you all voting rights for all my shares of stock in Domcoy Enterprises Inc, a Utah 
corporatioa I willingly take this measure to ratify the indemnification 
agreement I exercised in your favor in the lawsuit commonly known as Park City 
Investors I v. Cen Corp., et al (or Park Avenue Central). 
This revocation of my voting rights is to allow you to freely make those business 
decisions necessary to insure the continuity and viability of Domcoy as a 
business entity in light of my current legal and business situation. 
This agreement will continue until you and I mutually agree to the return of my 
stock voting rights. 
Very Truly Yours, 
cc: Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq. 
March 15, 1985 
Mr. Eugene E. Doms 
23276 South Pointe Dr. 
Suite 204 
Laguna Hills, CA 92653 
Dear Gene, 
In order to show my support of the business decisions of my husband, Michael 
R. McCoy, and per his request, I irrevocably tender my stock voting rights to 
you under the same terms as outlined in Michael's letter of March 15, 1985 in 
regards to this matter. 
Very Truly Yours, 
Marguerite McCoy 
cc: Gerald H. Klnghorn 
attch. 
MICHAEL H. MoCOY 
TAX ANO f O l ESTATE ATTOHNEV 
88089 DOROTHY DOVE • SUITE 108 • AGOURA HUB. CA 81301 
Eugene E. Doms 
PO Box 3614 
Mission Viejo, CA 92690 
t w w it re *»*-»» 
ADDENDUM 14 
Edward S. Sweeney (3168) and 
J. Peter Mulhern (3667), of 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-1666 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal 
representative of the estate of 
D. C. ANDERSON and DAN SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
EUGENE E. OOMS and MICHAEL R. 
McCOY, 
Defendants. 
,
 |M|||| ^K> 
0«ou«r Ctets * 
Pla in t i f fs complain of Defendants and for cause of action allege: 
1 . P la in t i f f , Ellen Anderson, is a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. Ellen Anderson became Personal Representative of the estate 
of D.C. Anderson by court order dated November 30, 1982. 
2. P la in t i f f , Dan Scott, is a resident of Sheridan County, 
State of Wyoming. 
3. Defendants are both residents of Orange County, State of 
Cal i fornia. 
4. On or about March 10, 1982, defendants executed a Note 
pursuant to which they promised to pay "D.C. Anderson as to an undivided 
one-half interest, and Dan Scott as to an undivided one-half interest" 
$194,250.00. A true and correct copy of that Note is attached hereto as 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. ? 3 3 9 
OOOOOi 
Exhibit "A". The outstanding principal balance on that Note is 
$194,250.00 which principal balance is currently due and owing. Defendants 
have fai led and refused to pay p la int i f fs that amount. 
5. In addition to the principal due and owing under the Note 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A", interest payments of $2,266.25 per month 
for the months of November, 1984, December, 1984 and January, 1985 are now 
past due. Defendants have fai led and refused to make those interest 
payments to p l a i n t i f f s . Defendants are therefore indebted to p la int i f fs in 
the amount of $6,798.75 for past due interest payments. Defendants total 
indebtedness to p la in t i f fs for the principal amount: due under the Note 
together with past due interest payments is therefore $201,048.75. 
6. The Note attached hereto as Exhibit "A" provides that a l l 
past due payments under that Note shall bear interest at the rate of 
eighteen percent (18%) per annum. 
7. The Note attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is secured by a Trust 
Deed dated March 10, 1982. A true and correct copy of that Trust Deed is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B". The Trust Deed attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B" covers the property in Summit County, State of Utah, which is ful ly 
described as follows: 
PARCEL NO. 1 ; 
All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 
29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to 
the amended plat thereof, as f i l ed and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: 
All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey, according 
to the amended plat thereof, as f i led and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom 
any portion located within the railroad rights of way as 
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 
"
2
- 000002 
8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at 
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records 
of Summit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: 
All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to the 
Amended Plat thereof, as f i led and of record in the'off ice 
of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of way as 
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 
8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at 
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records 
of Summit County, Utah. 
TOGETHER WITH AN EASEMENT FOR UTILITIES, INCLUDING SEWER AND 
WATER LINES OVER THE SOUTHERLY FIVE FEET AND NORTHERLY FIVE 
FEET OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED LOTS. 
All of Lot 14, and the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park 
City Survey according to the amended plat thereof as f i led 
and of record in the office of the Summit County Records. 
8. Plaint i f fs have elected to foreclose the Trust Deed Note and 
Trust Deed attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B" as a note and mortgage 
pursuant to paragraph 16 of the Trust Deed and the Utah Code. 
9. Other than the above captioned matter, p la int i f fs have 
commenced no action to collect the sums owing from defendants• 
10. The Trust Deed and Note attached hereto provide that i f the 
Note is collected by an attorney defendants wi l l pay a l l costs of 
collection, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
11 . Pla int i f fs have had to retain an attorney and incur 
attorneys fees to collect the sums due from defendants. 
WHEREFORE, p la int i f fs pray for re l ief as follows: 
1 . For a judgment against defendants, joint ly and severally, in 
the sum of $201,048.75, together with interest thereon at 18% per annum 
from January 25, 1985 until paid. 
-3 - n f i n f * c -
2. For costs including reasonable attorney's fees. 
3. For a determination that p la in t i f fs 1 interest in the subject 
property is superior to the claims of al l defendants. 
4. For declaration that the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed 
attached hereto as Exhibits "A11 and "B" are to be treated as a note and 
mortgage and for an order authorizing and directing that they be 
immediately foreclosed and that the subject property, or so much thereof as 
may be necessary, be sold as provided by law to satisfy the amounts prayed 
for , including costs and attorney's fees. 
5. For a judgment for any deficiency which may remain owing by 
defendants to p la int i f fs after the property is sold and the proceeds duly 
applied to the costs of sale, attorney's fees, costs of this action, and 
the principal and interest remaining unpaid on the Note attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A". 
6. For an order that a l l persons claiming an interest in the 
subject property have the r ight, upon producing satisfactory proof of 
interest, to redeem the property within the time provided by law for such 
redemption, and that after the expiration of the period of redemption as 
provided by law, defendants and a l l persons claiming by, through, or under 
them are forever barred and foreclosed of a l l r ight, t i t l e , and interest in 
and to the subject property. 
7. For such further rel ief as the Court deems just . 
DATED this Sjjk day of QZ*€s*^ 1985. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
3 7 PETER MULriEfcrt — 
-
4
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Pla in t i f fs ' Address: 
Ellen Anderson 
2134 St. Mary's Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Dan Scott 
Box 297 
Dayton, Wyonring 82836 
S0G000 
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FILL: NO. 4914 
Exhibit "A" 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing some, must be wrrendei^ d 
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
$.. i9jit25o%oo wJPi^?.J&?y.!...5Sft 
March 10,
 1 t t 82 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
D.C. ANDERSON as to an undivided one-half interest and DAN SCOTT as to an 
undivided 1/2 interest 
....j^^Ham^^lONCT FOUR THOUSAND TOO HUNDRED FIFTST & NO/IQQQT
 T AR<. tf 194,250.00 ^  
together with interest from date at the rate of .555^S£3 per cent (±Z.zP...%) per annum on 
me unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTC SIX AND 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25) towards 
interest only on the 10th day of April, 1982, and a like amount to interest 
on the 10th day of each and every month thereafter to and including January 
10, 1985, 
The entire unpaid principal, together with interest is due oh January 25, 1985. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any 
a installment not paid when due si 
cent (.18 .0.%) per annum until paid. 
such shall bear interest thereafter at the rate o f . f r r ~ ~ r , per 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, ax ia 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in me payment of principal or interest, either with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointiy and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
a reasonable attorney s fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or nrviffiffH'»"« that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
• L A N K NO. 8 1 3 O ««« T O . CO. — »*i» •©. a*oo BA«T — SALT L*«C CITY 
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WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: IRECO* 0-0 T'^'^TZ ?*,* ^ ^ ^ - ^ 
Valley Bank & Tmst | *&-*.-. >T
 c f . gUM^ICO, JlTLE . 
5 P.D-03 - 2iiT ^> Trf'-''-^--
*c/o Dave Bennett - Ttust"i>epw. !"-5 . ^ W^-« .Y «.c*s* -^M-Trn ~^~~ 1 
*"""*" * " Space Above This Line tor Kedordui^  UJL-SIC, Utah 34111 
Exhibit "B" TRUST DEED 
With Assignment of Rents 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this ...10th
 d a y 0f March. 19.. 82 
between &X£ttJZ.^ 
, as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is .2.?5?..?>cean Park B^ 
(Strwrt an4 number) (City) (3t»U) 
- . S U £ ^ . C Q U O T ^ as TRUSTEE/ and 
£*C.,..ANJ£S$^..a^ 
Uncllv34ed^l/2..ijatex3est. , as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in Sunmit. 
County, State of Utah: 
PARCEL NO. 1: A l l of Lots 17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31 
and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to the amended 
p l a t thereof, as f i l e d and of record i n the o f f i ce of the 
Sunmit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2 : A l l of Lots 17 and 19 , Block 59, Park City Survey, according 
t o the amended p la t thereof, as f i l ed and of record i n the 
o f f i c e of the Sunmit County Recorder, excepting therefrom 
any part ia l located within the railroad r ights of way as 
described i n those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 
8176 i n Book C a t Page 401, Entry No. 13316 i n Bock H a t 
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 i n Book H a t Page 373, records 
of Sunmit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3 : A l l of Lot 18, Block 59 , Park City Survey, according t o the 
Amended Plat thereof, as f i l e d and of record i n the o f f i ce of 
the Sunmit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion 
located within the rai lroad r ights of way as ripyTihflri i n 
those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 i n Book C 
a t Page 401, Entry No. 13316 i n Book H at Page 326, and Entry 
No. 13610 i n Book H a t Page 373+ records of Sunmit County, Utah. 
T0GEIHE2* KITH AN EASa©JT FOR UTILITIES, INCLUDING SEWS* AND VMER LINES OVER 
THE SOUTHERLY FIVE FEET AND NCE3HERL? FIVE FEET OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED LOIS. 
A l l of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of l o t 15, Block 58, Park City Survey according 
t o the amended p l a t thereof as fP*** and of record i n the o f f i ce of the Sunmit 
County Records. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and ail water rights, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of S 19.4,250.00 , made by 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein 
set forth, and anv extensions and /or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of* Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
•NOTE: Trustee must be a member of the Utah SUte Bar; a bank, building and loan association or savings 
and loan association authorised to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah. 
BOOKM .15 PA lA^O 
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TO PROTECT T. - SECURH . J F THIS TRUST DEED. TRUSTOR AGRt.~S. 
1. To keep laid property in rood c 'ion and repair; not to remove or demolish any buildinf eon. to 
complete or restore promptly and in . and workmanlike manner any building which may he .ructed. 
da roared or destroyed thereon: to coo. with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting aaid pi . <rly; not 
to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or |>ermit any act upon said property in..vio3atJuajjCu' law:*to 
do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be reasonably in 11 SJSSSI.I we specific 
enumerations herein not excluding the general; and. if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof is being ob-
tained for the purpose of financing; construction of improvements on said properly. Trustor further agrees: 
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursui* same with reasonable diligence to completion 
in accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all tunes during construction. 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default 
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept as true and conclusive all facts and state-
ments therein, and to act thereon hereunder. 
2. To provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amount* a* Beneficiary may require, on 
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said pmfierty. Such in»urancc »hali lie carried 
in companies approvvd by Beneficiary with loss payable riau>«*» in fa\»»r of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary. 
In event of loss. Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may make proof of lun*. and each insurance 
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment for such Uisa directly to Honeficiary 
instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance proceeds, or any part thereof, may be applied 
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or U* the restoration or repair ot 
the property damaged. 
3. To deliver to. pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, 
such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts ol title or policies of title insurance and 
any extensions or renewal thereof or supplements thereto. 
4. To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to 
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee: and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to 
also appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evi-
dence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee. 
5. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, including 
all assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and •charges for water, appurtenant to or 
used in connection with said property: to pay. when due. all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, 
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay aU costs. 
fees, and expenses of this Trust 
6. Should Trustor fail to make any :>ayment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or 
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing 
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may 
deem necessary to protect the security hereof. Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said 
property for such purposes: commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase, contest, or compromise any 
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in ex-
ercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem 
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees. 
7. To pay immediately and without demand ail sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, 
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10Tc) per annum until paid, and the repay-
ment thereof shall be secured hereby. 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement 
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary snail be 
er.titl-d to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option 
to commence, appear in and prosecute m its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compro-
mise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rifhta 
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property, 
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's (ten, 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any 
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require. 
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and pre-
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and 
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby. 
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any ease* 
ment or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed 
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part of said property. The grantee in 
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto**, and the recitals therein of any 
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's 
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
10. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, ail 
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property 
located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per-
formance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties. 
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid. 
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without 
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect ail rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or 
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. 
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be. or be construed to 
be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor mn assumption of liability under, nor a 
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in 
Sprson. by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of eneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security fcr the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or 
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profit*, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness 
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
12. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collecton of such rents, issues, and 
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or 
damage of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any 
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
13. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as 
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other 
or subsequent default. 
14. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured here-
by or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due 
and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such default. Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee 
to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations 
hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or 
parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the now and all documents evidencing 
expenditures secured hereby. 
B00KM215PAGEA51 
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15 After the lapse of «***» time »s rk -hen be required by law following the recordation of said ice of 
default and notice of default and notice of s*.w having been given as then required by law. Trustee; without demand 
on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the lime and place designated in said notice of sale, either as 
a whole or in separate parce**< **<* in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to 
direct the order in which such property. i( consisting of several known Jots or parcels, shall be sold), at public 
auction to the highest bidd*r* *"* purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the Ume of jajt The person conducting the **** may. for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the tsle from time to 
time untd it shall be competed and. in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration 
thereof by such person at the tune and place last appointed for the sale: provided, if the sale u postponed 
for longer than one day b«y0**i the day designated xn the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the 
same manner as the orig"*ai notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con» 
vevinc said orooerty so sdW. but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the 
Deed of any matters or fa*t» *hall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Bene-
ficiary may bid at the sal«- Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (I) the costs and 
expenses of exercising the power °* »1« *n<4 °* the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's 
fees* (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; 
(3) ail sums expended und*r the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date 
ol «io*tvd\VUT*\ <A\ *U. <*h*< um& thet*. leoiced. heteb>fv *<«i C5\ the remainder, if any, to the person or persons 
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County 
Clerk of the county m'which the sale took place. 
16 Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums 
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mor(f*fes on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceed-
ing ail costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be 
fixed by the court 
17. Beneficiary may Appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From 
the tune the substitution i* fl*ed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority 
and title of the trustee n#med herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice (hereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
18. This Trust Deed 'hall apply to. inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, 
devisees, adminstrators executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and 
severni. The term "Beneficiary** shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed* whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular m*™ber includes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts (his Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record as provided by law, Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor. Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trustee. 
20. This Trust Deed *h«U be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah 
21. The undersigned Trustor request* that a copy of any notice 
hereunder be mailed to hi™ at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
of default and of any notice of sale 
(If Trustor an Individual) 
SrTrVTCOFUTKft.
 M COUNTY OFSunorat "• 
On the Jtott--
appeared before me ...., 
the signer(s) of the above* 
My Commission Expire*-
9-28-82 
„, AJD. 19 .J2 , personally 
Mcax 
whoril^ly acknowledged to me that .tr.Jie.y. executed the 
Notary Public residing at: 
Sa l t Lake City, Utah 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
(If Trustor a Corporation) 
On the <**y °* - ~» AJ)- 1 9 • P*»°a*lly 
appeared before me ...- i - — • w h o M"f by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the ~~ —• °' • 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) *nd said - acknowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
Notary Public residing at: 
My Cornxnission Expires: B Q Q K M 2 1 5 . M B t f t 3 i 
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ADDENDUM 15 
GERALD H. KINGHORM A 1825 
Attorney for Defendants 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 100 0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8644 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of D. C. ANDERSON and DAN 
SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. McCOY, and 
EUGENE E. DOMS, 
Defendants. 
-
v
 , - : . ^ - — & 
Eugene E. Doms hereby answers the Complaint of the""!?Iain-
tiffs on file herein and for Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs 
alleges as follows: 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
Defendant Eugene E. Doms admits, denies and alleges as 
follows: 
1. The Answering Defendant denies the allegations of 
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 on the grounds and for the reasons that 
with respect to the allegations of paragraphs 1 and 2 The Answer-
ing Defendant is without knowledge as to the truth or falsity and 
therefore denies the same; with respect to the allegations of 
paragraph 3 the Answering Defendant believes that the Defendant 
Michael R. McCoy is not a resident of Orange County/ State of 
California. 
_1
" 00004 | 
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ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 8339 
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-»arv -t iu.'-rr.: ^ ^ u n r u 
2. The Answering Defendant admits the allegations of 
paragraph 4 and alleges that the note was in consideration for a 
certain purchase of real property described more specifically in 
paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint as an integral part and 
consideration for the purchase and sale transaction wherein the 
Plaintiffs sold to the Defendant the real property described 
therein. 
3. The Answering Defendant denies the allegation in 
paragraph 5 on the grounds and for the reasons that the Answering 
Defendant is entitled to rescission of the transaction for the 
reasons stated in the Defendants Counterclaim. 
4. The Answering Defendant admits the allegations of 
paragraph 6 and 7 and denies the balance of the allegations 
contained therein. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For the Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs the Counterclaim 
of Eugene E. Doms alleges as follows: 
1. That the parties are the holders of a certain trust 
deed note executed in connection with the purchase by the Defen-
dants of certain real property in Park City, Utah, described more 
specifically in paragraph 7 of the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
2. That the parties entered into the transaction on or 
about November 12, 1981 and that in consideration of the trust 
deed note which is attached to the Plaintiff's Complaint the 
Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest executed a certain 
general warranty deed in favor of the Defendants warranting title 
-2- 000042 
011901 /3 
in the grantors thereof with the implied warranty and 
covenant against encumbrances on the property. 
3• That the grantors violated the warranty against encum-
brances in the execution and delivery of the warranty deed in 
exchange for the trust deed note by virtue of certain prescrip-
tive easements which prevented the warranty deed from passing 
clear title to the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms. 
4. Because of the violation of the implied warranty 
against encumbrances the Counterclaimant is entitled to 
rescission of the sales transaction and the return of all sums 
paid upon a tender by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs of title 
to the property described in paragraph 7 of the Plaintiffs1 
Complaint. 
5. Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms alleges that the Court 
should rescind the transaction entered by the parties, vest title 
in the Plaintiffs as the grantors or successors in interest to 
the grantors under that certain warranty deed executed by them 
and grant judgement in favor of the Counterclaimant and against 
the Plaintiffs in the amount of all sums paid by the Counter-
claimant to the Plaintiffs in a specific amount to the proven 
upon trial of the matter. 
Wherefore the Answering Defendant and Counterclaimant Eugene 
E. Doms prays that the Plaintiff's tak^nothing by the Complaint 
and that the Court award Judgment as set/forth/ ab^e, 
GEPALO^H. KING^ORN 
Attorney JofUelfendant Doms 
"
3
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM was mailed, postage prepaid, on 
the ;£?<£ day of January, 1988, to the following: 
E. Russell Vetter 
BIEHLE, HASLAM & HATCH 
50 West Broadway, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
- 4 -
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ADDENDUM 16 
NO 
LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
Attorney for Defendant Doms 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
DY. 
Clar* :r iunir;; ^juniy 
Depu^v Clark 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
Of C D . ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON personally, DAN 
SCOTT and JEAN SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and 
EUGENE E. DOMS, 
Defendants. 
ORDER REGARDING 
PROVISIONAL ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
Case No- 8339 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
-ooOoo-
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on 
Defendant Doms' objection to the Order proposed by Plaintiff 
setting aside Default Judgment and the award of attorney's 
fees in the matter. Plaintiff was represented by Irving H. 
Biehle, Esq. and Defendant Doms was represented by Larry R. 
Keller, Esq. 
000245 
After heading argument of counsel and receiving pleadings 
and memoranda Of counsel on the issue as to whether or not it 
was appropriate for the Court to have awarded all of the 
attorney's fees incurred by counsel from the on set of the 
case to the date of setting aside the Default Judgment, the 
Court orders tnat the matter shall be taken under advisement 
and considered anew once the case itself is finally disposed 
of on the merits. 
Furthermore, the Court denies Defendant Doms' Motion to 
impound the sum of $4,467.00 paid by Defendant DomsT to 
Plaintiffs1 counsel as a condition of setting aside the 
Default Judgment on June 1, 1988. The court finds that 
because this sum has already been paid, that it would be 
inappropriate for the Court to now impound it as requested by 
Defendant Doms* counsel, but once again orders that whether or 
not it was appropriate for the Court to award that sum as 
attorney's fees for setting aside the Default Judgment is an 
issue which will be reserved until the final disposition of 
the case on its merits. 
DATED this 5" day of H< ^ ,/.*/ , 1988. 
if 
BY THE COURT: 
HON. PAT B . ~BRI3 
Third Dis tr ic t Court 
- 2 -
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order, first class postage prepaid, this &jn day 
of June, 1988 to Irving H. Biehle, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 50 
West Broadway, Fourth Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84101. 
jUUn dipdi 
- 3 -
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ADDENDUM 17 
NO 
LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
Attorney for Defendant 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
:Y 
^ierx OT ^urr.rrn s^ounTy 
Depufv Clark 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ELLEN ANDERSON, Personal Re-
presentative of the Estate 
Of D.C. ANDERSON & DAN SCOTT, 
and JEAN SCOTT, his wife, and 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, 
Plaintiffs, 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY & EUGENE E. 
DOMS, 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 8339 
Defendants. 
-ooOoo-
COMES NOW Defendant, Eugene E. Doms, by and through his 
attorney, Larry R. Keller, and amends the Counterclaim 
previously filed in the above-entitled matter as follows: 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For cause of action alleged, Defendant Eugene E. Doms 
counterclaims against Plaintiffs as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiffs jointly and severally are the 
holders of a certain trust deed note executed in connection 
000102 
with the purchase by the Defendant Doms of certain real 
property in Park City, Utah described more specifically in 
Paragraph No. 7 of the Plaintiffs1 Complaint. 
2. That the parties entered into the transaction on or 
about November 12, 1981 and that in consideration of the trust 
deed note which is attached to the Plaintiffs1 Complaint the 
Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest executed a 
certain general warranty deed in favor of the Defendants 
warranting title in the grantors thereof with the implied 
warranty and covenant against encumbrances on the property. 
3. That the grantors violated the warranty against 
encumbrances in the execution and delivery of the warranty 
deed in exchange for the trust deed note by virtue of certain 
prescriptive easements which prevented the warranty deed from 
passing clear title to the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms. 
4. Due to the violation of the implied warranty against 
encumbrances and a violation of the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 57-1-12 as amplified by Utah Supreme Court 
decisions such as Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 
(Utah 1984), the Counterclaimant is entitled to rescission of 
the sales transaction and contract and the return of all sums 
paid together with interest upon a tender by the Defendants to 
the Plaintiffs of title to the property more particularly 
described in Paragraph No. 7 of the Plaintiffs1 Complaint. 
5. Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms alleges that no 
default ever occurred and the Court should rescind the 
transaction and contract entered into by the parties, vest 
- 2 -
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title in the Plaintiffs as the grantors or successors in 
interest to the grantors under that certain warranty deed 
executed by them, and grant judgment in favor of the 
Counterclaimant and against the Plaintiffs in the amount of 
all sums paid by the Counterclaimant to the Plaintiffs 
pursuant to said contract in a specific amount to be proven 
upon trial of the matter which should include interest, costs 
and attorney's fees of pursuing this rescission action. 
6. Defendant Doms purchased the property which is the 
subject of this lawsuit with the intent of developing said 
property and earning a profit from such development. 
7. The failure of the Plaintiff to deliver clear title 
prevented Defendant Doms from developing the subject property 
as planned and he is damaged thereby in an amount to be 
determined at trial, together with interest, costs and 
attorney's fees. 
WHEREFORE, the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms prays that 
Plaintiffs take nothing by the Complaint filed against him in 
the above-entitled matter and that the Court award Judgment 
against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, rescinding the 
contract and conveyance in the above-entitled matter and 
ordering Plaintiffs to repay all sums paid to them under the 
contract and conveyance including interest at the contract or 
legal rate, costs, and attorney's fees required to pursue this 
rescission action. 
- 3 -
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FURTHER, Counterclaimant prays the Court award him 
damages for lost profits, interest thereon, costs and 
attorney's fees for this inability to develop the property 
which was caused by Plaintiffs1 failure to deliver clear 
title* 
DATED this day of June, 1988. 
aLER, 
for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Amended Counterclaim, first class postage 
prepaid, this fj day of June, 1988 to: E. Russell Vetter, 
Biehle, Haslam and Hatch, 50 West Broadway, Fifth Floor, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84101. 
- 4 -
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ADDENDUM 18 
NO. 
LARRY R. KELLER #1785 
Attorney for Defendant Doms 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of"D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON personally, DAN 
SCOTT and JEAN SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MICHAEL R. McCOY, and 
EUGENE E. DOMS, 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
COMES NOW Defendant Eugene E. Doms, by and through his coun-
sel, Larry R. Keller, Esq., and files this Second Amended 
Counterclaim amending the previously filed Amended Counterclaim 
in the above-entitled matter as follows: 
COUNTERCLAIM 
For cause of action alleged, Defendant Eugene E. Doms 
Counterclaims against Plaintiffs as follows: 
1 
000237 
F I L E D 
wierx _>T summit County 
& 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 8339 
Judcre Pat B. Brian 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. That the Plaintiffs jointly and severally are the 
holders of a certain Trust Deed Note executed in connection with 
the purchase by Defendant Doms of certain real property in Park 
City, Summit County, Utah. 
2. That the parties entered into a transaction for the 
transfer of the parcel of real property more specifically 
described in Plaintiffs' Complaint on or about November 12, 1981 
and that in consideration of the Trust Deed Notef a copy of which 
is attached to Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Plaintiffs or their 
predecessors in interest, executed a certain Warranty Deed in 
favor of the Defendants warranting title in the Grantors thereof 
with the implied warranty and covenant against encumbrances on 
the property provided by law. 
3. That the Grantors violated the warranty against 
encumbrances in the execution and delivery of the Warranty Deed 
in exchange for the Trust Deed Note by virtue of certain 
prescriptive easements which prevented the Warranty Deed from 
passing clear title to the Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms. 
4. Due to the violation of the implied warranty against 
encumbrances and a violation of the provisions of U.C.A. § 57-1-12 
as amplified by Utah Supreme Court decisions such as Bergstrom v. 
Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1984), the Counterclaimant is 
2 
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entitled to rescission of the sales transaction and contract and 
the return of all sums paid, together with interest, upon a 
tender by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs of title to the pro-
perty more particularly described in Paragraph No. 7 of the 
Plaintiffs• Complaint. 
5. As a result of the failure to grant clear title to the 
property which is the subject of this lawsuit through the Warranty 
Deed, Counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms alleges that no default ever 
occurred with regard to payments due under the Trust Deed Note, 
and the Court should rescind the transaction and contract entered 
into by the parties, vest title in the Plaintiffs as the Grantors 
or successors in interest to the Grantors under that certain 
Warranty Deed executed by them, and grant iudgment in favor of 
the Counterclaimant and against the Plaintiffs in the amount of 
all sums paid by the Counterclaimant to the Plaintiffs pursuant 
to said contract in a specific amount to be proven upon trial of 
the matter which should include interest, costs and attorney's 
fees pursuing this rescission action. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
6. Defendant Doms realleges and incorporates by reference 
all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 5 above as 
though set out in full herein, 
7. Defendant Eugene E. Doms purchased the property which is 
3 
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the subject of this lawsuit with the intent of developing said 
property and earning a profit from such development. 
8. The failure to the Plaintiffs to deliver clear title 
prevented Defendant Doms from developing the subject property as 
planned, and he is damaged thereby in an amount to be determined 
at trial, together with interest, costs and attorney's fees. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
9. Defendant Doms realleges and incorporates by reference 
all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 above as 
though set out in full herein. 
10. Defendnat Eugene E. Doms discovered on June 23, 1988, 
through his attorney, that a fraud was perpetrated upon him by 
the Plaintiffs in this matter, in that Plaintiffs transferred 
title to Defendant Doms through a "Special Warranty Deed" in 
violation of the express contract and agreement that title should 
be transferred by virtue of a warranty deed without the denomina-
tion "Special" in the deed. 
11. Plaintiffs therefore breached their contract with 
Defendant Doms at the time they typed in the word "Special" in 
the form Warranty Deed in violation of the Earnest Money Agreement 
which represented the contract between the parties in the above-
entitled matter. 
12. As a result of said breach of contract, Defendant Doms 
4 
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is entitled to a complete rescission of the contract, or in the 
alternative, payment of all sums which are damages as a result of 
Plaintiffs1 breach of contract, which include all sums paid by 
Defendant Doms on said contract to Plaintiffs, plus interest, 
costs and attorney's fees relating thereto. 
WHEREFORE, Counterclaimant prays that Plaintiffs take 
nothing by the Complaint filed against him the above-entitled 
matter, and that the Court award him judgment against Plaintiffs, 
jointly and severally, rescinding the contract and conveyance in 
the above-entitled matter, and ordering Plaintiffs to repay all 
sums paid to them under the contract and conveyance, including 
interest at the contract or legal rate, costs and attorney's fees 
required to pursue this recission action, 
FURTHER, Counterclaimant prays the Court award him damages 
for lost profits, interest thereon, costs and attorney's fees for 
his inability to develop the property which was caused by 
Plaintiffs' failure to deliver clear title. 
FURTHER, Counterclaimant prays the Court award him all dama-
ges caused as a result of Plaintiffs' fraud and breach of 
contract in not supplying Defendant Doms with a general warranty 
deed as required by the original contract between the parties. 
DATED this c?<l day of June, 1988^ . 
KELLER, 
Atnorr^t for Defendant Doms 
000241 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true, correct copy of the 
foregoing Second Amended Counterclaim, first class postage pre-
paid, this 2^fh day of June, 1988, to: 
Irving H. Biele, Esq. 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, OT 84101 
Attorney for Ellen Anderson as 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of D.C. Anderson and 
Dan S c o t t 
6 
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ADDENDUM 19 
W1IEN RECORDED, MAIL TU:
 R j„ M ( , l t Atl 
C r . n t - ; DOMCOY PTTERP1MSPS THC. 2%2^9 
c/e Larry R. toller Vp^>o^--"*N*^*-*^-
2S7E. 200 S. , Suite 340. toe 10 Qg fcUG 30 AH 10*- OU 
Salt Uk« C^ty, Vrth 64111 A L A M S , , R I G S S 
SUMMIT C0UH1Y RECOROER^ 
QMT.CUIXMH0 ^ . . ^ 
SttftIT COUNT!, A Body Corporate and Politic* organized and existing under 
the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at Coalville, County 
of Sumit.State of Utah, grantor, hereby QUIT CLAIMS to P0HC0Y 
ENTERPRISES, INC.
 t Grantee 
o f ^axt i^ ane City, Utah for good and 
valuable consideration, the interest of Summit County as acquired under that 
certain tax sale in Book 1982 paee 216 j and subsequent Auditors etamp 
recorded as entry I 273536 in Book 436 peso 779 in and to the 
following described trsct of' land in Summit County, State of Utah: 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 
27, 28. 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to 
the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office of 
the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lot* J7 and 19, M*ck 59, Park Cily Survry, 
according to the aaended plat thereof, aa filed and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion 
located within the railroad rights of way as described in those certain 
documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 
13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373. 
records of Summit County, Utah* 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according 
to the Amended Plat thereof, aa filed and of record in the office of 
the Suamit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion located 
within the railroad rights of way aa described in thoae certain 
documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry 
No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book K at 
Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water lines 
over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the following 
described lots. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Psrk City Survey 
according to the amended plat thereof aa filed and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder. 
The officer who algns this deed hereby certifies that this Instrument and 
the tranafer represented hereby was duly authorised under a resolution duly 
adopted by the Board of County Commleeionere of the grantor at a lawful meeting 
duly held mnd attended by a quorum. 
Therefore, in accordance with title 59-2-1363 of the Utah Code and in 
witness hereof, the grantor has cauaed its corporate name and aeal to be here 
unto affixed by ita duly authorised County Clerk thia ^V^car of Hi/y./n I . 
A.O.. \<fd . 3 
SlffiTT C0UNTT 
By Douglas R. Geary 
Summit County Clerk OWOIIKLL*, Oliilt 
STATE OF UTAH ) J C rVOflUUfl -V> U t * , 
COUNTY OF SWtilT ) *** BOO* 4 9 1 ^ 4 0 5 
# On the J*/. day of £T<*0i*tj*' l ° i l . A.D. , personal ly appeared before me 
;..^J Peuglaa R. Coery, who being bf me duly sworn, did say, that he, the s s l d Douglas jl<*.«« 
**?" R. Gea^y. i s the Clerk of Suamit County, snd that the within and foregoing Instrument -t* / 
was signed in behalf of sa id county by authori ty of a re so lu t ion of i t s Board of 
Commissioners, and Douglas R. Geary duly acknowledged to me that sa id county executed _ 
the same and that the s e s l a f f ixed i s the s e a l of the sa id county. 
v». « J - * . j 
Notary-Public . \ '*** 
My Commission Expires *-tf */ Residing at: <*/«*.'., ^ <rA T / ^ / 
FvU^UV*. A 
ADDENDUM 20 
RED NC7E AS. 
Recorded a t Reques t of 
a t M. Fee Pa id $ 
by 
2%300 
88 AUG 30 AH 10^  0U 
Dep.Book 
^ ^ ALAN Sr'HlGGS 
Page RfJKMlT COyKlY RECORDER 
c£> 
Mail tax notice to: Grantee c/o Larry R. Keller, 257 EFr.jJ9# S.J! 
Suite 340, Box 10, Salt Lake City, UT 84T1T 
W A R R A N T Y D E E D 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, I N C , — grantor 
of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby 
CONVEYS and WARRANTS to 
EUGENE E. DOMS grantee 
of Mission Viejo, California for the sum of 
TEN and 00/100 DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Summit County, 
State of Utah: 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, 
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record 
in the office of the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City 
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting 
therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of 
way as described in those certain documents recorded as Entry 
No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at 
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records 
of Summit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record 
in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting there-
from any portion located within the railroad rights of way as 
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 
8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 
326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of 
Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water 
lines over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the 
following described lots: 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey 
according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in 
the office of the Summit County recorder. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor, thisl* day of J^uf^f , 1988. 
Signed in the presence of: 
Jean M. Henry 
Mission Viejo National Bank 
Mission Viejo, CA 92691 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
) S S , 
COUNTY OF ORANGE ) 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, I N C . , a 
C o r p o r a t i o n by/s r\ 
EUSENEVET DOMST"Secretary/ 
T r e a s u r e r and A u t h o r i z e d O f f i c e r 
The f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t was acknowledged b e f o r e me t h i s 26th 
day of August , 19_88, by Eugene E. Poms ~" 
S e c r e t a r y / T r e a s u r e r and A u t h o r i z e d O f f i c e r of Domcoy E n t e r p r i s e s , 
I n c o» r i rui . VLKX. \ 
JEAN M. HENRY J 
NOTARY fUBUC-CMIfOBWU \ 
OAAftGi COUNTY J 
M, Comm Cap A^iJ 27. 199? \ NOtAHY PUBLIC"j e aTM. hpfcy 
^ _ 
ry 
My Commission Expires A-27-92 Residing in Orange County, CA, 
too . 49iw«4G6 
ADDENDUM 21 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. — NO. 2194 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
A Utah Professional Law Corporation 
Attorneys for Petitioner Jeanne Scott 
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
*£TDFE3 S 7989 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON 
personally, DAN SCOTT and 
*JEANNE SCOTT 
Plaintiffs and 
Petitioner 
*JEANNE SCOTT IS THE ONLY 
PLAINTIFF TO THIS APPEAL 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and EUGENE 
E. DOMS, 
NONRESIDENT JEANNE SCOTT'S 
PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
DENYING HER MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR LACK OF IN 
PERSONAM JURISDICTION 
Trial Court No. 
(Summit County) 
8339 
Defendants 
litigate the original lawsuit in the Utah courts, as well as also 
litigating the third-party action against Summit County Title 
Company. 
ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION 
Jeanne Scott submits the granting of her appeal will 
materially advance the termination of the litigation, because the 
case would be finally dismissed on the merits as to her, without 
causing an innocent nonresident to expend substantial time and 
funds in litigating a case, when the court has no jurisdiction over 
her. 
DATED this 6th day of February, 1989. 
Respectfully Submitted: 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
I JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
( /Attorneys for Petitioner Jeanne Scott 
-23-
ADDENDUM 22 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
March 9, 1989 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South-10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeanne Scott, Ellen Anderson, 
as personal representative of 
the Estate of D.C. Anderson, 
Ellen Anderson, personally, and 
Dan Scott, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant, 
v. No. 890042 
Michael R. McCoy and Eugene 
E. Doms, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Ellen Anderson as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D.C. Anderson, Ellen Anderson 
personally, Dan Scott and 
Jeanne Scott, 
Third-party Plaintiffs 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Summit County Title Company, a 
Utah corporation, 
Third-party Defendant 
and Appellee. 
THIS DAY, Petition for an interlocutory appeal having been 
heretofore considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in the 
premises, it is ordered that an interlocutory appeal be, and the same 
is, denied. 
C T MA* | 5 1959 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
ADDENDUM 23 
IRVING H. EIELE, A0317, of 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Ellen Anderson as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of D. C. Anderson and Dan Scott 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, 2194 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Jeanne Scott, Personally 
Ellen Anderson, Personally 
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
Ji8rnjo,\i2?^ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the ESTATE 
OF D. C. ANDERSON 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
DAN SCOTT, Personally 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
ELLEN ANDERSON, Personally, 
Involuntary Plaintiff and 
Petitioner, 
JEANNE SCOTT, Personally, 
Involuntary Plaintiff and 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JUDGES OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH, 
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
WRIT UNDER RULE 65B(b)2 AND 
65B(b)4 (TANTAMOUNT TO 
PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS) 
Case No. 
Respondent, 
could be dismissed on routine motions relating to the statute of 
limitations, waiver and estoppel. Judicial economy requires that 
the courts enforce the laws and rules that create economy of an 
action rather than ignoring the same causing citizens and the court 
extensive time and expense before these matters can be brought to 
the attention of the Utah Supreme Court. Continuation of the 
discovery in this matter under the present pleadings will require 
depositions and discovery in several states which is only a small 
example of the costs involved. (See Petitioner Points and 
Authorities, Point 2.) 
WHEREFORE, your Petitioners and each of them pray that this 
Court issue its Writ directed to the Respondent Court and the 
Judges thereof, restraining and prohibiting the Court and the 
Judges from proceeding further in the trial of the aforesaid action 
against these Petitioners without dismissal from this action of 
those persons who are now named as Involuntary Plaintiffs or 
mandating that they be so dismissed. 
DATED this 23rd day of June, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NYGAAR COKE & VINCENT 
V « * ^ L 
* 
AttftSrney for Petitioners Ellen 
Anderson as Personal Representative 
and Dan Scott 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
^ Sst -UtsW (J • ,. 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
Attorney for Petitioners Jeanne 
Scott and Ellen Anderson, Personally 
-F 
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ADDENDUM 24 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
State of Utah } 
Vis. 
County of Salt Lake } 
I, GEOFFREY J. BUTLER, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the j53g£i*«& rendered 
Anderson v. Judges of fliird D i s t r i c t No. 890269 
in the foregoing entitled action, now of record and on file in my office. 
In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
and affixed the seal of said Supreme Court this 
the 1 1 t h 
day of Ap.ri.l A. D. 19..0©.. 
Gg.Q^X.cfty...i7.»...au.tler. 
Clerk, Supreme Court 
Deputy Clerk 
"SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
332 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
July 31, 1989 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Brant H. Wall 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ellen Anderson, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of D.C. Anderson, Dan Scott, 
Ellen Anderson, and Jeanne 
Scott, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Judges of the Third Judicial 
District Court of the State 
of Utah, 
Respondents. 
Amended Minute Entry 
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied because the 
district court has jurisdiction over both petitioners inasmuch as they 
were grantors on the deed, and both are proper parties to the 
counterclaim for recission under U.R.C.P. # 13 and 19. Further, under 
district court ruling, petitioner Scott still has opportunity to move 
for dismissal atleast as to one issue, and district court has not yet 
ruled on statute of limitations defense of petitioners to counterclaim. 
FILE 
Petition for Extraordinary 
Writ Under Rule 65B(b)4 
(Tantamount to Prohibition 
of Mandamus) 
No. 890269 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
ADDENDUM 25 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate 
of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON, personally, DAN 
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and 
EUGENE E. DOMS, 
Defendants. 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate 
of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON, personally, DAN 
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Third Party Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 8339 
NC. 
8Y. 
F I L E D 
MAY S 1 9 9 0 
Core OT Summit County 
Deputy Cart 
• 44*' -A 
This case was tried on April 17, 18, 19, 1990, at the 
Summit County Courthouse in Coalville, Utah. The plaintiffs 
004183 
ANDERSON V. McCOY PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
were represented by James A. Mcintosh and Irving H. Biele. The 
defendant Doms was represented by Larry R. Keller. Third 
party defendant was represented by Brant H. Wall. The Court 
heard the testimony of witnesses, admitted documentary 
evidence, read the Memorandums filed herein, heard oral 
argument, and took the matter under advisement. 
The Court now being fully advised, makes its ruling. 
The Court finds as follows: 
1. Defendant Doms met with Mike Sloan, a real estate 
agent, in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and purchase of 
the Rossie Hills property. 
2. Defendant Doms also met with Dewey Anderson, the 
seller of the property, once before Doms and McCoy purchased 
the property. 
3. Both Sloan and Anderson represented that the property 
was a prime piece of development property and its highest and 
best use would be as an integrated development with the two 
adjoining parcels referred to as block 62 and the Slipper 
Parcels. 
4. The plaintiffs conveyed the property to defendants 
Doms and McCoy on March 10, 1982. 
5. Defendants Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the 
Slipper parcel in October of 1982. 
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6. The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and McCoy to 
further the integrated development of the three parcels and to 
equalize their position with the developers of the Slipper 
parcel and block 62. 
7. In October of 1982 Doms engaged Mr. Kinghom, an 
attorney, for the specific purpose of closing the purchase of 
the Slipper parcel and continuing the negotiations with the 
owners of block 62 for the purpose of developing the three 
parcels as an integrated development. 
8. Prior to Doms' purchase of the Anderson parcel of 
property, Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the 
development of the three parcels of property prepared by the 
architect: Mr. Kohler 
9. Doms knew or should have known at the time he 
purchased the Anderson parcel and the Slipper parcel that the 
integrated development of the three parcels had failed because 
of the problems with the Anderson parcel and the inability of 
the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each parcel. 
10. Doms walked the Anderson property with Mr. Sloan in 
the fall of 1981 and knew that there were roads and sheds on 
the property. 
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11. Doms had actual notice of the easement encroachment 
for the first time sometime between October 22, 1981 and 
November 7, 1981 and had further notice during 1982 and up and 
through 1984. 
12. Doms did not give notice of his intent to rescind 
until January of 1985. 
13. Doms7 purchase of the Slipper parcel, the negotiations 
to develop the three parcels as an integrated development, the 
subsequent negotiations about credits and defining the problems 
with the Anderson parcel, affirm the fact that Doms had 
personal knowledge of the road and encroachments no later than 
October of 1982. 
The issue presented to the Court for decision is whether or 
not laches should apply in this matter. 
The Court has found that Doms knew of the loop road and 
the encroachments as early as the fall of .1981 and was made 
aware of the encroachments and road prior to the purchase of 
the Slipper parcel. Therefore, Doms was bound to take remedial 
action after that time. It is unbelievable that Doms would 
purchase the Anderson parcel and an interest in the Slipper 
parcel without viewing the property and determining why 
Anderson couldn't conclude the integration of the three parcels 
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for development. The Court believes that Doms was aware of the 
problems with the credits that would be allocated to each 
parcel and the problems that may be encountered as a result of 
the loop road and encroachments on the Anderson parcel, 
nevertheless, Doms purchased an interest in the Slipper parcel 
in hopes of integrating the three parcels and making his 
investment more profitable* 
The Court is of the opinion that it was not necessary for 
Doms to obtain a legal opinion that the loop road was a 
prescriptive easement or the shed and fences had a legal basis 
for being on the Anderson property before he could make his 
tender to rescind. Once Doms knew of the road and the 
encumbrances, he should have taken action within a reasonable 
time to notify the sellers of his intent to rescind or make his 
claim for damages. 
Doms contends that Eaeter v. West and North Properties, 758 
P.2d 361 (Ore. App. 1988), is the applicable law to be applied 
to the facts in this case. Eaeter stands for the proposition, 
among others that an unmaintained dirt road that showed little 
use and brush and trees had to be moved to drive on it was not 
so open or notorious that purchasers would be chargeable with 
knowledge of its existence. 
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This case is readily distinguishable on the facts because 
there is no question that the road in this case has been used 
and was being used. The aerial photograph of the Anderson 
parcel clearly defines the loop road so that there could be no 
question that the road has been and is still in use. 
The Eaeter case is also cited for the rule that the person 
seeking to rescind the contract must do so promptly after 
obtaining knowledge of the facts constituting the grounds for 
rescission. However, the buyer is not required to act 
immediately to rescind so long as he acts within a reasonable 
time. 
The Court does not agree with Doms' contention that he 
acted within a reasonable time after he obtained knowledge that 
that Loop Road and the encroachments were upon the Anderson 
property. 
Doms knew of the Loop Road and encroachments as early as 
1981 and no later than October of 1982, and yet he did not take 
any action to rescind until January of 1985, and that was by 
way of a settlement offer in lieu of making the $194,000 
payment due on January 25, 1985. 
It was not until plaintiffs' action to foreclose was filed 
that Doms filed his Amended Counterclaim in June of 1988 
seeking to rescind the warranty deed. 
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The Court concludes that Doms has waited an unreasonable 
amount of time to seek rescission, therefore, rescission is not 
the appropriate remedy in this case. 
The Court refers the parties to plaintiffs' trial brief 
that supports the Court's conclusion that rescission is not the 
appropriate remedy in this case. 
Dated this £-£> day of April, 1990. 
oJ-^. A C^JJLC/^ 
ROKICH 
CT COURT JUDGE 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT - STATE OF UTAH 
FILE NO. 8339 
V r t E : (V PARTIES PRESENT) 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as pers. rep, of ESTATE of: 
COUNSEL: t ^  COUNSEL PRESENT) 
D.C.ANDERSON, ET"AL, DAN & JEANNE SCOTT 
V 
IRVING H. BIELE, 50 W BROADWAY.4TH FL,SLC 84 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, 1399 S 700 E**fcLC 84105 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY & EUGENE E. DOMS 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE CO. 
LARRY R. KELLER.257 E 200 S-10,#340, 3LC 841 
BRANT H. WALL, 9 EX PL, #800, SLC 84111 
JOYE D. OVARD 
CLERK 
REPORTER 
BAILIFF 
HON. J, DENNIS FREDERICK 
JUOGE 
DATE. JUNE 25, 1989 
After RKQUEST FOR RULING was received and respective MEMORANDA reviewed, also OBJECTIONS 
thereto, Court rules as follows: 
1. Involuntary Plaintiffs Anderson & Scott's MOTION FOR SANCTIONS RE: DOM'S OBJECTIONS TO 
REQUESTS is granted to the extent that the discovery sought relates to real property 
transactionsCas opposed to personalty). Defendant Poms is directed to respond to the 
discovery request within 30 days of the date of this minute entry ruling. Movant is 
amount, 
granted reasonable attorney fees for necessity of bringing motionyto pe determined at 
trial, 
2. Counsel for Movants is to prepare order. 
Copies mailed i"6" Counsel as shown above 6-22-89. JO 
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21 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8 
Relief from judgment or order. U.R.C.P. 60. 
Requirements of signature. U.R.C.P. 11. 
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and 
other papers. U.R.C.P. 5. 
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P. 
65B'a;. 
Supreme Court, rulemaking power of, 
§ 78-2-4. 
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside, 
U.R.C.P. 65A. 
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.P. 
6(d). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Motions. 
—Amendments. 
Prayer for relief. 
—New trial. 
Particularization. 
—Setting aside conditional order. 
Orders. 
—Correction. 
Cited. 
Motions. 
—Amendments. 
Prayer for relief. 
Although a trial court may deny a motion to 
amend the complaint for a movant's failure to 
present a written motion and a proposed 
amended complaint, that rule does not apply to 
the prayer for relief because, under Rule 54(c), 
the prayer does not limit the relief which the 
court mav grant. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 
Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). 
—New trial. 
Particularization. 
Only purpose for requiring particularization 
of grounds for motion for new trial is to inform 
court and other party of theories upon which 
new trial is sought; where defendant filed affi-
davit with motions setting forth theories, and 
judgment had been on pleadings, court and 
parties were sufficiently advised as to grounds 
for motion. Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 
149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960). 
—Setting aside conditional order. 
Where court on own initiative lowered from 
$2,000 to $1,000 value of building as found by 
jury and entered conditional order granting 
new trial unless plaintiff consented to reduc-
tion, court could restore jury findings under 
authority of this Rule, since plaintiff filed mo-
tion to set aside conditional order for new trial 
within ten days. National Farmers' Union 
Property & Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 
286 P.2d 249, 61 A.L.R.2d 635 (1955). 
Orders. 
—Correction. 
Where judge made perfunctory or clerical 
mistake resulting from erroneous assumption 
that order prepared by counsel correctly re-
flected judgment of Supreme Court and trial 
court, judge could correct order on his own mo-
tion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 196, 
299 P.2d 827 (1956). 
Cited in Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 
Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953); Thomas v. 
Heirs of Brafifet, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 
(1956). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, 
Rules, and Orders § 1 et seq.: 61A Am. Jur. 2d 
Pleading §§ 1 et seq., 238. 
C.J.S. — 60 CJ.S. Motions and Orders § 1 
et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 63 to 210,140 et 
seq., 211 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment 
as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8 
A.L.R.3d 1361. 
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action 
as affected by opponent's motion for summary 
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
rected verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. 
Key Numbers. — Motions *» 1 et seq.; 
Pleading «=» 38 l/2 to 186, 187 et seq. 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 
shall contain ( D a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to 
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms 
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments 
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state 
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of 
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a 
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true 
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends 
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he 
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or para-
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graphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated 
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits: but, when he does so intend 
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the 
obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affir-
mative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a coun-
terclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a plead-
ing to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alter-
native and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the 
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims 
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal 
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject 
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially the same as Rule 8. F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Amended and supple-
mental pleadings, U.R.C.P. 15. 
Arbitration. § 78-3 la-1 et seq. 
Comparative negligence, $ 78-27-38. 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13. 
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1 
et seq. 
Defenses and objections. U.R.C.P. 12. 
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim, 
§§ 21-1-5, 78-6-14. 
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2. 
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10. 
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and 
brevity of statement, U.R.C.P. 84. 
Forms of answers. Forms 21, 22. 
Hearing of certain defenses before trial. 
U.R.C.P. 12(d). 
Interpleader, U.R.C.P. 22. 
Motions, forms for. Forms 20, 23. 24. 
Numbered paragraphs. U.R.C.P. 10(b). 
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2. 
Reply to answer, order for, U.R.C.P. 7(a). 
Security interest, enforceability of, § 70A-
9-203. 
Special forms of pleadings and writs abol-
ished. U.R.C.P. 65B(a). 
Statute of frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq. 
Statute of frauds, investment securities. 
§ 70A-8-319. 
Statute of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201. 
Statute of frauds. Uniform Commercial 
Code, personal property not otherwise covered, 
§ 70A-1-206. 
Third-party practice, U.R.C.P. 14. 
Time for answer, U.R.C.P. 12(a). 
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary 
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affirmative defenses. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
Pleading. 
Time limitation. 
—Avoidance. 
—Consent. 
—Election of remedies. 
—Estoppel. 
Failure to plead. 
—Failure of consideration. 
Failure to plead. 
Pleading. 
—Failure to plead. 
Affidavit opposing summary judgment. 
Denial. 
Notice and opportunity. 
Waiver of defense. 
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Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim. 
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim 
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against 
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adju-
dication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire juris-
diction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action 
was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the 
opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by 
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on 
that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 
13. 
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any 
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim. 
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or 
may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may 
claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the 
pleading of the opposing party. 
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which 
either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, 
with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supple-
mental pleading. 
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim 
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice re-
quires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment. 
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim 
any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of a 
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of 
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party 
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or 
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. 
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties 
other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete 
relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall 
order them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if juris-
diction of them can be obtained. 
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may 
be rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of 
the opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of. 
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. When cross 
demands have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one 
had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim could have been set 
up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each 
other, and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or 
death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision ij) of this rule. 
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to 
negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted against an as-
signor at the time of or before notice of such assignment, may be asserted 
against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee. 
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction. Where any counterclaim or 
cross-claim or third-party claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice's 
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such court does not have the power to 
grant the relief sought thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire 
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plaint was filed and two weeks before the 
scheduled trial date, where reasons for the un-
timely motion were inadequate and where the 
parties failed to demonstrate that the court's 
denial of the motions resulted in prejudice. 
Tripp v. Vaughn. 746 P.2d 794 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
Cited in Sen- v. Rick Jensen Constr., Inc., 
743 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
or indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20 
A.L.R.4th 338. 
Key Numbers. — Parties «=» 49 to 56. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties 
§ 188 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 72 to 84. 
A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense as-
serted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall 
so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 15, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Amendments. 
—After pretrial order. 
—Alternative to dismissal. 
Payment of attorney fees. 
Prolix complaint. 
—Amendment of response. 
—Answer. 
To include counterclaim. 
—Complaint. 
To defeat motion for summary judgment. 
To include damages. 
—Considerations. 
Prejudice. 
—Court's discretion. 
Abused. 
Not abused. 
—Dismissal without opportunity to amend. 
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| COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 62A Am. Jur. 2d Pretrial issues not fixed for trial in pretrial order, 11 
Conference and Procedure § 1 et seq. A.L.R. Fed. 786. 
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial § 17(2). Validity and effect of local district court 
A.L.R. — Failure of party or his attorney to rules providing for use of alternative dispute 
appear at pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. resolution procedures as pretrial settlement 
Propriety of allowing state court civil liti- mechanisms. 86 A.L.R. Fed. 211. 
gant to call nonexpert witness whose name or Imposition of sanctions Under Rule 16(f), 
address was not disclosed during pretrial dis- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failing to 
covery proceedings, 63 A.L.R.4th 712. obey scheduling or pretrial order, 90 A.L.R. 
Consideration or submission at trial, under Fed. 157. 
Rule 16 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of Key Numbers. — Trial *= 9(1). 
PART IV. 
PARTIES. 
Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may 
sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the 
action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or 
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action 
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection 
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, 
the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall 
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the 
real party in interest. 
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. A minor or an insane or incompetent 
person who is a party must appear either by a general guardian or by a 
guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court in which the 
action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it 
is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expe-
dient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the action or 
proceeding, notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian 
and may have appeared by the guardian. In an action in rem it shall not be 
necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might 
be a minor or an incompetent person. 
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by 
a court must be appointed as follows: 
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if 
the minor is of the age of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the 
application of a relative or friend of the minor. 
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if 
the minor is of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after 
the service of the summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so 
to apply, then upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor, or 
of any other party to the action. 
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon 
motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable 
person to be guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the defen-
dant or someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after service of 
notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such 
minor. Service of such notice may be made upon the defendant's general 
or testamentary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is 
none, such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be 
served in the manner provided for publication of summons upon such 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations 
and Clubs S§ 50. 51; 36 Am. Jur. 2d Foreign 
Corporations § 193 et seq.; 41 Am. Jur. 2d In-
competent Persons §§ 115 to 121; 42 Am. Jur. 
2d Infants $$ 155 et seq., 175; 59 Am. Jur. 2d 
Parties S§ 31, 38 to 44, 249 to 252, 255; 60 Am. 
Jur. 2d Partnership § 324. 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Associations §§ 36, 38: 20 
C.J.S. Corporations § 1828 et seq.; 43 C.J.S-
Infants S§ 108, 110; 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons 
S§ 133 to 146; 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 17, 18, 133 
to 138: 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 206 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Power of incompetent spouse's 
guardian, committee or next friend to sue for 
granting or vacation of divorce or annulment of 
marriage, or to make a compromise or settle-
ment in such suit, 6 A.L.R.3d 681. 
Insurance, proper party plaintiff, under real 
party in interest statute, to action against tort-
feasor for damage to insured property where 
insured has paid part of loss, 13 A.L.R.3d 140-
Insurance, proper party plaintiff, under real 
party in interest statute, to action against tort-
feasor for damage to insured property where 
loss is entirely covered by insurance, 13 
A.L.R.3d 229. 
State Consumer Protection Act, right to pri-
vate action under, 62 A.L.R.3d 169. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 18, F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Joinder of claims. 
—Tort, contract and equity. 
Auto accident. 
Same transaction. 
—Unrelated claims by assignee. 
Joinder of remedies. 
—Insurer and tort-feasor. 
Cited. 
Joinder of claims. 
—Tort, contract and equity. 
Auto accident. 
Where insurer of a vehicle involved in an 
auto accident filed a declaratory judgment ac-
tion seeking to void insurance policy due to 
Who is minor's next of kin for guardianship 
purposes, 63 A.L.R.3d 813. 
Bailor's right of direct action against bailee's 
theft insurer for loss of bailed property > 64 
A.L.R.3d 1207. 
Proper party plaintiff in action for injury to 
common areas of condominium development, 
69 A.L.R.3d 1148. 
Necessary or proper parties to suit or pro-
ceeding to establish private boundary line, 73 
A.L.R.3d 948. 
Necessity of requiring presence in court of 
both parties in proceedings relating to custody 
or visitation of children, 15 A.L.R.4th 864. 
Right of illegitimate child to maintain action 
to determine paternity, 19 A.L.R.4th 1082. 
Required parties in adoption proceedings, 48 
A.L.R.4th 860. 
Joint venture's capacity to sue, 56 A.L.R.4th 
1234. 
Standing to bring action relating to real 
property of condominium, 74 A.L.R.4th 165. 
Key Numbers. — Associations «=» 20, 26; 
Corporations «=» 662; Courts «=» 12; Infants *=» 
78, 80: Mental Health «=» 471 to 497; Parties *=> 
1, 2. 6, 8, 21: Partnerships <e=» 191. 
misrepresentations by the vehicle's owner in 
the policy application, and one of the defen-
dants in the declaratory judgment action coun-
terclaimed against the insurer and cross-
claimed in tort against the other defendants, in 
determining whether to dismiss the defen-
dant's counterclaim and cross-claim or permit 
their joinder, the trial court should have per-
mitted the joinder unless the insurer could 
show that it would be prejudiced because of 
bias by the trier of fact if joinder was allowed; 
trial court should not have dismissed defen-
dant's counterclaim and cross-claim on basis 
that joinder was of both tort and contract ac-
tions. Dairvland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 
737 (Utah* 1982). 
Rule 18. Joinder of claims and remedies. 
la) Joinder of claims. The plaintiff in his complaint OT in a reply setting 
forth a counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting forth a counter-
claim may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims 
either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party. 
There may be a like joinder of claims when there are multiple parties if the 
requirements of Rules 19, 20, and 22 are satisfied. There may be a like joinder 
of cross-claims or third-party claims if the requirements of Rules 13 and 14 
respectively are satisfied. 
(b) Joinder of remedies; fraudulent conveyances. Whenever a claim is 
one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been prosecuted to a 
conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a single action; but the court shall 
grant relief in that action only in accordance with the relative substantive 
rights of the parties. In particular, a plaintiff may state a claim for money and 
a claim to have set aside a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first 
having obtained a judgment establishing the claim for money. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Rule 19 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56 
— Same transaction. Joinder of remedies. 
All issues, whether in contract tort law or _ , „ , „ ,
 and tort-feasor. 
l l r r l , 8 A ^ T n ^ t W e e " Plaintiffs attempt to join defendant's insur-
two parties, may be pleaded and proved m a :! J r J ^ 
single action. Smoot v Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, ance company as a party defendant m a per-
369 P.2d 933 (1962) sonal injury action, based on insurance policy 
-Unrelated claims by assignee. providing that the insurance company "has 
Where seven different claimants assigned a * r e e d t 0 Pav a c i a i m o n i v afteT another claim 
twelve different causes of action to plaintiff for h a s heen prosecuted to a conclusion," did not 
purpose of collecting on them from a single de- come within the joinder provision of either 
fendant, and each cause of action arose from Subdivision (b) or Rule 20 Young v. Barney, 
facts unrelated to any of the other causes of 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967). 
action so assigned, the single collector-plaintiff Because there is no reason to believe the new 
was not permitted to join all of the claims rules were intended to change pnor practice of 
against defendant m one action despite the not permitting disclosure to a jury of insurance 
provisions of the rule, since the assignors could coverage in a personal injury suit, joinder of 
not have joined together and asserted their tort-feasor with plaintiffs uninsured motorist 
various claims in one action against defendant
 i n s u r e r ^ impropeT. Chnstensen v Peterson, (Rule 20(a)), and an assignee cannot possess
 25 Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447 (1971). 
anv greater rights than those possessed by his 
assignor. Stank v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 96, 404 Cited in Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 
P.2d 964 (1965). 351 P.2d 959 (1960). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Actions §§ 61 to 101. 
§§ 100 to 126. Key Numbers. — Action «=» 39 to 60. 
Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to sendee of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction oveT the 
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter 
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, mul-
tiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If 
he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he 
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, 
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue 
and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be 
dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person 
as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person 
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the 
court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's ab-
sence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties: second, the extent 
to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or 
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether 
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for non-
joinder. 
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for 
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as de-
scribed in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons 
why they are not joined. 
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of 
Rule 23. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
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Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanc-
tions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable 
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order 
compelling discovery as follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be 
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating 
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being 
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall 
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or 
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to 
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer 
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a 
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance 
with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the 
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination be-
fore he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such 
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion 
made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision 
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court 
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose 
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such 
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the 
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or 
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, 
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of 
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reason-
able expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, 
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may 
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion 
among the parties and persons in a just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a 
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to 
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, 
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Sub-
division (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order 
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others 
the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made 
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the 
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purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party ob-
taining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from intro-
ducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying fur-
ther proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an 
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders 
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders 
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless 
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such 
person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court 
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising 
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, 
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substan-
tially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit If a party fails to admit the genuineness 
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if 
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the 
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order 
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in 
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make 
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant 
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or 
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might 
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to 
admit. 
id) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to 
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under 
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before 
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper 
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under 
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper 
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may 
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision 
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall 
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless 
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other cir-
cumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to 
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party 
or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportu-
nity for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
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PART VII. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants: and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves.. 
(2) Judgment by default A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
ADDENDUM 28 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT - STATE OF UTAH 
PILE NO. 8339 
I"1 L E : I • PARTIES PRESENT) 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal rep, of Estate: 
C O U N S E L : I-/ COUNSEL PRESENT) 
IRVING H. BIELE 
of D.C.ANDERSON, ET AL 
333 N 300 W, SLC 84103 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, .SUITE 14, INTRADE BLDG, 
1399 S 700 E, SLC 84105 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY & EUGENE E. DOMS 
ANDERSON & SC0TT(3rd Party Plaintiffs) : 
v SUMMIT CO. TITUi CO. (3rd Party Defendant! 
LARRY R. KELLER, 257 TOWERS, SUITE 340, 
257 E 200 S #10, SLC 84111 
"BRlNT H. WALL, 9 EX PL,#800, SLC 84111 
JOYE D. OVARD 
CLERK HON. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
JUDGE 
REPORTER DATE AUG. 10, 1999 
BAILIFF" 
After REQUEST FOR RULING ON MOTIONS PERTAINING TO JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK'S JUNE 22, 1989 
MINUTE ENTRY RULING, REQUEST FOR HEARING OR TELEPHONE CONFERENCE and OBJECTIONS thereto having 
been filed and Court's review of MEMORANDA, Court rules as follows: 
1. Defendant Poms' MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY REQUESr 
is denied. 
2. Defendant Poms' MOTION FOR HEARING ON COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES is denied. Hearing 
as to reasonableness of fees awarded is reserved for trial. 
3. Defendant Poms' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF COURT'S MINUTE ENTRY RULING OF JUNE 22, 198' 
and REQUEST FOR HEARING OR TELEPHONE CONFERENCE is denied. 
) / 4. Counsel for Anderson and Scott is awarded reasonable Attorney Fees on the instant matte: 
to be determined at trial. 
5. Counsel for Anderson and Scott is to prepare Order. 
Copies mailed to Counsel as shown above. JO 
001968 PAGE. 
ADDENDUM 29 
E. Russell Vetter, (#4934) of 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-1666 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of ] 
D.C. ANDERSON and DAN SCOTT, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. McCOY and 
EUGENE E. DOMS, 
Defendants. ] 
> AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
1 OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) AND COSTS 
Civil No. 8339 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
E. RUSSELL VETTER, after being first duly sworn and upon oath, 
deposes and says as follows: 
1. He is a member of the Utah State Bar and in good standing. 
2. He is employed with the law firm of Biele, Haslam & Hatch and 
in such capacity has represented the above-named plaintiffs. 
3. He has undertaken effort in behalf of the plaintiffs in the 
prosecution of this matter as follows: 
DATE DESCRIPTION AMOUNT 
03/13/84 Discussion with Jerry Kinghorn attorney for parties 
who are purchasing the Rossi Hill contract from the 
Dewey Anderson Estate. (ESS) 1.00 $ 85.00 
11/08/84 Preparation of memo to co-counsel. (ESS) .25 $ 21.25 
~-f 
• *\ 
X- *-
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11/26/84 Discussion with Ellen Anderson on payment on Rossi 
Hill contracts. (ESS) .50 $ 42.50 
12/05/84 Conference with Jerry Kinghorn related to Rossi Hill 
contracts. (ESS) .50 $ 42.50 
01/17/85 Conference with Jerry Kinghorn concerning the 
January 25 payment owing the estate from Ooms McCoy. 
Review of documentation relative to easement problem. 
(ESS) 2.00 $170.00 
01/29/85 Review publishing of service by publication. (IHB) .75 $ 86.25 
02/14/85 Office conference, review f i l e . (JPM) .50 $ 42.50 
02/15/85 Going over Rossi Hi l l Doms/McCoy foreclosure with 
co-counsel . Conference with creditor of estate. 
(ESS) .50 $ 42.50 
02/15/85 Review of f i l e , le t ter to opposing counsel regarding 
encroachment dispute, assessing over-due amounts 
on contract, phone call to Valley Bank Trust Dept 
regarding over-due amounts. (JPM) 3.50 $297.50 
02/20/85 Calls to opposing counsel and Valley Bank Trust 
Dept. regarding Rossi Hi l ls contract. (JPM) .50 $ 42.50 
02/28/85 Conference with Dan Scott concerning the Rossi 
Hil l property. (ESS) .25 $ 21.25 
03/12/85 Conference with Jerry Kinghorn related to the 
Doms/McCoy transaction. (ESS) .25 $ 21.25 
03/18/85 Meeting with Jerry Kinghorn on the Rossi Hill 
property which the estate has a 1/2 interest . 
Review of Doms and McCoy's position of default by 
the estate and Dan Scott concerning transfer of 
property without encumbrances. (ESS) 1.00 $ 85.00 
03/18/85 Meeting with opposing counsel, review of plat 
maps, drafting memorandum to f i l e (JPM) 2.50 $212.50 
03/19/85 Call to opposing counsel, revisions to memo. 
(JPM) .50 $ 42.50 
03/25/85 Discussion with Mike Sloan concerning the Rossi 
Hi l ls contract (ESS) .25 $ 21.25 
04/09/85 Review of f i l e , revisions to Complaint. (JPM) .50 $ 42.50 
000030 
04/10/85 Revisions to Complaint, phone calls regarding 
service of process, preparation of discovery 
requests. (JPM) 2.00 $170.00 
05/14/85 Phone conference with t i t l e company related to 
obtaining address for Doms and McCoy (ESS) .25 S 21.25 
05/24/85 Review and direction on setting up the Complaint 
for foreclosure. (IHB) .50 $ 42.50 
05/24/85 Drafting Complaint, office conference. (JPM) 1.00 $ 85.00 
05/28/85 Review of and modifications to Complaint for 
foreclosure. (IHB) 1.00 $115.00 
05/29/85 Conference with co-counsel, revisions to Complaint. 
(JPM) 1.00 $ 85.00 
06/03/85 Meeting with Mike Sloan to go over the Rossi Hi l l 
lawsuit, in part icular , the facts surrounding the 
sale of the property to Doms and McCoy. (ESS) .50 $ 42.50 
06/05/85 Review of Complaint and approval. (IHB) .50 $ 57.50 
05/21/85 Search for documents related to deposition on 
06/24/85. (CM) .25 $ 10.00 
06/25/85 Arranging for service of process, le t te r to Los 
Angeles county sher i f f , phone call to same, 
tracing address. (JPM) 1.00 $ 85.00 
06/28/85 Phone call to Dan Scott. (JPM) .25 $ 21.25 
09/16/85 Phone call to opposing counsel. (JPM) .25 $ 21.25 
10/25/85 Conference with opposing counsel, le t ter to same. 
(JPM) 1.00 $ 85.00 
10/31/85 Phone call to opposing counsel, preparation of 
default papers. (JPM) 1.00 $ 85.00 
11/19/85 Preparation of default papers, phone call to 
Jerry Kinghorn. (JPM) 1.00 $ 85.00 
12/03/85 Phone calls to Dan Scott, Summit County Clerk 
and opposing counsel. (JPM) 1.00 $ 85.00 
01/02/86 Conference with opposing counsel. (JPM) .25 $ 21.25 
04/05/86 Review of file and preparation to file default 
judgment against Doms and to proceed against 
Michael McCoy. (ESS) 1.00 $ 85.00 
•3-
000031 
12/23/86 Preparation of le t ter to c l ien t . Review f i l e . 
(ERV) ,40 $ 28.00 
04/26/87 Review of f i l e related to status of case. Further 
review of case and discussions with court clerk 
related to status of case. (ERV) .50 $ 35,00 
04/28/87 Attorney1s conference related to strategy in 
case. Discussions with Summit County Clerk 
related to pleadings in f i l e . Preparation of 
le t te r to c l ien t . (ERV) .25 $ 17.50 
05/06/87 Discussions with James Sandal! related to pro-
ceedings in case. (ERV) .25 $ 17.50 
06/18/87 Discussions with Summit County Clerk on tracking 
down documents in case. (ERV) .50 $ 35.00 
07/02/87 Discussions with Summit County Clerk regarding 
location of documents. (ERV) .25 $ 17.50 
07/10/87 Preparation for hearing to default Doms. (ERV) .25 $ 17.50 
07/20/87 Appearance at Coalville Court for hearing on 
motion for default judgment. Discussions with 
counsel for defendants regarding resolution of 
disputes. (ERV) 2.00 $140.00 
07/21/87 Preparation of st ipulat ion. (ERV) .25 $ 17.50 
08/21/87 Preparation of default cer t i f ica te on defendant 
Doms. (ERV) .25 $ 17.50 
12/01/87 Preparation of Default Judgment and Affidavit 
in Support of Attorneys1 Fees. (ERV) 2.00 $140.00 
$3,004.25 
$ 
$ 
50, 
33, 
.00 
.00 
TOTAL 
Costs: Filing Fees 
Service Fees 
TOTAL COSTS $ 83.00 
4. In his opinion, considering the amount for which judgment was 
prayed, the time and effort involved in the matter and the time that will 
be required to enforce the judgment, that the sum of $3,004.25 is a reason-
-4-
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able attorney's fee to be allowed plaintiff in this action, plus $83.00 
as costs. 
DATED this /4 day of January, 1988. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
< /LJtfrh 
E. RUSSELL VETTER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / V ^ a y of January, 1988. 
lMl.lL A?J.Mi,*a.,x 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBjLlC <- ,
 t s . ~~ * ^ . ,-, / 
Residing at: /jdJCT JZ/LKJL C-Cuu Ut~ 
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TRVING H. BIELE, A0317, of, 
BIELE. HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys For Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-1666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of ] 
D. C. ANDERSON and DAN SCOTT ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. . ] 
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE E. DOMS 
Defendants. ] 
) SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN 
) SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
( AND COSTS 
) Civil No. 8339 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
IRVING H. BIELE. after being first duly sworn, and upon oath deposes 
and says as follows: 
1. He is a member of the Utah State Bar and in good standing. 
2. He is employed with the law firm of Biele, Haslam & Hatch and in 
5*uch capacity has represented the above-named plaintiffs. 
3. This supplemental affidavit is filed showing attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in this case since December 31, 1987, which fees and costs are as 
follows: 
uis 
ooooco 
HATE DESCRIPTION AMOUNT 
01/29/88 
03/03/88 
04/05/88 
04/29/88 
05/02/88 
05/03/88 
Discussions with court clerk of execution of 
order defaulting parties. Review of Answer 
and Counterclaim. 37.50 
Review of documentation. Call to the court 
to determine if a judgment had been filed. 
preparation of letter to opposing counsel 
indicating that our judgment was of record 
prior to his filing of the answer and 
counterclaim. Client updates. 125.00 
Receipt of Motion to Set Aside Judgment. 
Research in relation to the legal issue on 
setting aside the judgment. Preparation of 
Order of Sale and forwarding to Sheriff. 187.50 
Research on the law and preparation of a reply 
to Mr. Kinghorn's Motion to Set Aside. Delivery 
of the same to Judge Brian, the opposing counsel 
and forwarding to the Court Clerk. 462.50 
Travel to Coalville to attend hearing on Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment. Appearance in court and 
return. 275.00 
Preparation of Order pursuant to instructions of 
the Court, preparation of Supplemental Affidavit 
for Attorney's Fees, letter to Sheriff cancelling 
the sale. 125.00 
Total Fees: 
COSTS ADVANCED: 
Photo Copies: 
Long Distance Calls: 
Certified copy of Judgment and Exhibits: 
Sheriff's Fees on Order of Sale (Sale cancelled as 
result of order) 
Total Costs & Fees: 
PLUS: Costs and Fees from original Affidavit 
Total Costs and Fees expended to date: 
Page -2-
$1 . 
$1 , 
$3, 
$4, 
,212. 
13, 
3. 
150. 
r380. 
,087 
,467 
.50 
.60 
.50 
.75 
.00 
.35 
.25 
.60 
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DATED this (_/ day of May, 1988. 
SITBSCRIBED AND SWORN V±o 
LA. 
day of May, 1988. 
^pt*</ 
My Commission Expires: W'/^r 
XOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah 
/ / 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing supplemental Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees and Costs to 
the Defendant, Eugene E. Doms, by delivering the same to counsel for this 
Defendant, Mr. Gerald H. Kinghorn, at his office at 9 Exchange Place, Suite 
#1000, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 6th day of May, 
000063 
